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During the last decade, the developments in data quality and availability
have allowed researchers to study retail gasoline markets at a greater level of
detail than ever before. Economists have focused on various topics, ranging
from analyzing and explaining the substantial price dispersion that exists
in this market despite the product homogeneity to studying the specifics of
price cycles. Nevertheless, a number of questions have been left unanswered,
partly due to lack of suitable data. They range from the effects of increased
unmanned retailing on competition, the relation between risk attitudes and
consumer search, to the role of retail price recommendations and discounts in
markets with significant inter-temporal price uncertainty. This thesis aims to
fill the gap in the empirical literature on gasoline retailing by studying issues
related to structural changes in competition and price uncertainty using rich
data. More broadly, we study competition forces in retail pricing, search
behavior of risk- and loss-averse consumers, and framing prices in terms of
discounts.
First of all, this thesis focuses on the shift towards unmanned (or au-
tomated) gasoline retailing. Recently, Western and Northern Europe have
seen a large fraction of stations convert to unmanned while in some other
countries this trend has not been easily accepted and is not yet a widespread
phenomenon. For example, four regions in Spain have recently hindered the
rise of unmanned stations by adopting legislation that requires all service
stations to have at least one employee present during opening hours.1 In
1This happened on instigation of an alliance of employers, unions and con-
sumers that cited potential safety risks, job losses and barriers to people with
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Italy, Hungary, and Romania unmanned stations had a market share of less
than 1% in 2012 (Civic Consulting, 2014). On the other side of the spectrum
there are more technologically advanced retail gasoline markets in Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland with more than 50% unmanned retailers.2
Despite the increasing popularity of unmanned stations, the effects of this
structural change have not yet been quantified.
To address this question we study a retail gasoline market in the Nether-
lands where this topic received its share of media attention with reports that
local manned stations are seriously challenged by their unmanned competi-
tors.3 While Soetevent et al. (2014) show that unmanned stations are on
average 2.6% cheaper compared to their manned counterparts, so far it has
not been established what lower prices at unmanned stations mean for local
competition. Lower operating costs of unmanned stations and lower service
quality have countervailing effects on rivals’ prices. Which effect is dominant
if one looks at the prices of competitors? Moreover, we investigate whether
the locations undergoing the transformation and their competitors react to
this event in advance or with a delay. Finally, in 2005-2011 the gap between
the average highway and non-highway prices in the Netherlands has been
widening. Can this trend be explained by the growth of the unmanned retail
sector? Chapter 2 provides answers to these questions.
Second, this thesis also contributes to better understanding of consumer
search in retail markets. A survey of ANWB (Dutch automobile association)
shows that two out of three car drivers travel a couple of kilometers off-
route in order to save on gasoline.4 Besides consumer search, retail gasoline
markets are also characterized by price uncertainty that results from crude oil
price fluctuations. In order to learn more about the interaction of these two
phenomena, we focus on how changes in price uncertainty affect consumer’s
search behavior. More specifically, we study how loss or risk aversion shape
this relation.
Consumer search models typically assume that consumers are risk neu-
tral. Recently, researchers started incorporating reference-price dependence
and loss aversion into consumer behavior (e.g. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2014).
Nonetheless, so far economists have not analyzed search behavior of risk-
disabilities. Source: http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/02/06/actualidad/
1423251729 289297.html (in Spanish).
2Source: www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/134739483.html.




averse consumers. Chapter 3 attempts to fill in this gap by addressing the
following question: Do the choices of consumers who search for a product’s
best price exhibit risk-neutral, risk-averse or loss-averse risk attitudes? We
study how in a problem of sequential search with costless recall the rela-
tion between a consumer’s willingness to pay for continued search and the
level of price uncertainty depends on her risk preferences. Do models with
loss aversion fit empirical data on actual search decisions at least as well as
competing models that incorporate risk aversion? We tackle these questions
using empirical evidence from a survey designed to study consumer search
behavior.
Third, in this thesis I aim to shed more light on the use of retail price
recommendations (RPRs, hereafter) in retail gasoline markets (Chapter 4).
In the Netherlands, gasoline manufacturers announce RPRs, also known as
manufacturer’s suggested retail prices (MSRPs) or list prices. Even though
RPRs are common in many industries (cars, electronic devices, books etc.),
only recently they have come to the attention of economic theorists and
empiricists who started analyzing and rationalizing different roles of RPRs.
Theoretical explanations include a role for RPRs in coordinating optimal
pricing between manufacturers and retailers (Buehler and Ga¨rtner, 2013) or
in teasing consumers to increase their willingness to pay for a product (Puppe
and Rosenkranz, 2011). Alternatively, Lubensky (2013) suggests RPRs could
serve as an instrument for manufacturers to guide consumers searching for
lower prices. The literature lacks empirical studies that evaluate how these
alternative theories compare to the developments in the real-world markets.
Chapter 4 tries to fill this gap by providing new empirical evidence on the
interaction between RPRs and retail gasoline prices. In particular, I look if
firms simply set prices equal to RPRs as some theories (Buehler and Ga¨rtner,
2013, and Puppe and Rosenkranz, 2011) suggest. If not, what factors cause
firms to deviate from RPRs? This chapter also investigates if consumers can
extract information from RPRs about marginal cost developments. Last but
not least, I analyze if positive and negative RPR changes are symmetrically
passed to retail prices.
Finally, this thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the role of dis-
counts in the Dutch retail gasoline market.5 Retailers often show prices and
advertise discounts relative to RPRs in many industries, e.g. internet-based
retailer Amazon has been advertising discounts for many different products
5For more details, see Consumentenbond (2014) and TankPro (2016b).
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for a long time.6 This is also a common practice among gasoline retailers
in the Netherlands and Belgium.7 But unlike Amazon which seems to be
abandoning this strategy, all unmanned gasoline stations in the Netherlands
display their discounts on the price boards and often in larger characters than
prices themselves. Because discounts are announced relative to RPRs which
are issued by gasoline manufacturers, it is no surprise that one may wonder
if they are actually worth anything to the consumer. Partly, this question is
tackled in Chapter 4 which shows that RPRs represent marginal cost changes
better than retail prices. This indicates that RPRs follow cost fluctuations
which means that the discounts can be informative about the actual price
level and thus can be used by low-cost retailers to signal their position in
the price distribution. However, in order to fully understand how discounts
off the RPR are used by gasoline retailers Chapter 5 analyzes this subject in
more depth.
There are multiple theoretical explanations for the wide use of discounts,
ranging from informing consumers about competitors’ prices (Armstrong and
Chen, 2013) to locking-in the loss-averse consumers through sales (Heidhues
and Ko˝szegi, 2014). In addition, there exists a body of empirical literature
on sales practices (Kehoe and Midrigan, 2008; Eichenbaum et al., 2011),
however quantitative studies on using discounts rather than prices in com-
petition are absent. Dutch gasoline retailers seem to be doing exactly that:
Unmanned gasoline stations compete by advertising higher than regular, i.e.
“bonus”, discounts on certain days of the week.8 Therefore, in addition to
analyzing whether consumers benefit from paying attention to discounts and
if discounts are informative, Chapter 5 attempts to reveal the incentives that
force firms to engage in this type of discount competition. More specifically,
we attempt to pinpoint which factors determine whether stations will an-
nounce bonus discounts on the same or on different days of the week.
The goal of this thesis is to extend the knowledge about retail pricing
in general and gasoline retailing in particular. Studying the proliferation of
unmanned gasoline retailing (Chapter 2) is rather specific to retail gasoline
markets but the findings also have a broader interpretation in form of the ef-
fects of new technology on prices. The results from the analyses on consumer
search with different risk attitudes (Chapter 3), the use of RPRs (Chapter 4),
6On Amazon’s use of discounts and list prices, see http://nyti.ms/29cpcw8.
7In Belgium, gasoline stations announce discounts relative to the “Official fuel prices”,
i.e. maximum allowed retail prices.
8For an example of Saturday bonus discounts, see https://www.tinq.nl/acties-en
-nieuws/zaterdagmazzel (in Dutch).
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and competition in discounts (Chapter 5) can be more easily related to other
retail markets. These topics are closely interconnected because almost all un-
manned stations display discounts relative to RPRs on their price boards and
these discounts are informative for searching consumers. Therefore, I revisit
these topics throughout the thesis and some overlap remains inevitable.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the empirical litera-
ture on retail gasoline pricing, identify how this thesis contributes to it, and
discuss how it has been shaped by the data revolution. Then, Section 1.3
presents the price dataset that will serve three chapters (Ch. 2, 4, and 5) of
this thesis and describes the Dutch retail gasoline market which is the focus of
the empirical analyses. Finally, Section 1.4 previews the analyses performed
and the methodology used in the remaining chapters.
1.2 Empirical studies on retail gasoline pricing
Retail gasoline markets are convenient to study for two main reasons. First,
retail gasoline markets have a simple structure so the analysis does not require
many simplifying assumptions. For example, despite being sold at different
locations gasoline is a largely homogeneous product.9 This makes gasoline
stations compete in terms of branding and additional services which also
affect prices of gasoline but these characteristics are easily observable for
the researcher.10 The second (and in our case essential) reason is the data
availability. Numerous price comparison websites and mobile device applica-
tions have emerged which provide tools to find the lowest prices. The latter
technology provides an easy and cheap access to station-specific daily and
hourly price data which enable researchers to analyze retail gasoline markets
in greater detail.
Mainly because of the aforementioned reasons, the empirical literature
9Despite various gasoline stations’ claims about their differentiated branded fuel, gener-
ally it is complicated for consumers to measure and perceive material differences between
Shell and Texaco gasoline, for example. Recently, Total has introduced City and Motor-
way gasoline types, featuring lower carbon emissions and better fuel efficiency respectively.
For more details, see TankPro (2016c).
10Other simplifying conditions include the lack of substitutes for gasoline in the short
term and nearly perfect observability of prices. Although diesel and liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) as well as different sorts of sustainable fuels are also available it is impossible to
use them on the same gasoline-powered vehicle without a costly modification. Retail prices
are perfectly observable to all consumers on the large billboards of most gasoline stations.
An exception is highway stations: Due to the highways’ infrastructure, consumers observe
prices only after making a decision either to visit a station, or to pass it.
6 Introduction
on gasoline retailing is vast. In his survey, Eckert (2013) counts more than
100 empirical studies. He distinguishes four major directions that empirical
researchers have been pursuing: (asymmetric) pass-through of upstream cost
shocks, Edgeworth cycles, mergers and vertical restraints, and station-level
price dispersion.11 While Eckert (2013) reviews and summarizes the main
findings of this stream of research and briefly mentions the main data sources
that researchers have used, I focus on the way greater data availability and
the digital revolution have shaped the nature of empirical studies on retail
gasoline pricing.
Section 1.2.1 discusses which research questions typically have been ad-
dressed in the last two decades and what data have been employed to answer
them. Section 1.2.2 zooms in on how the three aspects usually associated with
big data, i.e. high volume, high frequency and high variety, have impacted
the research orientation. My assessment is based on a selection of empirical
studies listed in Table 1.1.12 At various points, I will refer to this table which
also succinctly summarizes the main characteristics of the individual studies.
1.2.1 Scope
Table 1.1 shows that the majority of studies uses price quotes from the US or
Canada. Readily-available station-level price data sources in North America,
such as Oil Price Information Service (OPIS), have played a major role in
making these studies possible. Retail gasoline price data on North Ameri-
can markets are available from OPIS since 1999.13 16 out of 73 datasets in
Table 1.1 are acquired from OPIS. The Energy Information Administration
(EIA) and MJ Ervin & Associates Inc., providing gasoline price data for the
US and Canadian markets respectively, have served as the source for a sig-
nificant number of datasets too. Notably, 13 out of 25 daily-price datasets
in Table 1.1 were provided by OPIS. All of these 13 datasets covered US
markets. Evidently, accessibility and quality of gasoline price data in the US
and Canada have significantly contributed to the literature on retail gasoline
pricing.
11For an extensive overview of the research questions analyzed and the main insights
that have resulted, refer to Eckert (2013).
12The selection procedure can be briefly described as follows. First, I searched JSTOR
for keywords “retail gasoline”. Then I selected empirical studies which use retail-price data.
Finally, to keep the table compact only articles published in journals ranked 3 or 4 according





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In terms of topics, the studies can be roughly categorized into four re-
search areas as Eckert (2013) suggests. The first and by far the largest group
studies the asymmetry of retail price responses to increases and decreases
in wholesale prices. The first two econometric analyses of this problem were
those by Karrenbrock (1991) and Bacon (1991). The former reflects a large
interest in this topic from politicians, industry specialists, and the media.
The latter study is inspired by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in-
quiries in the UK.14 The common finding is that retail prices adapt faster to
increases in wholesale gasoline price than to decreases. The explanations for
this phenomenon vary from consumer search (Tappata, 2009) to tacit col-
lusion (Borenstein et al., 1997). In a large cross-market comparison, Peltz-
man (2000) finds that more than two thirds of the roughly 200 investigated
product prices respond to positive input price shocks faster than to nega-
tive ones. The great public interest in the issue, the occurrence of the same
phenomenon in a wide array of other markets combined with easily accessi-
ble price information explain why studying response-asymmetry using retail
gasoline price data has been a popular and worthwhile research topic. The
second group analyzes whether and why the data exhibit Edgeworth cycles,
i.e. the asymmetric cycles where prices fall until profit margins become very
small or even negative, at which point prices jump back to the original price
in a sudden and sharp movement (see Noel, 2007a,b, and Atkinson, 2009).15
One third of all papers in Table 1.1 (24 articles) analyze either the asym-
metric pass-through of upstream cost shocks or Edgeworth cycles. A few
papers attempt to establish a connection between both phenomena although
there is not much consensus in the findings (see Section 1.2.2). Edgeworth
cycle theory assigns an important role to firm’s best responses to their com-
petitors prices. The availability of high frequency price data has played a
major role in the development of the empirical literature on Edgeworth cy-
cles by enabling researchers to observe these price responses in great detail.
Of the papers using higher-than-daily frequency data, two-thirds focus on
analyzing asymmetric price cycles.
The third research area concentrates on the impact of vertical relations
and regulation on retail gasoline prices (see Barron and Umbeck, 1984; Hast-
14The Monopolies and Mergers Commission was replaced by the Competition Commis-
sion which was recently superseded by the Competition and Markets Authority.
15Edgeworth cycle is an asymmetric price cycle which consists of a series of small price
decreases (price war) followed by a large price increase, restoring prices to the initial level
once the marginal cost level is reached. See Maskin and Tirole (1988) for the theoretical
model of Edgeworth cycles.
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ings, 2004; Taylor and Hosken, 2007). Hastings (2004) for example shows that
the presence of independent retailers helps to decrease local retail prices; Bar-
ron and Umbeck (1984) provide empirical evidence indicating that prices rise
when a manufacturer-controlled station changes to a franchise operation.
The final category of articles analyzes station-level price dispersion and
examines to which extent price differences can be explained by differences
in station characteristics or by differences in the level of local competition
(see Barron et al., 2004, or Clemenz and Gugler, 2006). By their nature, the
completeness and variety of data (individual characteristics, location etc.) is
more important for studies in this category than the number and frequency of
price quotes. For example, besides retail price of gasoline, Barron et al. (2004)
use an extensive set of controls (such as the stations’ brand, location, number
of pumps, availability of additional services, hours of operation, etc.) in their
investigation of the relation between station density and price dispersion.
Nowadays, the data on individual station characteristics are relatively easy
to obtain because various market research companies routinely collect and
offer them for sale.
The main contribution of this thesis results from studying competition
in retail gasoline sector. Chapter 2 analyzes the direct and spillover price
effects of transforming stations from manned to unmanned. Chapter 5 ana-
lyzes competition using discounts as a price-framing tool and explains why
some stations commit to offer weekly bonus discounts in response to their ri-
vals’ strategy. This thesis also demonstrates the role of information provision
in retail markets. Chapter 3 shows that the effect of changes in price un-
certainty strictly depends on risk attitudes of consumers searching for lower
prices. Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that RPRs and discounts can be used to pro-
vide information to consumers and effectively reduce the price uncertainty.
So besides learning more about retail gasoline pricing by using richer data,
more generally this thesis contributes to the literature on competition, con-
sumer search and behavioral economics, as well as research on asymmetric
information.
In the following section, I discuss the impact that the main characteris-
tics of big data have had on the retail gasoline literature. This shows that
recent empirical research on gasoline retailing is highly data-intensive and
will lead to further advances in the near future by exploiting detailed data
from different sources of information.
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1.2.2 Impact of better data availability
Research on gasoline retailing is largely driven by data availability. A greater
level of detail in the data often allows new topics to be studied empirically. For
example, the advent of weekly and daily price quotes has enabled researchers
to study whether the competitive strategies firms apply in empirical prac-
tice fit Edgeworth price cycles. Without price data arriving at a frequency
exceeding or at least matching the frequency with which firms update their
prices, we would not be able to tell the adequacy of the dynamic reaction
functions that feature prominently in Maskin and Tirole’s theory. Indeed, in
Table 1.1 there are no empirical studies on Edgeworth cycles using bi-weekly
or monthly data. In this subsection I discuss the trends in the characteristics
of data used in studies on retail gasoline pricing as well as the implications
of these trends for the thesis at hand.
Volume: The term “big data” is most often associated with the volume
of the data. However, the empirical literature on retail gasoline cannot be
solely characterized by the use of massive datasets counting millions of ob-
servations. Despite a few recent studies which actually use very large datasets,
the majority of recent papers do not rely on the volume but instead on the
level of detail of the data.16 Nevertheless, Figure 1.1a shows that datasets
used in research on retail gasoline are getting larger. There are several rea-
sons underlying this trend. For example, the frequency of price quotes is also
increasing over time as Figure 1.1b shows. Hence the datasets of the same
length are larger than in the past. The volume of datasets has also increased
due to changes in data collection techniques. The Internet has played a vital
role in this development. Whereas in the past, aggregate price indices were
constructed by statistical agencies or branch organizations, price quotes of
individual stations are nowadays mostly available on firms’ websites. More-
over, some companies also collect credit-card data with fuel price records
which are then sold to oil companies, distributors, traders, government, and
academia. Many large datasets listed in Table 1.1 have been obtained from
OPIS which provides the data on North American gasoline markets. These
trends illustrate that research on retail gasoline and microeconomics in gen-
eral are moving towards more intensive use of “big data”.
16For recent studies using datasets in excess of 1 million observations, please see Hosken
et al. (2011), Myers et al. (2011), Lewis (2012, 2015), Soetevent et al. (2014), and Gautier
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Figure 1.1: The development of empirical literature by dataset
characteristics.
Note: Number of papers per period from earliest to latest: 14; 12; 25; 22.
Frequency: Table 1.1 shows that in the 20th century only two empirical
studies using daily price quotes were published (i.e. Slade, 1992, 1998). But
even Slade’s (1992, 1998) dataset has a sample of only 14 stations in Vancou-
ver which can represent a small sub-market at best. After 1994, cross-section
data were used only once by Barron et al. (2004). These trends towards us-
ing less cross-section (more longitudinal) and more daily and hourly data are
evident in Figure 1.1b.
Researchers use the high frequency property in different ways to answer
specific questions. For example, Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) use daily
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prices to determine short-term pass-through of taxes by comparing two days
before and two days after the tax change. Atkinson et al. (2009) use bi-hourly
prices to study timing of responses to price increases and decreases. In both
cases, the high frequency characteristic is crucial for identification. Atkinson
(2008) actually shows that while (twice-) daily price data are suitable to iden-
tify the Edgeworth cycles, they are not sufficient to identify which stations
initiate the cycles and which ones drive them down.
I find that eight out of ten most recent studies on asymmetric price pat-
terns used price data with daily to hourly frequencies.17 Using daily data,
Lewis and Marvel (2011) provide evidence that consumer search can explain
asymmetric responses to cost shocks.18 Daily price data have also been used
to relate asymmetric response and Edgeworth cycles (see Noel, 2009; Lewis
and Noel, 2011). While Noel (2009) argues that Edgeworth cycles might cause
or at least amplify asymmetric-response pricing, Lewis and Noel (2011) find
that cost changes are passed on two to three times faster in markets exhibit-
ing Edgeworth cycles. Lewis (2012) uses daily and tri-hourly price data to
examine the price leadership and coordination mechanism in markets with
Edgeworth cycles. He finds that the market leader signals the beginning of
the cycle by raising a price to the same level at all its stations. The com-
petitors then follow within 24 hours. These studies demonstrate how our
knowledge about price asymmetries and price cycles has been informed by
high frequency data.19
High variety and increased coverage: The availability of station-level
price quotes has greatly enhanced the possibilities to study the impact of sta-
tion characteristics and market structure on pricing. To accomplish the for-
mer, price data are merged with information on site characteristics including
details about vertical contracts, brands, service hours, or other services that
17These papers are Lewis (2009, 2011, 2012), Noel (2009), Wang (2009), Lewis and Marvel
(2011), Lewis and Noel (2011), Douglas and Herrera (2014), and Gautier and Le Saout
(2015). An exception are Lewis (2011) who uses weekly prices and Greenwood-Nimmo and
Shin (2013) with monthly data. However, the sample of Lewis (2011) covers over 50% of
all sites in San Diego market.
18A theoretical explanation was proposed earlier by Tappata (2009).
19I would like to note that three out of five datasets with higher-than-daily frequency
in Table 1.1 have been hand-collected. Other two used either credit-card transactions data
(Wang, 2009) or prices were downloaded directly from the company’s website (Lewis, 2012).
Hence, hourly retail prices are still rather difficult to obtain. Although OPIS now offers
real-time price data too, see http://www.opisnet.com/products/retail-fuel-station
-prices.aspx.
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are available on-site (e.g. a grocery shop, a car wash, automotive services,
etc). For the later, price data have been frequently merged with demographic
information to construct proxies for station-specific demand which is usu-
ally unobservable to researchers (Doyle and Samphantharak, 2008; Verlinda,
2008). Advances in geocoding have given researchers more accurate informa-
tion about the location of sites. By calculating distances between individual
gasoline stations, most researchers nowadays have very precise measures of
the intensity of local competition at their disposal. The approaches of gather-
ing these data have differed substantially: Some use street addresses or postal
codes, e.g. Barron et al. (2000), others use exact geographical coordinates
using Google Earth (Soetevent et al., 2014) or manually using a GPS unit
(Verlinda, 2008). Given the developments in geocoding technology, I expect
a strong growth of market power studies that use geocoded information.20
The exact market coverage of each dataset listed in Table 1.1 is known
only if the authors mention this explicitly. For example, Manuszak and Moul
(2009), Wang (2009), and Chandra and Tappata (2011) note that their data
cover (almost) 100% of the markets they study. This is exemplary of the
trend to use less aggregated and more complete data: Note that in Table 1.1
the use of city- or state-averaged data is decreasing over time; also, until the
year 2000, none of the papers had more than 100 stations in their sample
(unless they used a cross section).
In the next section I introduce the dataset used in this thesis. This dataset
falls in the highest categories in terms of volume, frequency, and coverage.
As the overview of the recent literature suggests this is a necessary condition
if one aims to extend the knowledge on the subject which already received
worldwide attention from governments, antitrust authorities, and academia.
The high coverage of the market in our dataset allows one to study a nation-
wide trend like the growth of unmanned gasoline stations. The volume and
hence the length of the dataset makes the analysis of the discount competition
strategies possible. And finally, the daily and hourly frequency of the data is
key to studying RPRs and their (asymmetric) relation to retail prices.
20Our own experience is that third-party-collected street addresses are not always error-
proof. For the Dutch market, we have come across cases where the address provided by
the car-lease company is the one of the headquarters of the firm rather than a particular
station. Fortunately, these cases seem rare.
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1.3 Data
In three chapters of this thesis, I use sub-samples of the price dataset from the
Dutch retail gasoline market. In order to avoid overlap as much as possible
and to familiarize the reader with the context of the empirical analysis, I
describe the structure and significant features of the market, and present the
data in this section. In the following chapters I will assume the reader is
familiar with this section.
1.3.1 Data collection
In August 2005, Athlon Car Lease (Athlon, hereafter), one of the leading
car leasing companies in the Netherlands with a fleet of over 125,000 cars,
launched an online website where it has published the gasoline prices paid by
its fleet card owners ever since.21 Every day, Athlon captures station-specific
retail gasoline prices using information retrieved from fleet card users who
frequent these stations.22 This methodology slightly differs from the one used
by OPIS who simply use credit-card transaction data, however the difference
is immaterial since both approaches lead to very comparable datasets.23 The
price at a particular station on a given day is recorded if and only if at least
one fleet card owner frequented the site that day. Price quotes for all grades
of gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) are available, but in
this dissertation I limit the attention to the prices for regular unleaded 95
octane gasoline (known as Euro 95) which is the most commonly used fuel
type by passenger cars in the Netherlands and the whole European Union.24
The sample of retail gasoline prices runs from October 1, 2005 to De-
cember 31, 2013, and counts more than 6 million unique observations. As for
studies using credit-card data one potential shortcoming of fleet-card data is
that prices are not reported for all stations for all days (Tappata and Yan,
2013, p. 6). Table 1.2 shows that for highway (off-highway) sites on average
21Athlon’s website: www.athloncarlease.com. Our data collection started August 10,
2005.
22Initially some gasoline station operators were not pleased by the site and refused to
supply gasoline to Athlon-lessees while others complained that the quoted prices were wrong
(De Telegraaf, 2005).
23Numerous researchers have recently made use of OPIS data, including Taylor and
Hosken (2007); Doyle and Samphantharak (2008); Chandra and Tappata (2011); Myers et
al (2011); Lewis (2012, 2015); Tappata and Yan (2013).
24In 2014, 78.5% and 54.1% of cars were powered by gasoline in the Netherlands and
the EU respectively. Source: www.acea.be/statistics/article/Passenger-Car-Fleet-by
-Fuel-Type.
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a price-quote is registered every 1.28 (3.70) days. This implies that for a
randomly selected day, the most recent price quote is on average 0.64 (1.85)
days old.25 This may potentially bias the estimates if the data are not miss-
ing at random. Although the missing-at-random assumption is not refutable
using the data alone26 there are some reasons to suspect that missing data do
not impact the results. First, one potential source of non-randomness is that
drivers structurally avoid visiting the higher-priced stations which would bias
the sample of observed prices towards the lower-end of the price distribution.
Although this may be a concern in data composed of transaction data of
private drivers, this arguably is less of an issue with fleet-card data. Lessees
do not pay for the fuel themselves which makes them rather unresponsive
to prices. Another bias would arise when site characteristics unobserved by
the researcher would lead lessees to structurally avoid visiting some outlets.
This however does not seem to be an issue given that the data at hand cover
more than 85% of all sites.27 Throughout this thesis, the empirical analyses
contain further tests using various sub-samples to gauge the potential impact
of non-random missing data; none of them find significant differences.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I use daily RPRs and Amsterdam-Rotterdam-
Antwerp premium unleaded gasoline spot (ARA spot, hereafter) prices along-
side retail price quotes. RPRs of ten manufacturer brands are collected from
Brandstofprijzen.info.28 The sample of RPRs starts on December 8, 2008
and runs until December 31, 2013. ARA spot prices are collected from the
Datastream database. ARA spot prices are expressed in dollars per gallon.
Therefore, I used the USD/EUR exchange rate (downloaded from the Eu-
ropean Central Bank) to convert prices to euros per liter. Since the market
is closed on weekends and public holidays I replace missing ARA spot price
25These characteristics closely compare to those of OPIS data. On its web site OPIS
reports that prices of the majority of its stations are updated via a daily batch process sim-
ilarly to ours with “transactions that are from 1-5 days old with the majority of prices being
no older than 3 days.” http://www.opisnet.com/about/methodology.aspx#RetailGas,
visited 06/03/2015.
26See Manski (2007, section 2.5) for a thoughtful treatment of this issue.
27This number is similar to the market coverage of OPIS data which is around 90% (Chan-
dra and Tappata, 2011). Athlon sample counts 3,616 active sites in June 2013. According
to BOVAG (Association of Automobile dealers and Garage owners) and RAI (Associa-
tion of Bicycle and Automobile Industry) report, there were 4,216 gasoline stations in the
Netherlands in June 2013, http://bovagrai.info/auto/2015/brandstoffen/6-3-aantal
-en-marktaandelen-nederlandse-tankstations/. Original source: PetrolView. Note that
4,216 outlets also include stations in construction and sites unavailable to public or those
that only sell diesel. Therefore, 85% serves as a strict lower bound for market coverage.
28These brands are: BP, Esso, Gulf, Q8, Shell, Tamoil, Tango, Texaco, TinQ, and Total.
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Table 1.2: Sample statistics at the site level (3,820 observations).
mean std. dev. min. p10 p50 p90 max.
# price quotes per year 210.89 93.90 1.46 62.75 239.14 306.77 362.25
# days between quotes 3.55 9.53 1.01 1.19 1.53 5.81 250.13
highway 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Highway sites (240 observations)
# price quotes per year 293.91 34.52 70.84 260.23 304.69 309.92 340.53
# days between quotes 1.28 0.36 1.07 1.18 1.20 1.40 5.15
Off-highway sites (3,580 observations)
# price quotes per year 205.32 93.99 1.46 58.35 229.85 305.69 362.25
# days between quotes 3.70 9.82 1.01 1.19 1.59 6.24 250.13
Note: px : xth percentile sample.
observations by the last available quote.
The price data are appended with other explanatory variables such as
the exact geographic coordinates and the (Euclidean) distances between all
pairs of stations.29 We also know the brand of station and whether it is an
unmanned (automated) site.30 Data on other individual characteristics of
stations such as type of ownership, availability of a car wash, grocery or hot
drinks services, manned working hours, number of pumps etc. were obtained
from Experian Catalist Ltd. Finally, the dataset also includes some demand-
side variables such as zip-code level information on the number of private
cars, number of households and age composition.31
1.3.2 Description of the Dutch retail gasoline market
During the last several years, the number of retail gasoline outlets in the
Netherlands remained steady around 4,200 stations.32 Shell has the largest
market share of 22.8% in terms of fuel sold. Meanwhile, five major companies
(from largest to smallest: Shell, BP, Esso (ExxonMobil), Texaco, and Total)
have a combined market share of 62.3% in terms of sales and 46.7% of all
outlets in the country. This shows that minor-brand or unbranded stations sell
29These data were obtained by Adriaan Soetevent using Google Earth.
30We know whether a particular station is unmanned either from its brand in the Athlon
price data (TinQ, Tango, Shell Express, Q8 Easy etc.) or from the website http://www
.onbemandetankstations.nl which lists all automated sites in the Netherlands. We have
downloaded the list from this website twice, in the middle and at the end of the sample
period.
31We used information at the 4-digit zip-code level (8.7 km2 on average) provided by
Statistics Netherlands on the number of private cars in 2006, using the midpoint of the
zipcode as point of reference.
32For details, see http://www.bovagrai.info. All figures in this subsection are from this
source and represent the situation in May 2015, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Chapter 1 19
considerably less fuel than major-brand sites. Indeed, small companies (with
individual shares of less than 1%) have a market share of 14.8% combined in
terms of volume sold but they own more than a quarter of all retail locations.
In the past decade, the Dutch retail gasoline market has undergone a sig-
nificant structural change – the fraction of unmanned gasoline retailers has
more than doubled and continues to grow. Most of new unmanned sites were
converted from their manned counterparts. This has considerably intensi-
fied competition in urban areas and significantly contributed to an increased
price gap between on- and off-highway stations since still less than 10% of
the highway sites are unmanned. The majority of retailers on highways offer
a wide range of services ranging from car-wash to catering and children play-
grounds, and generally attract less price sensitive consumers. The five majors
own over 80% of all highway sites whereas off-highways this number is below
60%. This contributes to higher concentration of the highway market where
competition is also lower because of less densely scattered outlets.33
The Dutch retail gasoline market also features an extensive use of RPRs.
Every day, oil companies announce their RPRs which are used as a reference
price by all stations operating under the flag of that brand. Tables 1.3 and
1.4 show that RPRs of different brands are often within a very close interval:
63.3% of the time the gap between the highest and the lowest RPR does not
exceed 1.0 cent per liter (cpl) and only 5.1% of the time this gap is larger than
2.0 cpl. The average RPRs are within 0.5 cpl interval. Table 1.4 also shows
that the brand with the lowest average RPR on 28.3% of days announces the
highest RPR. These numbers indicate that RPRs of different manufacturers
move closely together. Therefore, one can expect that even though gasoline
prices fluctuate significantly over time, the differences between marginal costs
of producers are relatively small.
The following section briefly describes the contents of the remaining chap-
ters. I mainly discuss the methodology used to analyze the data in order to
answer the primary research questions of this thesis.
33Most of the time two gasoline sites on the same side of the highway are located more
than 20 kilometers away from each other. Moreover, because of the covenant between the
sector and the government no new highway sites will open on the current road network
until 2024 (for more details, see http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0018447/2005-07-31,
in Dutch).
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Table 1.3: RPR spread in cpl, 2008-2013.
Spread Frequency Percent Cumul. %
0.0 165 9.0 9.0
0.5 61 3.3 14.1
1.0 846 46.1 63.3
1.5 80 4.4 72.7
2.0 358 19.5 94.9
2.5 10 0.6 96.5
3.0 40 2.2 99.5
8.0 2 0.1 100.0
Total 1834 100.0
Note: The least common values are omitted.
Table 1.4: Summary statistics of deviations of brand specific RPR from the
average RPR.
Brand Mean Min Median Max % cheapest % most exp.
Tango -0.21 -1.87 -0.16 1.30 57.5% 28.3%
Shell -0.19 -2.46 -0.12 1.14 55.3% 29.0%
TinQ -0.16 -1.80 -0.10 1.50 52.3% 30.3%
BP -0.12 -1.87 -0.06 1.40 50.0% 33.9%
Gulf -0.05 -1.80 0.00 1.63 44.7% 37.2%
Esso 0.01 -3.00 0.00 2.50 44.3% 46.3%
Q8 0.12 -6.50 0.10 2.09 26.3% 44.2%
Total 0.13 -1.66 0.10 1.68 32.8% 53.2%
Tamoil 0.19 -1.25 0.14 2.04 29.7% 57.0%
Texaco 0.27 -1.52 0.20 2.20 25.4% 64.2%
Notes: 1834 observations per brand. RPRs expressed in cents per liter.
1.4 Overview
Chapter 2 addresses the sharp increase in the number of unmanned fueling
stations that many European countries have witnessed in the last decade.
Using detailed data on the retail market in the Netherlands, we study the
effect of this market change on price levels at converted outlets and price
spillovers to their competitors. Moreover, we quantify the effects of manned-
to-unmanned conversions on different sub-groups of stations to see which
competitors are affected the most. Most importantly, this method allows us
to compare the countervailing effects of a decrease in quality and a decrease
in cost. The results are informative for the policy discussions regarding un-
manned stations. These analyses are based on reduced-form fixed-effects re-
gressions. In addition, we perform an event study analysis to evaluate the tim-
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ing of the change in prices when the stations are transformed to unmanned.
This is one of the first applications of event study analysis to non-financial
price data.
Chapter 3 is largely a theoretical chapter that looks at how differences
in risk attitudes affect the decision to continue search when the price un-
certainty changes. The chapter explains the motivation for cheaper stations
to advertise discounts assuming that discount reduces price uncertainty for
consumers. We develop a theoretical model of sequential consumer search to
study how an increase (or a decrease) in price variance affects the consumer’s
willingness to pay (WTP) for continued search, conditional on the currently
observed price. We compare three different scenarios where consumers are
either risk neutral, risk averse, or loss averse. Finally, we test our theoreti-
cal predictions surveying 300 students. In particular, by means of a stylized
problem of sequential search, we elicit subjects’ WTP for continued search in
four situations where the price variance and the current best price are either
high or low. The results allow us to distinguish which of the three consumer
risk attitudes better represent the observed choices.
In Chapter 4, I shed more light on the role and the effects of RPRs using
daily and hourly price data from the Dutch retail gasoline market. First of all,
I survey theoretical and empirical literature on RPRs and distill a number
of testable hypotheses in terms of pricing patterns. In order to test these
hypotheses, I employ reduced-form regressions as well as (asymmetric) error
corrections models. This chapter evaluates the current understanding about
RPRs in a specific (retail gasoline) market setting where frequently changing
marginal costs are of key importance. Using daily data, I test a notion if
in such markets RPRs are more informative about the cost level than retail
prices are. In addition, I use hourly data to see if retail prices respond to
changes in RPRs symmetrically.
Chapter 5 studies the discounts that are prominent among unmanned
gasoline retailers in the Netherlands. Using a mix of theory and empirics, we
investigate why and how firms use discounts off a reference price in markets
with frequently changing baseline prices. We observe that in the Dutch retail
gasoline market cheaper outlets announce both their actual price and the
discount given off a reference price. Moreover, firms in this market publicly
announce and commit to offer weekly “bonus” discounts on top of baseline
discounts.
We first show theoretically how cheaper firms can use baseline discounts
to inform consumers about the value of cost components common to all firms
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and to signal their position in the price distribution. Then, we build upon
existing models of price-frame competition to study the strategy of offering
bonus discounts. We argue that in a two-period sequential game discounts act
as a price frame because the announcement of discounts eases the comparison
of prices and for this reason increases the fraction of searching consumers. We
empirically test our hypotheses and discuss other factors driving the discount
competition phenomenon observed in the data.
Finally, Chapter 6 includes a summary and conclusions along with limi-
tations of this work and suggestions for further research.
Chapter 2
The proliferation of
unmanned fuel retailing and
cost pass-through∗
2.1 Introduction
In the last decade, unmanned retail fuel stations have proliferated across
Europe. According to one large study on the functioning of the vehicle fuels
market in Europe, 7.7% of all service stations in the European Union were
unmanned in 2012, but with large cross-country differences. The market for
unmanned stations has matured in Scandinavian countries such as Denmark
and Sweden where the share of unmanned stations is over 60%, but in other
countries such as Italy, Hungary, and Romania it is still less than 1%.1
Declining fuel volumes and a desire to cut fixed staffing cost seems to drive
the increased activity of converting service stations into unmanned sites.2 At
converted sites, this may lead to lower price levels for two reasons. First, re-
alized reductions in unit cost may be partially or fully passed onto consumers
in the form of lower retail prices. Second, replacing a full service station by
an unmanned site where motorists can only use automated payment tech-
*This chapter is based on Bruzˇikas and Soetevent (2014).
1Civic Consulting (2014). Four regions in Spain have recently stalled the rise of un-
manned stations by adopting legislation that requires all service stations to have at
least one employee present during opening hours. This happened on instigation of an al-
liance of employers, unions and consumers that cited potential safety risks, job losses and
barriers to people with disabilities. http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/02/06/
actualidad/1423251729 289297.html.
2See CBRE (2012).
24 The proliferation of unmanned fuel retailing
nology may lower product quality and thereby prices. On the other hand,
manned-to-unmanned conversions in markets where most stations are still
manned increases product differentiation. This may soften price competition
and lead to higher local retail prices.
An evaluation of the social benefits of the pan-European trend towards
more unmanned stations for this reason necessitates an assessment of how
this development impacts prices via the respective channels of changes in cost
base, quality perception and competition intensity. This study provides such
an assessment by focusing not only on observed price changes at converted
outlets but also considering the spillover effects on prices charged by their
direct competitors. This allows us to distinguish between the three channels:
If products are substitutes and firms compete in price, theory predicts pos-
itive competitive effects if the prices at converted sites decrease because of
lower unit cost; prices at local competitors should instead increase when price
levels at converted stations are lowered due to lower product quality. When
competition is softened because of the conversion, equilibrium price levels at
converted and their competitors should both increase.
In our empirical application, we use an extensive dataset that contains
price quotes of over 80% of all outlets in the Netherlands for the time period
10/2005-04/2011. The Dutch market is an interesting market to consider
because with a market share for unmanned stations of 25.1% in March 2011,
it can be classified as a market in transition. The share of unmanned stations
is sufficiently large for its economic impact to be estimable. At the same
time, it is sufficiently small not to be considered a mature unmanned fuel
retailing market that has already reached a new steady state equilibrium.
Table 2.1 shows that the share of unmanned stations has steadily increased
in the period considered with no signs of this trend leveling off near the
end. With the proportion of unmanned sites at 12.4% in November 2005,
the Dutch market has witnessed a doubling of the proportion of unmanned
outlets in the period we consider.
Our sample of 3,820 individual sites with on average more than 1,000
price quotes per station allows us to include day fixed effects in all our re-
gressions. These pick up time-variant shocks common to all sites, such as
price fluctuations due to developments in the international oil market. Next
to that, station-level fixed effects are included such that identification of our
key parameters is based on within-site variation. The regression analysis in
Section 2.4 is followed by an event study analysis (Brown and Warner, 1985;
MacKinlay, 1997) in Section 2.5 which exploits the high-frequency nature
Chapter 2 25
of our data. Our object of interest is the cumulative abnormal price move-
ment after the event of a conversion to an unmanned station. The fact that
new price quotes arrive almost daily enables the identification of abnormal
post-event price movements which inform us whether unit cost reductions
are passed through to consumers immediately or with a lag.
Our main empirical findings are the following. First, our regression results
show that non-highway stations that convert from manned to unmanned re-
duce price with 2.6 eurocents per liter (cpl) before taxes; for highway sites,
this number is 3.8 cpl. For non-highway stations these conversions lead to
significant competitive effects with a doubling of the number of unmanned
stations in one’s direct neighborhood causing a statistically significant aver-
age price decrease of 0.18 cpl. This supports the view that the lower prices
at converted stations are primarily caused by the pass-through of realized
cost efficiencies and not by a reduction of the product quality; no indication
is found that the conversion has softened competition. Consistent with the
regression estimates, the event study analysis uncovers sharp non-transitory
price drops at the day a station converts to an unmanned station and com-
petitive effects of 0.2 cpl for non-highway sites that neighbor (2 km radius)
a site that experienced a conversion. The latter are however not significant
at the 5-percent level.
Throughout our analysis, we contrast the direct and competitive effect of
manned/unmanned conversions with the impact of a different type of station
transformation often observed in our data: the event of rebranding a station
from a major non-major brand (or vice versa). Rebranding from one of the
six major brands to a minor brand leads to prices that are on average 1.4-
2.2 cpl lower. For highway stations, we find a competitive effect from nearby
non-highway competitors as well: when the number of nearby non-highway
competitors serving a major brand halves, prices decrease with on average
0.5 cpl. This suggests that the pass-through of realized cost reductions is the
prime force driving the observed lower price levels at rebranded stations, not
a reduction in perceived product quality. The event study approach reveals
that this pass-through to consumers is however much slower than for manned-
to-unmanned conversions, with the adjustment to the lower equilibrium price
level taking one to two months.
A few empirical other studies on the competitive effect of rebranding have
appeared.3 Hastings (2004), using the quasi-experimental variation generated
3We refer the reader to Eckert (2013) for an extensive overview of the empirical literature
on retail gasoline markets.
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by the event of the conversion of 260 independent Thrifty gasoline stations to
ARCO stations, finds that after the rebranding prices at nearby competing
outlets are five cents per gallon higher. Taylor et al. (2010) revisited Hast-
ings’ analysis using OPIS data.4 They only found an economically insignifi-
cant price effect of four-tenths of a cent per gallon. The empirical literature
has not yet addressed the effect of unmanned fueling on retail price levels.
Other researchers before us have however estimated the pass through of cost
changes. The difference with our case is that in most of those studies it is a
priori clear that the events studied affect cost but have no impact on quality.
For example, Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) study the short-term pass-
through of taxes by comparing prices at two days before and two days after
the tax change.
The application of event study techniques has so far been limited to the
field of finance, where it has been used to measure e.g. the impact of earning
announcements on a firm’s stock price by estimating abnormal ex post re-
turns in the stock’s performance. In the field of industrial economics, event
study analysis has been applied to estimate the impact of EU merger control
decisions on consumer surplus (Duso et al., 2007), but again by considering
the stock market prices of the firms involved in the decision.5 However, high-
frequency price data are increasingly becoming available for non-financial
markets with the retail gasoline market being a prime example. This makes it
possible to apply the event study technique to these markets as well. Whereas
a difference-in-difference approach estimates the average effect of an event,
event study analysis also reveals the adjustment process to the new price
level following the event. We believe that this approach has potential in the
study of all retail markets characterized by frequent price changes and con-
sumer search, such as the markets for groceries, financial products and online
markets.
The chapter continues as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical re-
sults that motivate our empirical approach. Section 2.3 introduces the data.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 contain the results of the empirical analysis. Section 2.6
discusses the countervailing spillover effects of manned-to-unmanned conver-
sions. Section 2.7 concludes.
4The Oil Price Information Service.
5We have found one study using an event study for non-financial data: McKenzie and
Thomsen (2001) studying the impact of recalls on wholesale beef prices.
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2.2 Theoretical framework
Conditional on type, fuel itself is a fairly homogeneous product despite the
fact different oil companies may use slightly different additives. Still, the
brand name and location of a station and the services and amenities it pro-
vides – such as the presence and size of a shop – lead to considerable prod-
uct differentiation.6 For this reason, competition between gasoline stations is
commonly modeled as price competition with differentiated products. We fol-
low this approach to show the possible implications of manned-to-unmanned
conversions on the prices of affected outlets and of their immediate competi-
tors. We use the differentiated duopoly model introduced by Dixit (1979)
that gives rise to the following inverse demand functions:7
p1 = α1 − β1q1 − γq2 (2.1)
p2 = α2 − γq1 − β2q2, (2.2)
with αi, βi > 0, β1β2 − γ2 ≡ δ > 0 and αiβj − αjγ > 0 (i, j = 1, 2; j 6= i)
to ensure well-behaved demand and positive prices. Given that we study the
competition between different providers of fuel, we focus on the case where
the goods are substitutes, γ > 0, with γ an inverse measure of product
differentiation. The corresponding direct demand functions are
q1 = a1 − b1p1 + cp2 (2.3)
q2 = a2 + cp1 − b2p2, (2.4)
with ai = (αiβj − αjγ)/δ, bi = βj/δ (i, j = 1, 2; j 6= i), and c = γ/δ. The
assumptions made above imply that ai, bi > 0.
8
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices of this linear model are derived in
Singh and Vives (1984). The equilibrium price pBi including marginal cost mi
6Figure 2.B.1 in the Appendix illustrates the qualitative differences of manned and
unmanned stations. Next to a shop with a cashier, manned stations often offer additional
services such as a car wash. These services come at a significant increase in operational cost
(wages, higher rent for land, larger power expenses etc.). Some of these costs will be only
indirectly related to gasoline sales, which does not hold for the cost of the cashier, especially
if customers pay cash. Hence manned and unmanned sites not only involve obvious quality
differences, but significant differences in marginal cost as well.
7The results derived in Proposition 2.1 of this section are qualitatively the same when
instead using Hotelling’s location model (Hotelling, 1929) with firms located at the end-
points of the line. In that case, equilibrium prices are pi = t+ (αi − αj + 2ci + cj)/3 with
αi the willingness to pay for firm i’s product, ci the unit cost for firm i and t the degree of
product differentiation.
8See Dixit (1979) for details.
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for firm 1 is
pBi = mi +
2(ai − bimi + cmj)bj + (aj − bjmj − cmi)c
D
(2.5)
for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i with D ≡ 4b1b2 − c2.9
For our purposes, we want to know the effect on equilibrium prices of a
change in: i) the own unit cost; ii) the unit cost of the competitor; iii) the
quality of one’s own product; iv) the quality of product provided by one’s
rival, and v) the degree of product differentiation. With regard to iii) and
iv), note that a higher value of the intercept αi in (2.1) implies that firm i can
sell the same quantity at a higher price, other things equal. We therefore take
the change in equilibrium prices that follows a decrease of αi as our measure
of the impact of a reduction in product quality. Proposition 2.1 presents the
results that will serve as the point of departure for our empirical analysis.
Proposition 2.1 Consider the differentiated duopoly model with the linear
inverse demand functions as in (2.1) and assume that two firms supply substi-
tutes (γ > 0) and compete in prices, then the marginal effects on equilibrium







> 0; i, j = 1, 2 j 6= i. (2.6)
The marginal effects of a change in the perceived quality of one’s own or






< 0; i, j = 1, 2 j 6= i. (2.7)




< 0; i = 1, 2. (2.8)
Proof: See Appendix 2.A.
Proposition 2.1 thus shows that whereas a decrease in unit cost and quality
both negatively affect own-prices, the impact on one’s competitors’ price is
9Singh and Vives (1984) give results for prices net of marginal cost. This amounts to
subtracting m1 (m2, respectively) from both sides of equation (2.1). The left-hand side
then becomes p˜Bi ≡ pBi − mi and the constant αi in the right-hand side is replaced by
αˆi ≡ αi−mi. To ensure positive demand qi = (αi−mi)/βi when firm i sets price equal to
marginal cost and firm j does not produce (pi = mi; qj = 0), we throughout assume that
αi > mi, for i = 1, 2. See Singh and Vives (1984) for further details.
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opposite; A decrease in unit cost puts a downward pressure on the competi-
tor’s equilibrium price, a decrease in quality instead gives competitors some
leeway to increase prices. We will use this observation to interpret our empir-
ical findings. When we observe that station that has converted from manned
to unmanned charges lower prices after the fact, we take this as evidence
that either the unit cost level of this station and/or the product quality has
decreased. To gauge the relative importance of these unobserved causes, we
will look at their net effect on price levels at local competitors of a converted
station: if price levels are importantly higher (lower) after the conversion,
this indicates that the quality (unit cost) change has been significant; if we
do not find an effect, this suggests that the spillovers of the quality and unit
cost change cancel each other out on average.
If the conversions have the effect of increasing product differentiation
(lowering γ) because of more variation in the service dimension, this would
show up as higher price levels at converted stations and their local competi-
tors because of softened competition. Indeed, when the conversions would
intensify competition by lessening product differentiation, the observed ef-
fect on equilibrium prices would be similar to the predicted effect of lower
unit cost. We however ignore the possibility in the main analysis because
in the period considered the large majority of stations were still manned.
Section 2.6 discusses the effects of the changes in quality and product differ-
entiation in more detail.
2.3 Data
For our empirical analysis in this chapter, we use a subset of the 2005-2013
Athlon dataset spanning from October 1, 2005 to April 25, 2011 which con-
tains a total number of 4,259,183 price observations.10 Table 2.1 stresses the
two major trends in the period of investigation: a steady increase in the
number of unmanned stations (both on- and off highways) and a decrease
in the non-highway market share of the Major-6 brands. Table 2.B.2 pro-
vides summary statistics of these trends at the regional level. It shows that
the share of unmanned stations has significantly increased in all regions and
that the number of events (manned-to-unmanned and major-to-minor con-
versions) has been geographically dispersed. Due to this fact, it is reasonable
10For a detailed discussion of the data collection procedure and major characteristics of
this dataset, please refer to Section 1.3. Note that in this chapter RPR and ARA spot price
quotes are not used.
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Table 2.1: Development of the shares of unmanned and Major-6 stations in
2005-2011.
Oct ’05 Oct ’06 Oct ’07 Oct ’08 Oct ’09 Oct ’10 Apr ’11
All sites
unmanned 0.121 0.149 0.184 0.203 0.223 0.237 0.252
Major-4 0.494 0.477 0.459 0.451 0.442 0.437 0.435
Total 0.131 0.132 0.122 0.117 0.111 0.105 0.100
Q8 0.039 0.035 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.029
Highway sites
unmanned 0.021 0.042 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.059
Major-4 0.751 0.733 0.717 0.711 0.720 0.727 0.730
Total 0.103 0.097 0.104 0.109 0.105 0.101 0.097
Q8 0.064 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.054 0.055 0.055
Non-highway sites
unmanned 0.129 0.157 0.194 0.214 0.236 0.249 0.266
Major-4 0.475 0.458 0.440 0.432 0.422 0.417 0.414
Total 0.133 0.135 0.124 0.118 0.112 0.105 0.100
Q8 0.037 0.033 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.027
Note: For historical reasons, the group of Shell, Esso, BP and Texaco is often referred
to as the group of major firms. However, in terms of market share and brand premium,
it is natural to consider Shell, Esso, BP, Texaco, Total and Q8 as the set of major
stations. To avoid confusion, we will talk of the Major-4 and Major-6 firms, respectively.
to take these events as exogenous in the local competitor’s pricing decision,
conditional on the inclusion of station-level and time fixed effects.
2.3.1 Prices
Gasoline prices in the Netherlands have fluctuated widely over the last few
years. Figure 2.1 shows that fluctuations in average retail prices reflect
the dynamics of the crude oil spot price: They move closely in line with
the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) premium unleaded gasoline spot
price. The ARA price gradually increased until the onset of the Great Re-
cession in August 2008 initiated a sharp decline. In the two years following,
prices recovered and reached their previous peaks in Spring 2011.
2.3.2 Within-station differences and changes in local market
structure
Part A of Table 2.2 summarizes the changes at the station level in our data.
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Figure 2.1: Average retail gasoline price, ARA spot price, and crude oil
prices (Oct. 2005 – Apr. 2011).
of manned to unmanned sites, with many more such conversions off high-
ways than on highways. Off highways, the market share of unmanned fueling
stations has steadily grown from 13.1% in October 2005 to 26.5% in April
2011.11 The market share of unmanned stations in the highway market has
almost tripled in the same period, but is with 5.9% still modest. We also
observe a considerable drop in the number of non-highway sites carrying one
of the Major-6 brands (Shell, Esso, BP, Texaco, Total or Q8). In total, 247
non-highway (12 highway) sites of the Major-6 have been rebranded to an-
other brand, 68 (6) stations have made a change in the opposite direction.
With a market share over 14 percent, Shell is the market leader in 2011 de-
spite having lost 3 percentage points of its market share since January 2006.
Total has experienced the largest decrease in market share with a fall of
nearly 4 percentage points.12 Whereas the non-highway market has a signif-
icant share of other players, the Major-6 still own 88 percent of all highway
sites at the end of the sample period. Including non-highway stations, the
total market share of the Major-6 decreased with 10 percentage points to 56
percent during the sample period.
11That is, 874 out of 3303 stations. The number of 874 is higher than the 713 (=424+291-
2) that one would derive from Table 2.2 because it also includes the unmanned stations
that entered the market between 2005 and 2011.
12The market share of an individual firm is defined as the percentage of all gasoline
stations operating under one of the firm’s brand names. Table 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B gives
further details.
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Table 2.2: Number of sites that experienced changes in
site characteristics and local market characteristics.
A. Site characteristics
Unmanned Major-6
Highway Non-highway Highway Non-highway
31.12.2005 5 424 215 1997
NO → YES 7 291 6 68
YES → NO 0 2 12 247
Total number of sites
2005 233 3118
2011 237 3303
B. Local market characteristics
# non-highway sites Increase Decrease
≤5 km from highway site 135 [224] 102 [156]
≤2 km from non-highway site 951 [1221] 713 [837]
# unmanned non-highway sites Increase Decrease
≤5 km from highway site 159 [320] 46 [51]
≤2 km from non-highway site 1207 [1742] 270 [295]
# Major-6 non-highway sites Increase Decrease
≤5 km from highway site 109 [171] 146 [278]
≤2 km from non-highway site 647 [802] 1070 [1466]
# highway sites Increase Decrease
≤5 km from highway site 3 [3] 0 [0]
≤2 km from non-highway site 4 [4] 2 [2]
# unmanned highway sites Increase Decrease
≤5 km from highway site 5 [5] 0 [0]
≤2 km from non-highway site 7 [10] 0 [0]
# Major-6 highway sites Increase Decrease
≤5 km from highway site 14 [14] 16 [16]
≤2 km from non-highway site 20 [20] 21 [21]
Notes: Figures in brackets indicate the total number of events with double counts
(some sites experienced multiple events).
These changes at the station level have induced significant changes in the
local market context in which highway and non-highway stations operate.
Part B of Table 2.2 shows that 951 (135) non-highway (highway) stations
experienced an increase in the number of non-highway competitors within
a 2 km (5 km) radius and 713 (102) a decrease. In other words, both for
highway and non-highway stations competition by non-highway stations in-
tensified, at least when measured by the number of neighboring non-highway






















































































































Figure 2.2: Absolute mark up highway vs. non-highway sites
(01/10/2005–25/04/2011).
Note: Dates with less than 20 price quotes for highway sites and/or less
than 30 price quotes in total have been excluded.
artifact of gradual improvements in market coverage. Using the same 2 km
(5 km) radius, there were 1,207 non-highway (159 highway) sites that expe-
rienced an increase in the number of non-highway unmanned sites in their
neighborhood, resulting from either conversion or entry. Some sites experi-
enced multiple changes in their local environment: The numbers in brackets
reflect these double counts. Even though we observe only two sites converting
from unmanned to manned, there is a significant number of highway and non-
highway sites that saw the number of unmanned non-highway sites in their
neighborhood decrease at some point. This is because a number of unmanned
non-highway stations exited the market. A total of 1,070 non-highway (146
highway) stations saw at some point the number of non-highway Major-6
stations within a 2 km (5 km) radius decrease, while 647 (109) stations saw
an increase.13
2.3.3 Unmanned stations and price levels
The introduction of unmanned stations is an obvious route to cut cost. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows that the sharp increase of the number of unmanned stations in
the non-highway market has been accompanied by a similar sharp increase in
the highway/non-highway price differential (before 19% VAT). This differen-
tial has increased from 3 cpl in October 2005 to 5 cpl in April 2011. At first
13Note that both sets are not mutually exclusive.
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sight a 2-cent change may look benign, but realizing that the average retail
price in this period excluding excise duty and VAT has been 50.7 cpl makes
clear that 2 cents constitutes a big chunk of the companies’ profit margin.14
On the surface this lends support to the view propagated by oil companies
that competition off highways has become stronger because of the emergence
of unmanned stations (TankPro, 2014b). However, without further analysis
of the spillovers, one cannot tell whether the lower non-highway prices are
primarily caused by the pass-through of realized cost efficiencies, a reduction
of the non-highway product quality or a combination of the two. Section 2.2
showed that increased cost efficiency at converted stations may intensify com-
petition, manifesting itself in lower price levels at the converted station’s lo-
cal competitors. The effect of a decrease in product quality will give local
competitors room to increase prices instead. The next section will use this
opposite effect on competitors’ prices to identify the relative importance of
cost efficiency and the quality dimension in driving down non-highway price
levels.
2.4 Regression Analysis
The large-N large-T panel dataset we employ (N = 3,820, T = 1,847) allows
for a statistical model that includes both day-specific fixed effects and station-
specific fixed effects. The time fixed effects capture the time-varying price
components common to all highway and non-highway firms. The station-
specific fixed effects absorb all unobserved variables at the station level that
may be correlated with the other regressors. Including such a rich set of fixed
effects implies that in a reduced-form regression of prices on a number of
explanatory variables, only the coefficients of the time-varying regressors will
be identified. Fortunately, as we saw in Section 2.3.2, a considerable number of
such changes have taken place. Next to (time-variant) site characteristics such
as unmanned and brand name dummy variables, we include as explanatory
variables for non-highway (highway) stations local market characteristics such
as the log of the number of highway and non-highway sites within 2 km
(5 km), the log of the number of sites of a Major-6 brand within 2 km (5 km)
and the log of the number of unmanned sites within 2 km (5 km).15
14Hosken et al. (2008) report an average gross retail margin in the U.S. of 12%. Translated
to the Netherlands, this would amount to about 19 cpl.
15We use the natural logarithm of the number of neighbors (plus 1) because the price
effects of the 1st and the 10th neighbor will in general not be the same. The implicit
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H0xit + εit if Hi = 0
(2.9)
where Hi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if station i is located on a highway.
The dependent variable is the price pit at station i at day t (measured in euro-
cents per liter excluding taxes, i.e. excise duty and VAT). On the right-hand




t denote station-level and time fixed effects, respectively.
The time fixed effects capture the time-varying price components common
to all stations, such as variation in the price of crude oil and we expect this
effect to differ for highway (cH1t ) and non-highway (c
H0
t ) stations. The vec-
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′ comprises the time varying explanatory variables.
We allow these to have a different effect on highway (βH1) and non-highway
(βH0) price levels. Throughout, we cluster the errors εit at the location level
to account for the fact that, despite the inclusion of station-level and daily
time fixed effects, price observations at a given station may be characterized
by serial correlation or heteroskedasticity.16
Statistical tests clearly favor the above specification with station- and
time-fixed effects over a model with random station-specific effects. A Sargan-
Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions in the random effects specifica-
tion indicates that our specification with fixed effects is strongly preferred
(χ2(41) = 208.45, p < 0.001).17 We also test for the daily time fixed ef-
fects and conclude that we should include them (F (1846, 3819) = 25886.76,
p < 0.001).18
assumption in this specification is that new competitors will have a larger impact on prices
when the initial number of local competitors is lower. Adding 1 to the number of competitors
implies that the marginal effect of one new rival depends on the initial number of rivals xk:
∆p/∆xk = βk/(x
k+1), or ∆p = βk/(x
k+1) when ∆xk = 1. Therefore, the marginal effect
of an additional nth competitor is ∆p = βk/((n− 1) + 1) = βk/n. Hence it is βk for the 1st
rival, βk/2 for the 2
nd, βk/3 for the 3
rd, etc.
16A Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 282-283) on the residuals from the first-
differenced regression indeed finds significant (p < 0.001) serial correlation in the distur-
bances warranting the use of clustering. We cluster at the location level because there are
different firms that may operate the same site at different points in time. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that price observations are correlated not only at each station (firm),
but at the location level as well.
17We use the user-written Stata command xtoverid.
18The null of no highway-specific daily time fixed effects is also rejected (F (1846, 3819) =
17.87, p < 0.001). Therefore, we include both highway- and non-highway-specific time fixed
effects.
36 The proliferation of unmanned fuel retailing
Table 2.3: Fixed-effects regression of pit on explanatory variables.
Highway Non-highway
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Local market characteristics
ln(# hw. sites + 1) 1.8903*** (0.6459) 1.2007 (1.0257)
ln(# hw. unmanned sites + 1) -0.2959 (0.5185) -0.3914 (0.9980)
ln(# hw. Major-6 sites + 1) 0.9822 (0.6028) -0.2802 (0.6782)
ln(# non-hw. sites + 1) -0.7560** (0.3335) -0.7362*** (0.1542)
ln(# non-hw. unmanned sites + 1) 0.1616 (0.0990) -0.1820** (0.0719)
ln(# non-hw. Major-6 sites + 1) 0.5070** (0.2311) 0.1740 (0.1123)
Site characteristics
Unmanned -3.8115** (1.4927) -2.6008*** (0.1605)
Major-4 1.1623*** (0.4195) 1.6826*** (0.1808)
Total 0.8506 (0.5815) 2.2433*** (0.3279)
Q8 1.3708*** (0.4508) 1.4237*** (0.2407)
Station fixed effects YES
Day fixed effects YES
Obs. 4,153,898
R2 within 0.1055
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors are clustered at the site level.
2.4.1 Estimates
Table 2.3 presents the estimates. We find that both highway and non-highway
stations are cheaper when unmanned. The size of the effect is 3.8 cpl and
2.6 cpl, respectively, both significant at the 5% and 1% level.19 This supports
the view that stations will lower their price after they have converted into an
unmanned station. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that this direct effect
is equal for highway and non-highway sites (F (1, 3819) = 0.65, p = 0.420).
Pass-through of lower unit cost Next we consider whether the lower
prices at converted stations lead to price changes at local competitors. The
estimates in Table 2.3 detect significant (p = 0.011) competitive effects off
highways: Non-highway stations decrease their prices by on average 0.18 cpl
when the number of non-highway unmanned competitors within a 2 km ra-
dius increases from 0 to 1.20 The identification of positive competitive effects
points out that the pass-through of increased cost efficiency is the main force
19For the consumers, this translates to 4.5 cpl and 3.1 cpl, respectively due to the VAT.
Consistent with this, Soetevent et al. (2014) have estimated in previous work that off
highways, gasoline sold at unmanned stations is on average 2.6% cheaper.
20The spillover effect of the 2nd unmanned rival is approx. 0.1 cpl.
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that drives prices at converted stations down, not a reduction of product
quality due to less service.
For highway sites, we are not able to identify competitive effects from
nearby highway or non-highway competitors converting into an unmanned
station. One reason for this that only a small number of highway stations
has been converted, rendering relatively large standard errors. The circum-
stance that the share of unmanned sites is very low on-highway opens up
the possibility that the events have softened competition due to increased
product differentiation but the negative coefficient does not bear out this
explanation. While the coefficient on the number of local unmanned highway
sites is not significantly different from zero, a formal test cannot reject the
null of equality of the indirect effects for highway and non-highway stations
(F (1, 3819) = 0.05, p = 0.828). So we find that the sharp increase in the
number of non-highway unmanned stations has led to significant competitive
effects off highways but not on highways. This is consistent with the view
that the increased highway/non-highway price differential is at least partly
caused by the high number of conversions off highways.
Rebranding, entry and exit Table 2.3 further shows that off highways,
rebranding from one of the Major-6 brands to a minor leads to price levels
that are on average 1.4-2.2 cpl lower; for highway stations this effect is 0.9-
1.4 cpl. For non-highway sites, we do not identify significant competitive
effects of rebrandings. For highway stations, we observe that when the number
of nearby non-highway major-brand competitors goes up, prices increase by
up to 0.5 cpl. Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that identification of this coefficient
is mostly driven by events where a highway station experienced an increase
in the number of nearby non-highway minor-brand stations.
As for the manned-to-unmanned conversions, we conclude that reductions
in perceived product quality are of minor importance and do not lower firm-
level demand. The direct and competitive effects of major-to-minor conver-
sions seem to be determined by the pass-through of realized cost reductions.
A possible alternative explanation is that the price decreases are the result
from intensified competition due to decreased product differentiation, as ar-
gued by Hastings (2004) in her empirical analysis of the conversion of 260
independent unbranded retailers. We will address this issue in Section 2.6.
The competitive effects of entry and exit are as follows. The first non-
highway competitor in the local market lowers incumbent’s prices by 0.7-
0.8 cpl. The effect is similar for highway and non-highway stations (apart from
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the fact that for highway stations we take a 5 km and for non-highway stations
a 2 km circumference).21 This suggests that highway sites do compete with
non-highway sites conditional on being located sufficiently close to the smaller
roads.22 Finally we note that prices at highway sites increase with the number
of highway competitors within 5 km distance. This result is probably due to
the fact that entry in the highway market is highly regulated and almost
exclusively permitted at places where the road network expands. Therefore,
the estimate is likely to reflect increases in local highway traffic, allowing
stations to increase their highway premium.
Robustness checks We have tested the robustness of our estimates by
using different sub-samples for estimation. For example, we dropped days if
we observe less than one half of the maximum number of daily price quotes
(12 max(Nt)), because highly-frequented stations may be over-represented on
these days. In another test, we also excluded the bottom 10% of stations
in terms of the number of price quotes. Finally, because of our data collec-
tion method, we observe less price quotes on Wednesdays and Thursdays in
the first two years of our sample.23 The dataset is sufficiently long to allow
us to drop the first years of observations without losing precision. None of
these modifications changed our results either quantitatively or qualitatively.
The only notable change is that for highway sites, the number of highway
competitors within 5 km distance is only significant at the 10% level.
2.5 Event-study approach
The regression analysis in the previous section primarily considered the av-
erage direct and competitive price effects of a change in one of the station
characteristics. In this section, we consider more in detail what happens to
prices in the time period surrounding a change in local market constellation.
We also check whether the impact of a change is the same independent of
the direction of the change, as the model in Section 2.2 suggests and the
regressions of the previous section assume. The high frequency with which
21For the highway sites that experience local entry (exit) off highways, the median number
of non-highway sites within 5 km is 9 (13) prior to entry (exit).
22In line with this, we have noticed that some non-highway sites have placed big signs
on roofs of farms next to a highway-exit to direct drivers to their premises.
23The reason is that until February 2007, we were not collecting the data during weekends.
When we started to do so, the average number of price quotes per day jumped from roughly
1,400 to more than 2,000.
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our price data arrive allows us to apply event study analysis to this end.
Next to shedding light on possible asymmetries in the effects of
manned/unmanned conversions, rebranding from and to a major, and entries
and exits, event study analysis enables one to see how quickly prices respond
to the change and whether prices show any change prior to the event. The
latter is a real possibility. For example, competitors may anticipate the entry
by a new competitor by lowering their prices in advance. Also, the decision
to convert a manned station into an unmanned one may be related to partic-
ular negative price developments in the local market of that station. In these
cases, a simple comparison of price levels before and after the change would
underestimate the direct effect of converting into an unmanned station and
the competitive effect of entry, respectively.
2.5.1 Analytical setup
The empirical setup of our event study analysis is derived from MacKin-
lay (1997). Retail gasoline prices are almost perfectly correlated with highly
volatile crude oil prices. For any event study, we have to isolate the influence
of all factors except the event itself. Hence, we consider price deviations from
the average highway or non-highway market price, whichever is relevant:
p˜it =
{
pit − p¯H1t if Hi = 1
pit − p¯H0t if Hi = 0
As before, this transformation accounts for all possible time fixed effects
such as taxes, seasonal trends, or weekday-specific effects specific to the set
of highway or non-highway stations. In event studies on financial data, the
interest is in detecting abnormal returns in stock prices. Given our context,
we redefine returns as follows. The first difference of p˜it is taken as the ‘return’
of station i on day t. That is,
Rit = ∆p˜it = p˜it − p˜i,t−1 = µi + ζit (2.10)




terminology of MacKinlay (1997), this specification has the form of a mar-
ket model with the imposed constraint that prices at individual stations will
move with the general market and therefore show the same volatility. Other
than in a financial market context where µi measures a stock’s excess return
(as compensation for the risk borne), we have no reason to expect individual
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µ’s to significantly differ from zero.24 We have a couple of reasons for select-
ing this model specification.25 Firstly, the time series of prices at individual
outlets reveal that for most stations, the difference between the station’s price
and the national average price is very stable over time. Secondly, even though
we observe a considerable number of changes in local markets, individual sta-
tions are not very often exposed to an event with subsequent events in most
cases sufficiently separated in time for their effects on price returns not to
interfere, apart from cases were events happen simultaneously, e.g. a brand
name change and a manned-to-unmanned conversion.26
Our interest is in estimating abnormal price changes in the periods sur-
rounding the event. To that end, we define an 80-days event window as the
time period [−10, 70), containing the price observations from 10 days be-
fore to 70 days after the event. In order to identify whether an observed
price change in the event window is “abnormal”, we have to specify what
price changes we would normally expect. To do this, we employ the period
[−90,−10) prior to the event as an estimation window. In this configuration,
the estimation window is of the same length as the event window and long
enough to obtain consistent estimates of normal returns; the event window
is sufficiently wide to see the full adjustment of prices after the event day.
Having defined returns, the estimation and event window, abnormal re-
turns at dates τ within the event window are calculated as a difference be-
tween the actual and predicted return:
ARiτ = Riτ − µˆi (2.11)
The variance of ARiτ is simply equal the variance σ
2
ζi
. For a period [τ1, τ2]
within the event window, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)





Since in our setup the return is a price change, CARi can be interpreted as
the abnormal price level of station i.
24We indeed do not find any stations with a µi significantly different from zero at p = 0.10.
25The common alternative is the market model which assumes a stable linear relation
between, in our case, national price changes and station-level price changes. For details, see
MacKinlay (1997, pp. 18, 20-21).
26The maximum number of different events per station is 2 (at 5 sites only). Those events
are at least 7 months (217 days) apart hence the estimation and the event windows do not
overlap.
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To estimate the price effect of a particular event type (e.g. manned-to-
unmanned conversion), we need to aggregate for this event all abnormal re-
turn observations for the event window and across observations of the event.
In doing this, we assume that the different events are independent. In other
words, we rule out overlap between the different event windows at a given
station and higher order spillovers. Due to the small number of events per
station, this first assumption is not stringent. The second, slightly stronger
assumption imposes that, for example, a station that sees one of its competi-
tors convert into an unmanned site only responds to that event and not to
the possible price response of the converted station’s other competitors.
Given M events of a given type, e.g. manned-to-unmanned or non-major-







In aggregating abnormal returns, we again assume that the events are in-
dependent such that the covariances across events equal zero. This is not
unreasonable if events of a given type in a given region are sufficiently sepa-
rated in calendar time or space.27 The variance of average abnormal return
depends on the length of the estimation period (MacKinlay, 1997). Since








Using equations (2.13) and (2.14) the cumulative (average) abnormal return









27None of the sites in our data experience multiple events of a given type. Taking the
80-day event window [−10, 70) we have 24 instances (12.5% of the total) of overlap within
a 5 km distance for the event manned-to-unmanned; 6 (4.8%) for major-to-non-major, and
0 for non-major-to-major.
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Finally, to test the significance of CAR(τ1, τ2) against the null hypothesis




∼ N(0, 1) (2.17)
with the asymptotic distribution being the limiting distribution with respect
to the number of gasoline stations experiencing a certain event and the length
of the estimation window.
2.5.2 Results
We calculate the cumulative abnormal return CAR(τ1, τ2) with τ1 = −10 and
τ2 ∈ [−10, 70). Setting τ1 equal to the beginning of the event window yields
wide confidence intervals and thus a conservative test of the significance of
the cumulative abnormal returns.28 Our main interest is in the events of
manned/unmanned conversions and rebrandings from a Major-6 to a minor
station (or vice versa). To disentangle the effects of different event types,
we exclude in our analysis all 99 (out of 457 in total) cases where these two
events coincide at a site (e.g. sites that experience a manned/unmanned con-
version combined with a rebranding). Another 60 sites are excluded because
they have five or fewer observations in the estimation window. Finally we
exclude all highway stations from our analysis because of a lack of events.
Consequently, the number of events included in the sample is 151 for manned-
to-unmanned, 1 for unmanned-to-manned, 37 for non-major-to-major, and
109 for major-to-non-major conversions.
Manned/unmanned conversions Figure 2.3 depicts the cumulative ab-
normal returns for the manned-to-unmanned conversions (and vice versa)
for the sites that experience such a transformation (Figure 2.3a and c) and
for their non-highway competitors (Figure 2.3b and d). Stations becoming
unmanned reduce prices by roughly 2.2 cpl on the day of event.29 For this
abnormal return AR0, θ1 = 27.71 such that the null hypothesis of no impact
on the day of conversion is firmly rejected. After the event date, prices consis-
tently stay at this lower level, despite an upward jump at event day 7 (0.5 cpl,
28Recall from equation (2.16) that variance is accumulated day-by-day. Therefore, if any
results are significant for this choice of τ1, we can be sure that they will remain significant
in different specifications of CAR(τ∗1 , τ2) with τ
∗
1 ∈ (τ1, 0].
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Figure 2.3: Panels a and b: The cumulative abnormal returns at
non-highway sites (a) and at their neighboring non-highway competitors (b)
following a manned-to-unmanned conversion; panels c and d: idem for
unmanned-to-manned.
θ1 = 5.47), possibly because of the ending of special first-week discounts. The
chart shows that the part of the unit cost reduction that is passed through to
consumers is transferred immediately following the conversion. In line with
our regression estimates, panel (b) shows negative post-event cumulative ab-
normal returns of the order of -0.2 cpl for non-highway sites that neighbor
(2 km radius) a site that experienced a conversion. However none of these
spillover effects are significant at the 5-percent level. For completeness sake,
panels (c) and (d) show the direct and competitive effects from unmanned-
to-manned conversions. The small number of such events however prevents
us to draw any definite conclusions.
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Figure 2.4: Panels a and b: The cumulative abnormal returns at
non-highway sites (a) and at their neighboring non-highway competitors (b)
following a major-to-non-major conversion; panels c and d: idem for
non-major-to-major.
Major/minor rebrandings Figure 2.4a shows that the impact of a major
to non-major brand name change is approximately 1.2 cpl at the event date.
However, in contrast to the direct impact of manned-to-unmanned conver-
sions, this amounts to less than a half of the cumulative price decrease of
about 3.2 cpl that is realized at the end of the event window. Indeed, in the
40 days following the event, we observe 6 days with significant price decreases
in the range 0.15-0.3 cpl and only 1 day with a significant increase of the same
order of magnitude.30 Panel (c) shows that this effect is asymmetric: non-
major to major rebrandings have no significant long-term price impact. There
is a significant drop of 0.5 cpl at the event day (θ1 = 5.81), but this drop
30At the 5% significance level. These days are event day 8, 11, 19, 22, 33, and 40, and 9,
respectively.
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is only temporary. In other words, where both manned-to-unmanned conver-
sions and rebrandings lead to a significant decreases in a station’s price level,
the timing of the pass-through to consumers is very different. In case of a
rebranding, the new price level is reached much more gradually. Panels (b)
and (d) of Figure 2.4 do not reveal any significant competitive effects.
2.6 Discussion on countervailing spillover effects
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the spillover effects of rebranding or changes
in the type of operation may work in opposite directions, dependent on the
extent to which they lead to reductions in quality and/or unit cost. More-
over, the spillover effects of a competitor’s lower marginal cost are possibly
negated by the softened competition due to an increase in vertical product
differentiation. In this section, we shed more light on the interaction of these
competitive effects and the mechanism of local competition between retailers.
As we have discussed earlier, unmanned stations are of lower quality
than the manned sites. Something similar holds for the minor brand and
the Major-6 stations although the quality difference that results from this is
much smaller. Major-branded sites often have a wider selection of and higher
quality fuels that lead to slightly higher (perceived) quality.31 Nevertheless,
we doubt that a wider range of fuels increases the station quality as much as
the presence of a shop. Consequently, one can rank the gasoline stations in
terms of quality as follows: 1) Major-6 manned, 2) minor manned, 3) Major-6
unmanned, and 4) minor unmanned. Based on this ranking we can study the
competitive effects of manned-to-unmanned conversions in more detail. As
in the previous sub-section, we limit our attention to non-highway stations.
Compare a manned-to-unmanned conversion in the neighborhood of a
Major-6 manned and a Major-6 unmanned station. The competitive effects
due to the reductions in quality and unit cost are identical for both stations.
However, differences in quality should lead to a different response to changes
in product differentiation. Prices at competing Major-6 unmanned stations
should drop because they observe a decrease in product differentiation (in-
crease in γ) (cf. Proposition 2.1). At Major-6 manned stations prices should
jump because they face an increase in product differentiation (lower γ). The
same reasoning applies for the non-major manned and unmanned sites.
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following model separately for
31For example, Major-6 stations offer premium fuels with more additives to reduce engine
wear, increase fuel economy, or clean the fuel system.
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Table 2.4: Fixed-effects regressions of pit on explanatory variables for the
sub-samples of Major-6 and non-major non-highway stations.
Manned Unmanned
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Sub-sample: Major-6 stations
ln(# non-hw. unmanned sites + 1) -0.1699* (0.0909) -0.6990** (0.2832)
ln(# non-hw. Major-6 sites + 1) 0.2977** (0.1352) 0.2056 (0.5494)
Sub-sample: non-major brand stations
ln(# non-hw. unmanned sites + 1) -0.3289* (0.1681) 0.0172 (0.1511)
ln(# non-hw. Major-6 sites + 1) 0.1884 (0.2586) 0.2788 (0.2099)
Local market controls YES
Station fixed effects YES
Day fixed effects YES
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors clustered at the site level.










U1xit + εit if Ui = 1
where Ui is a dummy variable equal to 1 if station i is unmanned. This model
as well as the notation is equivalent to that in equation (2.9).
Table 2.4 presents the coefficient estimates of the variables of interest.
Other controls included are identical to those in Table 2.3. Note that we only
observe the net effect on prices. Therefore, we interpret the differences in
the coefficient estimates of the number of unmanned neighbors as a result of
changes in product differentiation because the price differences due to changes
in quality and unit cost of the competitors are the same for manned and
unmanned sites (cf. Proposition 2.1). For the Major-6 stations we find that
both manned and unmanned stations significantly reduce prices by up to 0.2
and 0.7 cpl respectively if their direct competitor transforms from manned
to unmanned. Hence the negative unit cost spillover effect dominates the
positive quality and product differentiation effects at both the manned and
unmanned sites but is significantly stronger at the unmanned sites (we reject
the null of equality, F (1, 2153) = 3.25, p = 0.072), because the effect of lower
product differentiation reinforces the spillover effect of lower unit cost.
For the non-major manned sites, we observe similar effects as for the
Major-6 manned stations – a net price drop of 0.3 cpl (for the first unmanned
competitor). However, minor brand unmanned stations do not respond to
conversions from manned to unmanned retailing at all. One explanation may
be that the spillover effect of change in quality countervails the effects of
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changes in unit cost and product differentiation. But this does not seem to
be the case knowing that the price response of Major-6 unmanned sites is
more than twice that of manned stations. From the estimates in Table 2.3
though one can deduce that ceteris paribus, minor brand unmanned gasoline
stations are the cheapest retailers in the market. Hence it is likely that they
price close to the marginal cost and simply have no profit margin left to
spare.
As a reliability check of stations’ ranking in terms of quality, we also look
at the spillover effects of major-to-minor (and minor-to-major) conversions.
We find that the spillover effect of a minor-to-major rebranding at all four
groups of stations is up to 0.2-0.3 cpl and not significantly different between
sub-groups.32 Although we cannot quantitatively compare the spillover effects
due to reduction in unit cost of manned-to-unmanned transitions vis-a`-vis
major-to-minor conversions, we show that the reduction in quality in the
latter scenario is negligible as we have argued earlier.
To conclude, the effect of the reduction in marginal cost dominates those
of lower quality and increased vertical product differentiation. We also show
that changes in station’s brand do not lead to significant differences neither
in quality nor in product differentiation. Finally, despite the countervailing
effects of lower unit cost, lower quality and higher/lower product differentia-
tion, the former dominates the latter two. Therefore, one can conclude that
the emergence of unmanned gasoline retailing in the Netherlands has signif-
icantly contributed to the widening gap between highway and non-highway
prices, not only directly but via spillovers within local markets as well.
2.7 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has investigated the consequences of the sharp increase in un-
manned retailing that has been observed in several European countries. One
market where these developments have played out is the Dutch retail gaso-
line market in the years from 2005 to 2011. This market is the focus of our
empirical analysis.
Using a set of day and station fixed effects, we find that converted stations
reduce pre-tax prices with on average 3.8 and 2.6 cpl on- and off highways,
respectively. Moreover, non-highway conversions generate significant compet-
32We tested for the equality of the effects between manned and unmanned sites for
Major-6 and minor brand sub-samples and failed to reject the null hypothesis in both
cases: F (1, 2153) = 0.03, p = 0.873, and F (1, 1688) = 0.09, p = 0.759 respectively.
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itive effects which is indicative of the price reductions at converted sites being
the effect of pass-through of increased cost efficiency, not of worsened product
quality. This evidence is important fuel for the public debate in some Euro-
pean countries on whether or not unmanned stations should be prohibited
through legislation.
The application of event study analysis allowed us to consider in more
detail the dynamics of the adjustment process towards the lower equilib-
rium price level. The main finding is that this adjustment is immediate. We
contrast this with the price adjustment process following another frequently
occurring event, i.e. the rebranding from a major to a non-major. This also
leads to significantly lower prices at the rebranded location, but the adjust-
ment towards the new price level is much more gradual and takes one to two
months.
While the event study approach is widely used in finance to measure for
example the effect of financial statements on a firm’s stock market price, this
is the first application of event study analysis to non-financial retail price
data. Our results show the added value of this approach in increasing our
understanding of pricing. Given the increased availability of detailed price
data we envision an increased use of this tool. We hope that this study
will stimulate the use of similar research approaches in empirical work on
other retail markets that are characterized by frequent price changes and
consumer search, such as the markets for groceries, financial products and
online markets.
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2.A Proof of Proposition 2.1
To find the effect on equilibrium price of a change in own marginal cost, take








4bibj − c2 + 1
=
(4bibj − c2)− (2bibj − c2)















because bj > 0 and c = γ/δ > 0 for goods that are substitutes (γ > 0).
























































i = 1, 2 j = 3− i.
In the final step, we insert c = γ/δ and bj = βi/δ.
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In the penultimate step, c is replaced with γ/δ and bj with β1/δ. The in-
equality follows because βi > 0 and we have assumed γ > 0.
The proof that
∂pBi
∂γ < 0 for i = 1, 2 if γ > 0 is straightforward. For i = 1,
equation (2.5) can, after some manipulations, be rewritten as




(2β1β2 − γ2)(α1 −m1)− β1γ(α2 −m2)
]
.
Taking the derivative of pB1 with respect to γ leads to an expression with
(δ2D)2 = (4β1β2 − γ2)2 > 0 in the denominator and as nominator:
δ2D [2γ(m1 − α1) + β1(m2 − α2)] +
+2γ
[
(2β1β2 − γ2)(α1 −m1)− β1γ(α2 −m2)
]
= −4β1β2γ(α1 −m1)− β1(γ2 + 4β1β2)(α2 −m2) < 0,
where the inequality follows from the condition αi −mi > 0 for i = 1, 2. 
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2.B Additional figures and tables
(a) Manned station.
(b) Unmanned station.
Figure 2.B.1: Examples of manned (a) and unmanned (b) stations.
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Table 2.B.3: Abnormal returns (in eurocents per liter) for different event
types.
manned to unmanned non-major to major major to non-major
τ ARτ s.e. θ1 ARτ s.e. θ1 ARτ s.e. θ1
-10 -0.116 0.104 1.119 -0.044 0.098 0.446 -0.167** 0.083 2.015
-9 -0.233** 0.098 2.382 -0.081 0.098 0.819 0.053 0.079 0.672
-8 -0.102 0.123 0.827 0.017 0.113 0.155 -0.178** 0.089 1.998
-7 0.145 0.110 1.313 0.000 0.092 0.002 -0.023 0.073 0.312
-6 -0.083 0.125 0.668 -0.079 0.103 0.774 0.014 0.085 0.167
-5 0.021 0.098 0.213 -0.001 0.100 0.013 -0.077 0.091 0.847
-4 0.133 0.150 0.883 0.196** 0.097 2.027 0.021 0.086 0.246
-3 0.166 0.111 1.496 0.028 0.091 0.314 -0.274*** 0.094 2.899
-2 0.009 0.124 0.070 -0.162 0.103 1.572 0.147 0.096 1.533
-1 -0.246 0.153 1.611 -0.046 0.116 0.395 -0.136 0.106 1.283
0 -2.229*** 0.080 27.711 -0.519*** 0.089 5.809 -1.218*** 0.063 19.389
1 -0.089 0.092 0.972 0.075 0.101 0.744 0.072 0.076 0.950
2 0.090 0.101 0.898 -0.026 0.103 0.251 -0.001 0.085 0.006
3 0.058 0.082 0.714 -0.017 0.098 0.175 -0.047 0.081 0.580
4 -0.098 0.096 1.015 0.014 0.121 0.120 0.059 0.073 0.809
5 -0.009 0.092 0.102 0.264** 0.103 2.561 -0.043 0.079 0.549
6 0.091 0.090 1.010 -0.112 0.099 1.127 -0.146* 0.075 1.941
7 0.519*** 0.095 5.466 -0.070 0.091 0.771 0.046 0.074 0.620
8 0.028 0.097 0.290 0.127 0.098 1.292 -0.265*** 0.072 3.677
9 -0.185** 0.093 1.992 0.055 0.110 0.504 0.188** 0.077 2.451
10 -0.158 0.101 1.567 0.091 0.100 0.907 -0.056 0.081 0.693
11 -0.029 0.097 0.294 -0.170* 0.091 1.875 -0.285*** 0.078 3.655
12 -0.045 0.088 0.510 0.065 0.108 0.601 0.122 0.076 1.600
13 0.117 0.081 1.443 -0.011 0.097 0.118 0.122 0.087 1.406
14 -0.122 0.131 0.928 0.065 0.109 0.596 -0.146** 0.071 2.068
15 0.052 0.142 0.370 0.053 0.112 0.474 0.091 0.075 1.208
16 -0.073 0.083 0.870 -0.020 0.098 0.202 -0.083 0.075 1.104
17 0.101 0.086 1.167 -0.164* 0.098 1.664 -0.053 0.083 0.636
18 -0.119 0.113 1.055 -0.008 0.094 0.084 0.004 0.083 0.043
19 0.153 0.126 1.215 0.134 0.101 1.325 -0.163** 0.077 2.110
20 0.081 0.121 0.674 0.007 0.102 0.065 -0.149* 0.078 1.911
21 -0.066 0.097 0.686 0.266** 0.111 2.396 0.110 0.072 1.523
22 0.055 0.081 0.681 -0.116 0.098 1.187 -0.189** 0.078 2.429
23 -0.227*** 0.088 2.581 0.016 0.101 0.163 0.093 0.078 1.198
24 0.083 0.093 0.895 -0.030 0.111 0.276 -0.110 0.077 1.422
25 -0.038 0.106 0.360 -0.086 0.111 0.778 -0.064 0.079 0.808
26 0.025 0.136 0.183 -0.129 0.110 1.172 -0.046 0.083 0.551
27 0.137 0.095 1.442 -0.003 0.104 0.030 0.157* 0.084 1.884
28 -0.059 0.097 0.609 0.032 0.101 0.320 -0.152* 0.084 1.813
29 -0.117 0.087 1.339 0.257*** 0.089 2.889 -0.014 0.085 0.163
30 -0.022 0.082 0.273 -0.126 0.102 1.241 0.085 0.077 1.108
31 -0.090 0.100 0.903 -0.102 0.100 1.015 0.074 0.078 0.951
32 -0.036 0.092 0.387 0.060 0.105 0.566 0.026 0.080 0.324
33 0.094 0.107 0.876 0.051 0.101 0.506 -0.161** 0.072 2.252
34 0.093 0.081 1.148 -0.012 0.111 0.110 -0.142* 0.086 1.657
35 0.017 0.093 0.186 0.336*** 0.105 3.191 -0.120 0.077 1.560
36 0.097 0.098 0.989 -0.393*** 0.098 4.014 0.010 0.081 0.122
37 -0.297*** 0.090 3.303 -0.094 0.099 0.948 0.159* 0.095 1.684
38 0.327*** 0.089 3.677 0.258** 0.113 2.284 0.009 0.077 0.119
39 0.045 0.084 0.533 -0.205* 0.120 1.717 -0.108 0.078 1.386
40 0.038 0.096 0.392 -0.008 0.104 0.081 -0.172** 0.082 2.100
Notes: For a given event, ARτ is the sample average abnormal return at event day τ .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Do the choices of consumers who search for a product’s best price exhibit risk-
neutral, risk-averse or loss-averse risk attitudes in the money dimension? In
current research in industrial organization, two approaches to modeling risk
preferences co-exist. In studies where consumer risk attitudes are not central
to the analysis, consumers are simply assumed to be risk neutral with the
decision to search being the outcome of a rational cost-benefit analysis.1 A
second, more recent strand of literature enriches the modeling of consumer
preferences with elements from behavioral economics such as reference depen-
dent preferences and loss aversion. In this approach, consumers are assumed
to experience gain-loss utility relative to a reference point with the losses
having a higher impact on consumer well-being than equivalent gains.2
The literature thus postulates either risk neutrality or loss aversion at
*This chapter is based on Soetevent and Bruzˇikas (2016).
1E.g. Janssen and Shelegia (2015); Haan and Moraga-Gonzalez (2011).
2E.g. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014) incorporate loss aversion in the money/price (and
product) dimension to explain the empirical phenomenon of regular sales. Herweg and
Mierendorff (2013) use consumer loss aversion to explain the wide use of flat-rate tariffs.
Other recent examples of IO studies with gain-loss utility in the price dimension are Car-
bajal and Ely (2016); Karle and Peitz (2014); Karle, Kirchsteiger and Peitz (2015).
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the demand side and focuses on the implications for the design of optimal
price distributions by profit-maximizing firms. Probably due to its emphasis
on equilibrium price distributions, two issues have remained relatively unex-
plored. First, direct empirical evidence on how risk attitudes influence the
decisions of agents in stylized situations of sequential search by considering
actual choices is extremely limited.3 Most of the existing evidence is indirect
in the form of observed price distributions that can only be an equilibrium
outcome in a model in which consumers are not risk neutral. We believe that
additional justification for the modeling assumptions in the form of direct
evidence is useful. We provide such evidence and test whether findings on
risk and loss aversion can be extrapolated to the task domain of price search.
Second, with an exception of Kohn and Shavell (1974), no models in
sequential search explicitly study how risk aversion instead of loss aversion
affects a consumer’s reservation price strategies.4 As we will elaborate below,
the neglect of risk aversion – in favor of loss aversion – is to some extent
justified both by theoretical arguments and by indirect evidence derived from
observed price distributions. However it would be comforting to have direct
evidence that models with loss aversion fit empirical data on actual search
decisions at least as well as competing models that incorporate risk aversion.
We aim to provide such evidence by deriving the theoretical implications
of different risk attitudes (risk neutrality, risk aversion and loss aversion)
on an agent’s willingness to pay (WTP) for continued search in a simple
problem of sequential search. We subsequently present stylized versions of
this problem to empirical subjects and evaluate which of the models best
fits the data. We show how the relation between the WTP for continued
search and the variance of the price distribution is dependent on the consumer
having risk-neutral, risk-averse or loss-averse preferences. More specifically,
we prove that when prices are normally distributed and the consumer is risk
neutral, a mean-preserving reduction in the variance decreases the WTP to
sample again, independent of the currently observed best price. In contrast,
for risk- and loss-averse consumers, this positive correlation only holds when
the current best price is sufficiently low.
Our approach and presentation differs in two ways from studies on search
in IO that commonly consider equilibrium price distributions. Throughout,
we take the price distribution as exogenously given. This allows us to focus
3Schunk and Winter (2009) is an exception.
4The final section of Kohn and Shavell (1974) also considers the impact of risk aversion
on the decision to continue search.
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on the decision-making problem of a consumer who currently observes a price
and has to decide whether or not to sample again from a given distribution.5
Also, most studies on search impose a fixed and constant search cost per
sample and, conditional on this cost, derive the buyer’s reservation price.
That is, once the buyer samples a price lower than or equal to his reservation
price, he will stop searching and purchase. We instead will condition on the
currently observed best price and derive how much the consumer is willing to
pay for another price observation. This presentation is primarily motivated
by our empirical implementation in which we ask subjects to state how much
they are willing to pay for another sample. As we shall illustrate, for all
assumptions made on consumer risk preferences, there is a simple monotonic
relation between the WTP and the reservation price.6
As said, the literature on search is remarkably void of theoretical models
with risk-averse expected utility maximizing consumers.7 There seem to be
two main reasons for the absence of risk aversion in search theory. First, the
focus in this field is on the (mixed-strategy) equilibrium price distributions
that result from different underlying models of consumer decision making
than on studying the actual decisions of consumers who are in a price search
situation. Models that assume loss-averse consumers are able to generate
rich equilibrium price distributions with discontinuities that offer an expla-
nation for important characteristics of empirically observed price patterns,
such as sales (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2014). In turn, the fact that such price
patterns are observed is indirect evidence for the presence of loss-averse con-
sumers. Lacking the kink in the utility function at the reference point, models
with risk-averse consumers have much less interesting implications for equi-
librium price distributions. Second, the search cost and the price of the goods
considered are usually modest compared to the searching consumer’s wealth.
Combined with the forceful argument by Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler
(2001) that expected utility theory should be abandoned as an explanation
for risk aversion over modest stakes, this has been an important motivation
for theorists to focus on loss aversion and not risk aversion as the relevant
5Carlson and McAfee (1983) also assume a price distribution that is unrelated to the
equilibrium distribution.
6The willingness to pay is sometimes also called the ex ante compensating variation,
since it indicates how much a buyer who initially faces a (in our case, degenerate) price
distribution F is willing to pay to replace F with another distribution G. That is, for a
consumer endowed with income m and an indirect utility function V (·), the WTP s∗ is the




V (p,m− s)dG (see Schlee, 2008).
7We ignore the literature on insurance markets in which risk aversion of course plays an
important role.
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risk attitude to study.
At first sight, one may believe that the results of contributions which do
not make any assumptions at all on the underlying risk preferences encompass
the case with risk-averse agents. An example is Stahl (1989) where buyers
continue sampling observations as long as the expected consumer surplus
exceed the cost of search.8 However, as Stennek (1999) and Schlee (2008) have
pointed out, expected consumer surplus as a measure of a buyer’s willingness
to pay to for another price observation is problematic in case the buyer is not
risk neutral in the money dimension. Because of its elegance and relatedness
to the problem we study in this chapter, we quote Stennek’s (1999, p. 266)
exposition of this problem in full:
“Consider a consumer with an income, m, who has a unit
demand for the commodity, and a willingness to pay α ≤ m.
Hence, there are no income or price effects. Assume that the price
is stochastic, but that p ≤ α. The residual incomem−p is spent on
a composite commodity with a unitary price. Since the consumer
always consumes one unit of the good, his ordinal utility can
be measured by his consumption of the composite good, that is
m − p. If the consumer dislikes variations in the consumption
of the composite good (utility is a concave function of m − p),
the consumer is risk-averse with respect to variations in residual
income. Hence, a mean-preserving reduction in the variance of
the price would increase the consumer’s welfare. The consumer’s
surplus is defined as the area under the demand function above
the price line, that is α−p. Let Ep denote the expected price, then
the expected consumer’s surplus is α−Ep, which is independent
of price dispersion. That is, relying on the consumer’s surplus,
one would falsely conclude that the consumer does not value a
stabilization of the price at its mean.”
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our stylized problem
of sequential search with costless recall. We show how the relation between
the WTP for continued search and the variance of the price distribution
is dependent on the consumer having risk-neutral, risk-averse or loss-averse
preferences. In Section 3.3, we use this result in our identification strategy
to separate choices consistent with risk-neutral risk attitudes from choices
indicative of risk- and/or loss-averse risk attitudes in the price dimension.
8We thank Alexei Parakhonyak for directing our attention to this issue.
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We elicit the WTP of over 300 individuals who each face four situations that
differ in whether the current best price and the price variance is either high
or low. The results of this non-incentivized experiment show support for the
specifications with risk or loss aversion.9 Both models have a good fit with
the data for parameter values of risk and loss aversion, respectively, similar to
those estimated in other decision domains. This is reassuring because it jus-
tifies recent efforts in industrial economics to develop theory that shows how
alternative risk attitudes by buyers impact equilibrium price distributions.
3.2 Price uncertainty and search
The stylized version of the decision problems that we present to our subjects
is as follows. Figure 3.1 shows four combinations of price distributions and
current best prices. Panels a and c show distributions with high price varia-
tion σH whereas the variance is low (σL) in panels b and d; in panels a and b
the current best price is low (pL) whereas in panels c and d it is high (pH). In
each of these cases, one can ask how much an agent, who currently observes
price pL or pH , is willing to pay for one more draw from the given price
distribution. This is a problem of sequential search with costless recall. As
we formally show in Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3, it turns out that the prediction
regarding the agent’s WTP critically depends on whether the agent is risk
neutral, risk averse or loss averse in the money dimension. For risk-neutral
agents, a reduction in price uncertainty reduces the expected benefits of con-
tinued search, both when the currently observed price pL is low (pL < µ, a
move from panel a to b), but also when the currently observed price pH is
high (pH > µ, a move from panel c to d).
10 Specifications that incorporate ei-
ther risk aversion or loss aversion instead predict an inversion: the willingness
to pay for continued search following a reduction in price variance decreases
when the current best price is low but increases when this current best price
is sufficiently high.
One reason to focus our design on how changes in price uncertainty affect
search decisions are the different empirical implications for models with risk
neutrality on the one hand and risk and loss aversion on the other hand.
9For evidence on stated preferences being similar to revealed preferences, see e.g. Kester-
nich et al. (2013).
10How is this in search without recall? Well, in that case the agent stops searching iff.
p1 ≤ E[p] + s. Clearly, since a change in σ does not alter either the left-hand side nor the
right-hand side of this equation, a change in σ does not change the expected benefits of
continued search.
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(a) Current price low, σ high.


















(b) Current price low, σ low.


















(c) Current price high, σ high.


















(d) Current price high, σ low
Figure 3.1: A price distribution with high (panels a and c: N(15, 5)) and
low (b and d: N(15, 2)) price variation. The currently observed price is
either low (a and b: pL = 10) or high (c and d: pH = 20).
Another reason is that recent contributions in theory have established a con-
nection between price uncertainty and the information provided to consumers
about the common cost components of firms. One empirical example of a
market where common cost components form a major determinant of prices
and where firms can credibly inform consumers about these costs is the retail
gasoline market. In this market, prices are to a great extent determined by
the gasoline spot market price. Janssen et al. (2011) build on Stahl (1989) to
incorporate cost uncertainty into the search literature. One of their results
is that in a sequential search model with production cost uncertainty, the ex
ante price uncertainty (as measured by the price spread) is higher when con-
sumers are uninformed about the firms’ cost realization, a situation similar
to panels 3.1a and 3.1c. Janssen et al. (2011) also cite the pricing by gas sta-
tions as a motivation for their work, as does the earlier Benabou and Gertner
(1993). In their models however, firms cannot give credible signals about the
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common cost and consumers have to infer this from the observed prices.11
Whereas these studies study the implications for certain characteristics of the
equilibrium price distributions, such as the price expectation and equilibrium
price spread, our aim instead is to uncover how searching consumers actually
respond to changes in price uncertainty.
Before we move on to the empirical application, we first state the the-
oretical results that motivate the design of our test. Section 3.2.1 gives the
empirical predictions for the case with risk-neutral consumers. Given that this
is the default assumption in most studies, it is no surprise that the analytical
results we present in this section are not new and have appeared elsewhere
often in a different form and context. This section is followed by two others
that present results for the cases with risk- or loss-averse consumers. This
approach and these findings are new.
3.2.1 Risk-neutral consumers
Theories of sequential search with costless recall commonly assume that
agents with unit demand for a good continue to search until the expected
benefit of further search is smaller than the fixed cost s of sampling one more
observation from a distribution F (p) of prices charged by firms12. That is,
the agent will stop searching if the currently observed best price p1 satisfies
the familiar condition:
p1 ≤ E[min(p, p1)] + s or, equivalently
∫ p1
0
F (p)dp ≤ s. (3.1)
That is, an agent’s optimal strategy is to continue search as long as the lowest
price observed is greater than p∗, with p∗ being the reservation price that is
the solution to
∫ p∗
0 F (p)dp = s. Stated differently s(p1) =
∫ p1
0 F (p)dp denotes
the WTP for continued search when the current best price is p1: the agent
continues her search as long as s(p1) > s.
An important step in arriving at this result is that the agent’s utility is
assumed to be linear in prices/wages. This effectively equates the objective
of maximizing expected utility to the maximization of expected payoffs by a
risk-neutral agent.
11In other work (Bruzˇikas et al., 2016) we provide empirical evidence that in the Dutch
retail gasoline market, firms do use their price boards to inform consumers about their
recommended price. This recommended price closely follows fluctuations in the spot price
of crude oil. Since this is an important cost component common to all firms, oil companies
effectively inform consumers about the realization of a common cost component.
12Stigler (1961); Rothschild (1973); Lippman and McCall (1976); Reinganum (1979);
Weitzman (1979).
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Proposition 3.1 (Risk-neutral agents) Suppose that prices are distributed
p ∼ N(µ, σ) and that this is common knowledge. Then, given a current best
price p1 ∈ (0, p¯), with p¯ ≡ F−1(1 − F (0)), the WTP for continued search
s(p1) =
∫ p1
0 F (p;µ, σ)dp is increasing in σ for p1 > 0:
13
Proof: All proofs of propositions in this chapter are in Appendix 3.A.
In other words, independently of the price currently observed, an increase
in the value of σ (without changing µ) will increase the expected benefits of
continued search to risk-neutral agents. This is what Be´nabou and Gertner
(1993, p. 83) dub the variance effect : “Given that buyers can return to the
first store costlessly, an increase in the variance . . . of the conditional distribu-
tion increases the option value of search.” They already note that an increase
in the unconditional variance of the common cost component leads to such
an increase in the conditional variance. Also, the result of Proposition 3.1
appears for general distributions as a corollary in Kohn and Shavell (1974,
p. 115).14
We will however show next this variance effect no longer holds in settings
with risk-averse agents whose preferences are described by a CARA utility
function.
3.2.2 Risk-averse consumers
Consider a risk-averse agent with CARA risk preferences u(w) = − 1γ e−γw
(with w current wealth and γ ∈ R+) who observes price draws out of a
N(µ, σ)-distribution.15 The agent has to decide between stopping and buying
at the current best price or to search once more.16 If the agent buys the
product at the best price p1 observed so far, her utility is
u(Stop|w − p1; γ) = −1
γ
e−γ(w−p1) (3.2)
13Note that if, as we will do, µ and σ are chosen such that the probability of observing
negative prices is zero, F (0) = 0, the upper bound p¯ = +∞.
14Their Corollary 20 reads: “If the utility function is linear, a mean-preserving increase
in risk can only raise the switchpoint level of utility.” The agent will stop searching if and
only if the utility of the best price is higher than the switchpoint level.
15In all situations we consider, the agent buys the good so we submerge the gross utility
of consuming the good in w. Formally, we assume that consumers face the outside option
of minus infinity in case of no purchase.
16Note that with risk-averse agents, it is important to impose that continued search im-
plies only one more draw, because, as pointed out by Kohn and Shavell (1974, p. 114), even
for risk-averse agents the option value of search may increase following a mean-preserving
increase in risk if they are allowed to sample many times.
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Her expected utility in case of continued search, paying a cost s for one more
search, is






P (p ≤ p1)E[e−γ(w−p−s)|p ≤ p1]




Equating (3.2) and (3.3) and solving for s via a number of manipulations
(see Appendix 3.A.2) leads to following proposition concerning the agent’s
maximum willingness to pay s(p1) to continue search:
Proposition 3.2 (Risk-averse agents) Suppose that prices are distributed
p ∼ N(µ, σ) and that this is common knowledge. For a risk-averse agent with
CARA risk preferences u(w) = − 1γ e−γw (with w current wealth and γ ∈ R+
the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion), the willingness to pay
s(p1) to sample one more observation when the best price encountered so far
is p1, equals:














where x ≡ (p1 − µ)/σ
√
2 and x˜ ≡ (p1 − µ − γσ2)/σ
√
2. Furthermore, there
exists a unique price pR1 such that
ds(p1)
dσ
> 0 (< 0) if p1 < p
R
1 (p1 > p
R
1 ).
For x˜ close to 0, pR1 is approximated by









Proposition 3.2 shows an inversion in the response to changes in price
uncertainty: a reduction in price uncertainty will decrease the option value
of searching once more for risk-averse consumers whose current best price is
sufficiently low. For risk-averse consumers for whom the current best price
however is at the high end of the price distribution the option value of one
more search will increase following a decrease in price uncertainty. The intu-
ition is that in a situation of large price uncertainty, especially agents whose
current best price is high can potentially receive a much better price by
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searching once more. However, risk aversion has the effect of lowering the util-
ity associated with larger gains. Therefore, for risk-averse consumers whose
current best price is high, the option value to continue search is higher after
a mean-preserving reduction in the variance of the price distribution because
in expected utility, the decreases in the probability of large gains are out-
weighed by the increases in the probability of small gains. The result also
shows that if the current best price is sufficiently low, the latter effect can
no longer compensate for the negative impact of the former.17 Finally, note
that if consumers are risk-neutral (γ = 0), the result in Proposition 3.2 cor-
responds with that in Proposition 3.1, i.e. an increase in price uncertainty
will unambiguously increase the WTP for continued search for all values of
p1 because limγ↓0 pˆR1 =∞.
3.2.3 Loss-averse consumers
Next we consider the case with loss-averse agents. Following Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2007), the agent’s utility is now specified as u(w|r) ≡ m(w) +
µ (m(w)−m(r)) with w a wealth level and r a reference wealth level. The
first term m(w) denotes a reference independent consumption utility. The
second term is the gain-loss utility function, which reflects that the agent
experiences a loss (gain) when her outcome is less (more) than the reference
level. We will assume that consumption utility is linear, m(w) = w, and use
the common piecewise linear specification of the gain-loss function:{
η(w − r) if w > r;
ηλ(w − r) if w ≤ r. (3.5)
In this expression, η is a weight that reflect the relative importance of gain-
loss utility to the agent compared to consumption utility. Throughout, we
normalize the weight on gains by setting η = 1. This is a common approach
and without loss of much generality. λ ≥ 1 is the parameter of loss aversion.
Loss neutrality corresponds to λ = 1. We assume that the agent takes the
current best price as the reference point with respect to which gains and
losses are evaluated: r = p1. There is no consensus in the literature on how
reference points with respect to prices are formed. As in Zhou (2011), we
17We leave it to future work to prove this for other distributions. Kaplan and Menzio
(2015) find that empirical price distributions typically are symmetric and unimodal but
leptokurtic, that is, having thicker tails and more mass around the mean than a Normal
distribution with the same mean and variance. We believe that adding the latter properties
to our model would not change our findings while considerably complicating the analysis.
Chapter 3 65
assume the the agent takes the current best price as her reference point. This
seems reasonable: the agent experiences a loss if she ends up paying net more
(including the search cost) after having searched one more shop than when
she would have decided to stop searching and buy at price p1. Finding a price
that is sufficiently low that the cost of search are covered leads to a gain. One
interpretation is that “no search” is the status quo that serves as the agent’s
reference point.18
The loss-averse agent compares the net benefit of buying at the current
best price u(Stop|p1) = w − p1 with the utility from continued search. The
latter is the sum of expected consumption utility plus the expected value of
the gain-loss value function:
u(Continue|p1) = w − p1 − s+ P (p ≤ p1)E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1]
+η
[
P (p ≤ p1 − s)E[p1 − p− s|p ≤ p1 − s]
−λ{P (p1 − s < p ≤ p1)E[p− p1|p1 − s < p ≤ p1]
+sP (p > p1 − s)
}]
.
The first term, w− p1 − s+ P (p ≤ p1)E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1], reflects consumption
utility: the agent’s net wealth after search is w − p1 − s in case the search
does not lead to a better price. However, with probability P (p ≤ p1), the
agent observes a price lower than p1 with the expected price differential in
that case being equal to E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1].
Note that we assume that the search cost is part of the gain-loss util-
ity: The agent only experiences a gain if searching leads to a price suffi-
ciently low to fully recoup the cost of search, which happens with probability
P (p ≤ p1 − s). In all other cases the search cost is not or only partly made
up for by a better price deal. Again, we derive the WTP for continued search
s(p1) by equating u(Continue|p1) and u(Stop|p1) and solving for s. Doing so
leads to the following result:
Proposition 3.3 (Loss-averse agents) Suppose that prices are distributed
p ∼ N(µ, σ) and that this is common knowledge. For a loss-averse agent with
loss-aversion parameters λ and η who takes the best price encountered so far,





> 0 (< 0) if p1 < p
L
1 (p1 > p
L
1 ),
18We are aware of possible alternative choices here, such at the expectation-based refer-
ence points developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
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with s(p1) the willingness to pay to sample one more observation. In the
limit, limλ↓1 pL1 =∞.
Proposition 3.3 proves that qualitatively, we have a similar inversion as in
the model with risk aversion. Other than for the model with risk aversion, we
cannot derive an analytical expression for s(p1) in terms of the fundamental
model parameters. We can however show that ds
∗
dσ > 0 when p1 exceeds a
unique critical threshold value pL1 . In the limit to loss neutrality (λ ↓ 1), this
threshold value goes to infinity such that ds
∗
dσ > 0 for all values of p1, as in
Proposition 3.1.
3.2.4 Empirical implications
A comparison of Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 shows that if the best price observed
so far is sufficiently high, risk and loss aversion generate the same qualitative
prediction that the willingness to continue search is decreasing in σ. The
numerical examples in Table 3.1 provide some additional insight. Based on the
discrete distributions that we will use in our empirical analysis (Section 3.3),
the table shows for different values of the parameters of risk and loss aversion
(γ and λ, respectively) the maximal WTP for continued search.19
Let’s focus on the case where the current best price is high, p1 = 20. At
levels of risk aversion commonly found in the empirical studies measuring risk
aversion using a CARA specification (γ ≈ 0.10 see e.g. Von Gaudecker et al.,
2011) the WTP for continued search is higher in the low variance case than
in the high variance case (4.80 vs. 4.55). The same holds for the model with
loss aversion for the commonly found estimates of the loss aversion coefficient
of λ ≈ 2.25 (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Abdellaoui et al., 2007;
Engstro¨m et al., 2015) (4.52 vs. 4.61).
Figure 3.2 shows the relation between the search cost s and the reservation
price r for the different risk attitudes, using γ = 0.10 and λ = 2.25 for risk
and loss aversion, respectively. In all cases, the relation is monotone with the
reservation price increasing in the cost of search. In line with Propositions 3.1
to 3.3, for any given search cost s, the reservation price for the high variance
case is lower than for the low variance case in case of risk neutrality whereas
for risk-averse and loss-averse risk preferences, the inversion is observed. A
comparison of panels 3.2b and 3.2c also shows in this setting and for the values
γ = 0.10 and λ = 2.25, risk and loss aversion have very similar implications:
both for the situation with low variance as for the one with high variance, the
19Using instead the continuous distributions from Figure 3.1 leads to a very similar table.
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Table 3.1: WTP for continued search under risk aversion (CARA
exponential utility u(z, γ) = − 1γ e−γz) and loss aversion (linear gain-loss
utility with weight η = 1).
WTP - Risk Aversion (CARA) WTP - Loss Aversion
p1 10 10 20 20 10 10 20 20
σ High Low High Low High Low High Low
γ λ
0.00 0.33 0.01 5.33 5.01 1.00 0.33 0.01 5.33 5.01
0.01 0.33 0.01 5.25 4.99 1.20 0.30 0.01 5.17 4.94
0.05 0.31 0.01 4.92 4.91 2.00 0.23 0.01 4.64 4.69
0.10 0.29 0.01 4.55 4.80 2.25 0.21 0.01 4.52 4.61
0.20 0.25 0.01 3.88 4.60 3.00 0.18 0.01 4.15 4.45
0.30 0.23 0.01 3.35 4.40 3.50 0.16 0.00 3.96 4.34
0.40 0.20 0.01 2.92 4.20 5.00 0.12 0.00 3.52 4.09
0.50 0.19 0.01 2.58 4.01 9.00 0.08 0.00 2.79 3.68
relation between the search cost and reservation price is almost identical. This
implies that while our design is able to distinguish between risk neutrality
on the one hand and risk/loss aversion on the other, it is not very suitable
to separately identify risk and loss aversion.
Future research could use the fact that, as shown in Table 3.1, the gap
in WTP between the low and high variance case grows faster under risk
aversion. The table shows that the main cause of this difference is that under
risk aversion, the WTP in the high variance case is decreases relatively fast
as γ increases20. The reason for this difference is that in the specifications
we use, we have a linear gain-loss function while in the risk-averse case, the
benefits of search enter the expected utility function in a non-linear fashion.
This has the effect that the potentially high benefits from search induced
by high price uncertainty receive relatively less weight in the latter case.
The small number of four observations per respondent does not allow us to
estimate the parameters of risk and loss aversion at the individual level.
3.3 Experimental evidence
3.3.1 Design
As part of their weekly tutorial 337 first-year students at the Department
of Economics at the University of Groningen were exposed to four different
20Compare e.g. the case with γ = 0.50 and λ = 5.00: for p1 = 20, the WTP is similar
when σ = σL, 4.01 vs. 4.09, but considerably different when σ = σH , 2.58 vs. 3.52.
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(b) Risk aversion (γ = 0.10).

























(c) Loss aversion (λ = 2.25).
Figure 3.2: Relation between the search cost s and the reservation price r(s)
for consumers with risk-neutral (panel a), risk-averse (panel b), and
loss-averse (panel c) risk attitudes.
choice situations that emulate those presented earlier in Figure 3.1. For each
situation, they had to answer how much they would be willing to pay to see
the price of a second firm.21 The students were all enrolled in one of the
undergraduate programs at the department. The majority (182) were first-
year students in Economics and Business Economics (E&BE). Another 83
were enrolled in the program Econometrics and Operations Research (EOR),
a program that traditionally attracts students with well-developed quantita-
tive skills. Fifty-five students were enrolled in the so-called pre-MSc program.
This is a one-year program designed for students with a non-economics BSc
to prepare for a MSc in Economics. The remaining seventeen students were
enrolled in the minor of Finance within the Business Administration program.
In order to ensure that students had no problems in understanding the
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(a) Situation 1: pL = 10, σH = 4.60
high.
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(c) Situation 3: pH = 20, σH = 4.60
high.
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(d) Situation 4: pH = 20, σL = 2.06
low.
Figure 3.3: Overview of the four situations presented to respondents. The
bars denote the number of firms that charges a given price (µ = 15 in all
cases).
price distributions, we used discrete price distributions in the experiment.
These distributions are shown in Figure 3.3. They have a mean (µ = 15) and
variance (σL = 2.06;σH = 4.60) that closely mimic the ones in Figure 3.1.
By using discrete distributions, there was no need for participants to have
an intimate knowledge of probability density functions, normally distributed
variables, variance etc. Subjects who would like to do so, could relatively
easily calculate the expected benefits of continued search. They just had to
calculate for each price lower than the current best price the difference with
the current price, to multiply this difference with the probability of finding
the lower price and sum the results. We refer to the four choice situations in
Figure 3.3 as (pL, σH), (pL, σL), (pH , σH), and (pH , σL), respectively.
Each student was presented with all four situations on five stapled pages.
To rule out order effects, we randomized the order in which the situations
were presented.22 The first page contained the following information: “Please
22The four possible orders were: pLsH−pLsL−pHsH−pHsL; pLsL−pLsH−pHsL−pHsH ;
pHsH −pHsL−pLsH −pLsL; pHsL−pHsH −pLsL−pLsH . Table 3.B.1 shows for the final
sample for each particular order the number of observations per program.
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consider the situations on the following four pages and answer the question
that follows the descriptions.” Each panel on the pages 2 to 5 was accompa-
nied by a brief explanatory text and the question how much they were willing
to pay for one additional search. To give an example, the text for situation
(pL, σH) was as follows:
“You wish to buy a certain product. The firm you have just visited
offers this product at a price of e10. There are 100 other firms
that offer exactly the same product. You know that two of these
firms charge a price of e5, five charge a price of e7, eight charge a
price of e9 etc. This information is summarized in the figure above
(the current price of e10 is shown by the dashed vertical line).
Unfortunately you don’t know which firm charges what price.
Now you have to decide:
a) buy the product from the firm you have just visited at this
firm’s price of e10.
b) pay an amount to visit one randomly selected firm out the
100 other firms to see whether this firm offers you the prod-
uct at a better price.
Important note: If you choose b), you still have to the option to
buy the product at e10 from the first firm, should the second
firm be more expensive. If the second firm charges a price lower
than e10, you can of course buy the product at this lower price.
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to see
the price of a second firm? [please fill in a non-negative number
with two digits]
e ”
Students were free to move forward and back between pages and to change
their answers if they deemed this necessary.
3.3.2 Results
Of the 337 subjects, 29 did not give an answer to any of the four situations.
Another 15 students completed one to three situations.23 We decided to drop
23Six persons answered three questions; five answered two and four answered one. With
4.8%, the dropout rate from the EOR sub-sample is considerably lower than for the other
majors (14.8% for E&BE, 16.4% for Pre-MSc, and 23.5% for Finance). This is because
students of the latter majors were asked to complete this non-obligatory survey after their
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics: respondents.
age grade
Program obs. % female mean s.d. mean s.d.
Economics and Business 146 30.4 19.33 1.35 6.74 1.50
Econometrics 79 31.6 19.05 1.45 6.39 1.40
Pre-MSc 46 33.3 23.67 1.71 7.00 1.31
Minor Finance 12 30.0 22.24 1.73 7.00 1.76
Total 283 31.2 19.92 2.16 6.67 1.46
Notes: Econometrics students follow a different Microeconomics course than the other three
groups. The statistics of the econometrics students are for all students who took the exam
and slightly differ from the sample of students who completed the survey (85 vs. 79 obs.).
all 44 observations. One other subject provided answers in the range e100
to e300. Possibly, this subject has answered the questions in cents instead
of euro’s but there was no way to verify this. For this reason, we decided to
drop all observations of subjects who – for one or more of the situations –
indicated a willingness to pay for search that exceeded the price observed
at the current shop. This reduced the number of observations by ten such
that our final dataset includes 283 observations. Background characteristics
of these individuals are provided in Table 3.2.
The expected benefits of continued search are e0.33 in (pL, σH); e0.01
in (pL, σL), e5.33 in (pH , σH), and e5.01 in (pH , σL). Based on this,
a risk-neutral agent would indicate WTP (pL, σH) > WTP (pL, σL) and
WTP (pH , σH) > WTP (pH , σL). However, Table 3.3 shows that is not what
we find in the data. When the best price observed so far is at the lower end
(pL = 10), respondents do indicate an on average higher WTP when the vari-
ance of the price distribution is higher, e0.83 vs. e0.46 (p-value < 0.0001,
paired t-test, unless stated otherwise). This is in line with the theoretical
predictions for risk-neutral agents. In both cases, the average WTP exceeds
the expected benefits of search, with e0.50 and e0.45, respectively, but this
difference is not significant (p = 0.438).
However, when the best price observed so far is at the high end (pH = 20),
the average WTP for continued search is e4.92 when the price variation
is high and e5.15 when this variation is low (p = 0.154). Moreover, while
the WTP/expected benefits gap is still positive for the low variance case
(e0.144), it is negative (-e0.406) for the high variance case and this difference
weekly tutorial test and may therefore have been less willing to participate because of their –
literally – outside option. However, we have no reason to suspect that the participation
decision is correlated with our outcomes of interest.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics: WTP.
p 10 10 20 20
σ High Low High Low
Exp. benefits of search 0.33 0.01 5.33 5.01
mean WTP 0.830 0.456 4.924 5.154
(0.118) (0.109) (0.251) (0.251)
Gap (WTP−Exp. benefits) 0.500 0.446 -0.406 0.144
obs. 283 283 283 283
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
is statistically significant (p = 0.0007). In other words, at odds with risk
neutrality but in line with the alternative hypotheses of risk aversion and
loss aversion, the respondents’ average WTP is decreasing in price variation
when the currently observed price is high.24
Table 3.4 considers decisions at the level of the individual subject and
provides further support for our main finding. The table shows that when the
current best price is low, almost no subjects (1.4%) indicate a higher WTP
for continued search when the price variation is low. In contrast, when the
current best price is high, 40.6% of all subjects indicates a higher WTP when
price uncertainty is low instead of high. To see whether the WTP/expected
benefit gap is related to any observable characteristics, define the binary
variable y such that y = 1 if WTP>Expected benefits and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.5 shows for our four situation the results of a linear regression of
this variable on the explanatory variables female, age and the grade the
student eventually obtained for the introductory microeconomics course.25
The results does not show that the propensity to indicate a WTP that exceeds
the expected benefits of sampling once more is related to gender or age. The
coefficients do show that the performance in the microeconomics course and
the indicated WTP are negatively related in the situations with low price
uncertainty.
24The difference of -e0.406 and 0 has a p-value of 0.107 (one-sided t-test).
25A number of notes: The students in econometrics are not included in this regression
because we lacked identifying information to match their decisions with background char-
acteristics and grades; Dutch grades are between zero and ten, with ten being the perfect
score. The marginal effects of a probit regression look very similar to the presented linear
regression estimates.
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Table 3.4: Ranking of willingness to pay on the subject level
WTP (pL, σH) TWTP (pL, σL)
> = <
> 31 37 2 70 24.7%
WTP (pH , σH) TWTP (pH , σL) = 20 77 1 98 34.6%
< 51 63 1 115 40.6%
102 177 4 283
36.0% 62.5% 1.4%
Table 3.5: Regression estimates (Dependent variable:
WTP − Exp. benefit > 0)
p 10 10 20 20
σ High Low High Low
female -0.029 -0.057 -0.018 0.081
(0.076) (0.054) (0.072) (0.071)
age -0.016 0.006 0.019 0.011
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
grade micro -0.008 -0.029∗ -0.013 -0.052∗∗
(0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
constant 0.653∗ 0.201 -0.077 0.337
(0.356) (0.253) (0.022) (0.336)
R2 0.011 0.03 0.014 0.043
obs. 171 171 171 171
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.4 Discussion: Risk or loss aversion in price search
Our empirical analysis shows clear support for the inversion of the response
of the WTP for continued search to changes in price uncertainty. This result
questions models of consumer search that assume that buyers act as risk-
neutral agents who simply trade off between the expected benefits and costs.
Our theoretical derivations show that both the expected utility specifica-
tion with risk-averse agents as well as the prospect theory formulation with
loss aversion predict the inversion we observe in our data. Moreover, the pa-
rameters of both risk and loss aversion that lead to a good fit are close to the
values found in other empirical studies. In all, our findings show that price
search is a decision task where consumer risk attitudes are relevant; they
suggest that results from studies on loss aversion in other domains (such as
endowment effects and tax compliance) have external validity for the domain
of price search. This justifies the recent efforts in industrial economics to
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develop theories that show how alternative risk attitudes by buyers impact
equilibrium price distributions and can help to explain phenomena such as
sales (e.g. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2014).
Our empirical evidence also adds to the debate on whether or not buy-
ers of goods experience loss aversion in routine transactions. Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) posit that there is no loss aversion in routine transactions
because buyers expect the money outlays associated with the exchange of
goods. However, in the theory developed by Bateman et al. (1997) there is
symmetry between the act of giving up goods and of giving up money with
both of them being construed as losses. The authors of these studies have en-
gaged in an “adversarial collaboration” (Bateman et al., 2005) to design an
experiment to settle the debate. The findings of this experiment by and large
support the hypothesis that money outlays are perceived as losses. However,
in another study, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) find conflicting evidence
that money given up in routine purchases is not subject to loss aversion.
Novemsky and Kahneman point to differences in the subject pools as a po-
tential cause for the empirical discrepancy and call for additional evidence.26
Our result support the view that money outlays do evoke loss aversion, also
in the context of routine purchasing decisions.
That said, the empirical data that we collected and presented clearly are
of an exploratory nature. Although we believe that respondents did not have
any reason to misstate their willingness to pay, they were not incentivized
and each respondent only answered four simple questions. It is clear that
a direct test of risk versus loss aversion asks for richer data which allows
one to estimate mixture models to gauge the relative importance of both
models (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2009) or to evaluate the models by fitting the
parameters of the alternative models at the individual level (Hey and Orme,
1994). As argued by Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009), there is the possibility
that different behavioral processes co-exist with the risk attitude of some
individuals being adequately fitted by expected utility and those of others
by prospect theory. The current study is too limited to pursue this question
in more depth but future research could fruitfully use the relation between
the key model parameters and response to changes in the price variation to
identify the relative importance of risk and loss aversion in price search.
26Bateman et al., (2005) uses UK subjects, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) US subjects.
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3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
First note that F (p;µ, σ) can be expressed as
















−t2dt the Gauss error function. Note that erf(−x) =
−erf(x).




0 F (p;µ, σL)dp > 0, ∀ p1 ∈ (0, p¯].




































































0 F (p;µ, σL)dp > 0 clearly holds for p1 ∈ (0, µ). It also holds for





















F (p;µ, σL)dp = 0. (3.A.6)
This completes the proof. Figure 3.A.1 visualizes the argument: Area B is
always smaller than area A for p1 < p¯. 
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Figure 3.A.1: The c.d.f. for p ∼ N(µ, 5) (solid blue line) and p ∼ N(µ, 2)
(dotted black line) with µ = 15.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Consider a risk-averse agent with CARA risk preferences u(w) = − 1γ e−γw
(with w current wealth and γ ∈ R+) who observes price draws out of a
N(µ, σ)-distribution.27 If the agent buys the product at the best price p1
observed so far, her utility is
u(w; γ) = −1
γ
e−γ(w−p1) (3.A.7)
27In all situations we consider, the agent buys the good so we submerge the consumption
utility of the good in w.
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Her expected utility in case of continued search, paying a cost s for one more
search, is










P (p > p1)e
































To arrive at the final equality, observe that



































In turn, this equals
F (p1)E[e











−(x− µ)2 + 2γxσ2
2σ2




We use (3.A.1) to rewrite (3.A.9) as
F (p1)E[e














Equating (3.A.7) and (3.A.8) and solving for s via a number of manipulations
leads to the expression in equation (3.4) for the agent’s maximum willingness
to pay s∗ to continue search.
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Next we wish to derive how the sign of ds
∗
dσ depends on p1, the best price



























































eγp1(1− erf(x)) + eγ(µ+γσ2/2)(1 + erf(x˜))
 .
(3.A.13)
The denominator of (3.A.13) is non-negative and therefore, ds
∗
dσ = 0 only if


















































+ γ2σ(1 + erf(x˜))
Define G(x˜) ≡ 12(1 + erf(x˜))− 1γσ√2pie−x˜
2
. So, ds∗/dσ = 0 if G(x˜) = 0. Note
that G(·) is continuous in x˜. We prove that there is one unique x˜ for which
G(x˜) = 0 by showing that:
i) limx˜→−∞G(x˜) = 0, G(x˜) < 0 for x˜ sufficiently small, and
limx˜→∞G(x˜) = 1;
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ii) dG(x˜)/dx˜ = 0 has one unique solution xˇ and that G(xˇ) is decreasing
(increasing) for x˜ < (>)xˇ.
Together i) and ii) imply that the value of x˜ for which G(x˜) = 0 must be
larger than xˇ and unique.
The proof of i) is immediate using the definition of G(x˜). To prove ii),





























Solving for x˜ results in
xˇ = − γσ√
2
,
which implies that G(x˜) reaches its minimum when p1 = µ.
We can approximate the value of x˜ such that G(x˜) = 0 by taking a
first order Taylor approximation of the error function and exponent in the
expression for G(x˜): erf(x˜) = 2x˜/
√


















It is straightforward to show that x˜ > xˇ for all γ > 0 and σ > 0. The
corresponding approximate value for pR1 is









Note that when approaching risk neutrality, pˆR1 goes to infinity:
limγ↓0 pˆR1 = ∞. Therefore, the sign of ds
∗
dσ = 0 no longer depends on p1, cf.
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eγp1(1− erf(x)) + eγ(µ+γσ2/2)(1 + erf(x˜))]
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for any p1 ∈ R+. 
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Consider a loss-averse agent with linear consumption utility, loss-aversion
parameter λ, and weight η attached to the linear gain-loss utility with the
currently best price p1 acting as a reference point.
28 Let s be the cost of
observing one more price and let these prices p be drawn out of a N(µ, σ)
distribution.
Then, the utility when the agent with wealth w stops searching is
u(Stop|p1) = w − p1.
28We assume that the agent’s utility of consuming the good exceeds p1 in all cases such
that she buys in all cases and we for this reason can ignore it in the decision whether or
not to continue search.
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The utility from continued search equals:
u(Continue|p1) = w − p1 − s+ P (p ≤ p1)E[p1 − p|p ≤ p1]
+η
[
P (p ≤ p1 − s)E[p1 − p− s|p ≤ p1 − s]
−λ
{
P (p1 − s < p ≤ p1)E[p− p1|p1 − s < p ≤ p1]
+sP (p > p1 − s)
}]
= −p1 + η˜
[
P (p ≤ p1 − s)E[p1 − p− s|p ≤ p1 − s]
−λ˜
{
P (p1 − s < p ≤ p1)E[p− p1|p1 − s < p ≤ p1]
+sP (p > p1 − s)
}]
with η˜ ≡ η + 1 and λ˜ ≡ (ηλ + 1)/(η + 1) such that η˜λ˜ = (ηλ + 1). In what
follows we normalize η = 1 such that η˜ = 2 and λ = (2λ˜ − 1). Note that
λ˜ = 1 iff. λ = 1.
Define α ≡ (p1 − µ)/σ and β ≡ (p1 − s − µ)/σ (β < α iff. s > 0); we






and its c.d.f. Φ(·).
Using these definitions, one can write
E[p|p1 − s < p ≤ p1] = µ+ φ(β)− φ(α)
Φ(α)− Φ(β)σ and
E[p|p ≤ p1 − s] = µ− σ φ(β)
Φ(β)
.
So, the agent is indifferent when u(Stop) = u(Continue), i.e. when
p1
{













= s[Φ(β) + λ˜(1− Φ(β))]
which can be simplified to:29
p1
{
Φ(β) + λ˜[Φ(α)− Φ(β)]
}
− µ[λ˜Φ(α) + (1− λ˜)Φ(β)]
+λ˜φ(α)σ − (λ˜− 1)φ(β)σ = λ˜s+ (1− λ˜)sΦ(β).
29For λ˜ = 1 the equation reduces to the familiar condition p1 − E[min(p, p1)] = s.
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After combining terms, we have:
f(σ, s) ≡ λ˜(p1 − µ)Φ(α) + (1− λ˜)(p1 − µ− s)Φ(β) + λ˜φ(α)σ
−(λ˜− 1)φ(β)σ − λ˜s = 0.
This equation implicitly defines s∗ such that f(σ, s∗) = 0, the search cost
that makes the agent indifferent between stopping and continuing search
conditional on the best observed price being p1. Next we take the partial
derivative of f(σ, s) with respect to s and σ and use the implicit function
theorem to determine ds∗/dσ.
∂f(σ, s)
∂σ
= λ˜(p1 − µ)∂Φ(α)
∂σ






































= −λ˜α2φ(α) + λ˜(1 + α2)φ(α)− (1− λ˜)β2φ(β)
+(1− λ˜)(1 + β2)φ(β)
= λ˜φ(α) + (1− λ˜)φ(β).















· σ − λ˜
= λ˜(Φ(β)− 1)− Φ(β).













Consistent with Proposition 3.1, ∂s∗/∂σ = φ(α) ≥ 0 for λ˜ = 1. The denomi-
nator is negative for all λ˜ > 1 and decreasing in λ˜ because Φ(β) < 1 in the
relevant price range when the search cost s > 0. So, ∂s∗/∂σ = 0 if and only
if
λ˜φ(α) + (1− λ˜)φ(β) = 0⇒ λ˜ = φ(β)
φ(β)− φ(α) ≥ 1. (3.A.16)























∂s∗/∂σ > 0(< 0) for p1 < (>)pL1 . In this equation, the willingness to pay
s∗ > 0 is endogenous. But because prices are non-negative, s∗ is always finite
such that limλ˜↓1 p
L
1 ↑ +∞. 
3.B Additional tables
Table 3.B.1: Order in which situations were presented
Order
Program (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Total
Economics and Business 36 39 36 35 146
Econometrics 22 20 17 20 79
Pre-MSc 13 12 9 12 46
Minor Finance 2 3 4 3 12
Total 73 74 66 70 283
Note: The orders are (i) = pLsH − pLsL − pHsH − pHsL; (ii) =
pLsL − pLsH − pHsL − pHsH ; (iii) = pHsH − pHsL − pLsH − pLsL;
(iv) = pHsL − pHsH − pLsL − pLsH .
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3.C Survey
General instructions
This is a short survey for research purposes. Please read the instructions
carefully. On the next pages, we will describe four situations. In each situa-
tion, we will ask you to write down what you would do if you were in that
particular situation. However, first we give an example of the situations you
fill face.
EXAMPLE: You wish to buy a certain product. The firm you have just
visited offers this product at a price of e10. There are 100 other firms that
offer exactly the same product. You know that one of these firms charges
a price of e1, four charge a price of e3, eleven charge a price of e5 etc.
This information is summarized in Figure 3.C.1 (the current price of e10 is
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Figure 3.C.1: 100 firms. The bars denote the number of firms that charges a
given price. The firm you have just visited offers this product at a price of
e10.
You face the following choice between options a) and b):
a) buy the product from the firm you have just visited at this firm’s price
of e10.
b) pay an amount to visit one randomly selected firm out the 100 other
firms to see whether this firm offers you the product at a better price.
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Important note: If you choose b), you still have to the option to buy the
product at e10 from the first firm, should the second firm be more expensive.
If the second firm charges a price lower than e10, you can of course buy the
product at this lower price.
In each situation, we ask you to answer the following question:
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to see the price
of a second firm? [please fill in a non-negative number with two digits]
e
If you prefer option a), you should fill in ”e0.00”. This means that you
are not willing to pay anything to observe the price of the second retailer. If
you prefer option b), you should indicate the maximum amount you would
be willing to pay.
When answering the questions, you may go back and forth between situ-
ations but you are not allowed to discuss with any other person in the room.
Situations
The general instructions were followed by four specific situations. The situ-
ations differed only in the price distribution and the given price p. The four
situations are depicted in Figure 3.3. We only present the text that accompa-
nied Figure 3.3a, the price distribution in Situation 1, the texts for Situations
2 to 4 were similar.
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Figure 3.C.2: Situation 1. 100 firms. The bars denote the number of firms
that charges a given price. The firm you have just visited offers this product
at a price of e10.
You wish to buy a certain product. The firm you have just visited offers
this product at a price of e10. There are 100 other firms that offer exactly
the same product. You know that two of these firms charge a price of e5,
five charge a price of e7, eight charge a price of e9 etc. This information
is summarized in the figure above (the current price of e10 is shown by the
dashed vertical line). Unfortunately you don’t know which firm charges what
price.
Now you have to decide:
a) buy the product from the firm you have just visited at this firm’s price
of e10.
b) pay an amount to visit one randomly selected firm out the 100 other
firms to see whether this firm offers you the product at a better price.
Important note: If you choose b), you still have to the option to buy the
product at e10 from the first firm, should the second firm be more expensive.
If the second firm charges a price lower than e10, you can of course buy the
product at this lower price.
What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to see the price







Despite the prevalence of retail-price recommendations (RPRs) in consumer
markets, the economic rationale for making RPRs is not understood well due
to a lack of empirical work. RPRs (also known as list prices or manufacturer’s
suggested retail prices) are widespread in the automobile, electronics, books
(e.g. Amazon), and computer game industries to name just a few. Never-
theless, the amount of empirical research on RPRs is limited. This chapter
reviews and evaluates theoretical explanations for announcing RPRs in light
of the retail gasoline price data. I also provide new and so far unexplained
empirical evidence on the interaction between RPRs and retail prices. In par-
ticular, using firm-level hourly price data I show that initially retail prices
adjust faster to positive than to negative changes in RPRs. High frequency
data suggest that these asymmetric price responses are a result of intra-day
price fluctuations related to traffic flow cycles.
Recently, a few theoretical explanations rationalizing the use of RPRs
have been proposed. The first explanation highlights that RPRs may affect
consumers through two different channels: a behavioral argument by Puppe
and Rosenkranz (2011) suggests that loss-averse consumers are more price-
sensitive when paying more than the announced RPR.1 This makes RPRs
1Bruttel (2014) shows that subjects during a laboratory experiment behave as Puppe
and Rosenkranz (2011) propose: For a fixed retail price consumers demand more when the
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an instrument for manufacturers to impose effective price-ceilings because
retailers will not set a retail price above the RPR. In the second explana-
tion, Lubensky (2013) argues that RPRs align the incentives of consumers
and manufacturers allowing the latter to credibly signal the production cost
and to influence consumer search behavior to their benefit. Hence, consumers
might refuse a deal not because they feel overcharged, but because they ac-
tually are. Finally, Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) point out that in vertical
manufacturer-retailer relationships RPRs can serve as a device to communi-
cate private information about production cost and consumer demand from
the manufacturer to the retailer. Notably, this study offers an explanation for
RPRs in a setting where recommendations are not necessarily observed by
consumers. To date, the number of empirical tests evaluating the implications
of these theories is limited.
The scarcity of empirical research studying the effects of RPRs given
their prevalence is surprising. An exception is De los Santos et al. (2013)
who exploit data on a policy experiment in South Korea where RPRs were
banned and reinstalled one year later. They find that banning RPRs leads to
higher retail prices. Moreover, there is no evidence that RPRs serve as a price
ceiling – neither when the ban was introduced, nor when it was lifted. Their
preferred, but untested explanation is that the removal of recommendations
reduces consumer search by concealing the information on the distribution
of prices. Most importantly, De los Santos et al. (2013) show clear evidence
that RPRs increase competition and consumer welfare.
In contrast, a couple of other empirical studies argue for the anti-
competitive effects of RPRs. In fuel pricing, Foros and Steen (2013) document
how RPRs were used as part of a binding retail price maintenance (RPM)
scheme in Norway. Imposed by the wholesale price contracts of four largest
gasoline brands in Norway, on Mondays the retail prices would jump to the
level of RPRs almost uniformly across all brands.2 Faber and Janssen (2008)
find that RPRs have additional explanatory power next to the Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) spot market prices and suggest that this indi-
cates that RPRs act as a price-coordinating device set up by the refineries.
The interpretation of their results is open to discussion because the exact
form of the contracts between the retailers and the refineries are unknown
RPR is above, and less when the RPR is below that price.
2Note that this chapter does not consider RPM practices where the manufacturer simply
sets the retail price (see Mathewson and Winter, 1998, or Jullien and Rey, 2007, for a
discussion on the collusive effects of RPM). Instead, the focus is strictly on RPRs which
retailers are free to ignore.
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and the ARA spot price merely serves as a rough proxy for the marginal cost.
This chapter aims to shed more light on the relation between RPRs and
retail prices in the markets for gasoline. I consider the Dutch retail gasoline
market where RPRs are made public by the largest gasoline refineries and are
also reported on the major news portals.3 The main contribution of this chap-
ter is to empirically test and contrast the empirical implications of different
theoretical models that rationalize the use of RPRs – a gap in the literature
that has not been dealt with so far. In the hypothesis formulation and data
analysis, the focus lies mainly on the link between RPRs and retail prices.
I demonstrate that in Dutch retail gasoline market RPRs inform firms and
consumers about marginal cost developments. RPRs follow ARA spot prices
closer than retail prices do, allowing consumers to learn about the general
price level in the market. Most of the time, gasoline retailers maintain a con-
stant discount relative to the RPR. This gap between retail prices and RPRs
is affected by local market conditions as well as individual station charac-
teristics. Highway stations with large market power set their prices equal to
recommendations most frequently. I find that firms fully adjust their prices
with respect to changes in RPRs within one to three days. Additionally, using
hourly data I am able to zoom in and test hypotheses that daily data do not
allow for. The results show that retail prices adjust 12 hours faster to posi-
tive than to negative RPR changes. This response asymmetry is an artifact
of stations increasing their prices earlier in the day than decreasing them. In
particular, retail prices seem to be higher around morning rush hours.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews and discusses the
theoretical contributions to understanding the prominence of RPRs in more
detail and formulates a number of testable hypotheses. In Section 4.3 I briefly
introduce the daily- and hourly-price datasets used in this chapter. Section 4.4
tests the implications of theoretical models for retail prices and their relation
to RPRs. Section 4.5 evaluates the relevance of competing theories in light
of the empirical evidence. Finally, in Section 4.6 I discuss the limits of the
analysis and present ideas for future empirical and theoretical research on
RPRs.
3See, for example, www.nu.nl/brandstof/.
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4.2 Theoretical studies on retail price recommen-
dations
In this section, I discuss major theoretical contributions that have been
recently put forward in an effort to explain the phenomenon of announc-
ing RPRs, i.e. Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011), Fabrizi et al. (2016), Luben-
sky (2013), and Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013). Based on the findings of these
studies I formulate testable hypotheses in order to evaluate how well these
models capture retail price developments in a real market where RPRs are
prominent.
RPRs and loss aversion. In order to better understand the mechanism
behind RPRs, Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011) offer a behavioral explanation
for announcing RPRs. They suggest that RPRs serve as an exogenous ref-
erence point for consumers. Methodologically, their paper has the following
setup. The upstream firm produces a good at a positive marginal cost and
sells it to the downstream firm which makes the product available to con-
sumers. The latter are assumed to be loss-averse. Conditional on a given
RPR, a sufficient level of loss aversion creates a kink in the demand and a
positive interval of wholesale prices for which the retailer’s best response is
to simply charge the RPR instead of a higher monopoly price. Therefore,
by announcing an RPR the manufacturer exploits consumer loss aversion
and mitigates the double-marginalization problem: The retailer’s margin is
lower and the equilibrium quantity is larger than in the absence of an RPR.
A sub-game perfect equilibrium is reached at the upper end of the afore-
mentioned wholesale price interval. Here, the retailer is indifferent between
charging the RPR or the monopoly price but the manufacturer can slightly
lower the wholesale price to ensure that the equilibrium price is equal to the
RPR. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis P&R In markets with upstream and downstream monopolies,
retail prices are equal to RPRs.
The authors admit that this equilibrium may not be a common observa-
tion in real markets. In order to address this problem, Fabrizi et al. (2016)
extend the model of Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011) by introducing down-
stream competition and bargain-loving consumers. Their main finding is that
in markets with intense downstream competition equilibrium retail prices are
strictly lower than RPRs. This result yields the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis FLPR In highly competitive retail markets, equilibrium prices
are lower than RPRs.
One should note that in Fabrizi et al. (2016) prices fall below RPRs
due to the presence of retail competition and bargain-lovers. Buehler and
Ga¨rtner (2013) arrive at the same implication but only need to assume that
RPRs affect the consumer’s willingness to pay without imposing competition
between retailers. While Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) show that prices are
lower than RPRs when consumers seek bargains, it is not clear-cut what
causes the relatively lower prices in the Fabrizi et al. (2016) model. Therefore,
future research might benefit from theoretical investigations whether retail
competition alone is sufficient to push prices below RPRs. To promote this
discussion, I investigate this research question empirically.
RPRs and fluctuating costs. Lubensky (2013) illustrates how RPRs can
credibly inform consumers about manufacturer’s costs which fluctuate in time
and may differ across manufacturers. The model can be briefly summarized
as follows. Lubensky (2013) assumes a market with multiple manufacturers
and an infinite number of retailers. Hence each manufacturer has multiple
retailers selling his product.4 Manufacturer’s cost is unobserved to consumers,
and it can take either a low or a high value with equal probability. The
realization of the cost implicitly affects retail prices. Lubensky (2013) shows
that RPRs may be used to credibly communicate the state of marginal cost to
consumers because they align the incentives of manufacturers and consumers.
In particular, when marginal cost is low, manufacturers announce a lower
RPR to induce more search in the market since then it is more likely that
his product is selected because his retailers are on average cheaper compared
to the competition. In turn, consumers are willing to search more because
a higher utility may be realized due to lower retail prices. When marginal
cost is high, the manufacturer prefers less search since his product is sold
at higher prices. In this case the manufacturer truthfully announces a high
RPR because in equilibrium expected gains of searching are lower for high
marginal cost so consumers also prefer to search less.5 The underlying idea is
4This setup is similar to the structure of most retail gasoline markets. The Netherlands
is also not an exception: There exist four major refineries alongside a few minor ones and
each refinery sells its fuel to a network of retailers.
5In Chapter 5, we show that in the Dutch retail gasoline market consumers can extract
a truthful signal from RPRs about the changes in marginal costs. We find that besides the
knowledge about the shocks in marginal cost, consumers learn very little extra information
from RPRs. This allows consumers to correctly infer the general price level in the market
92 Rationales for RPRs: An empirical assessment
that the manufacturer increases the probability that his product is selected by
signaling the aggregate market conditions to consumers who in turn benefit
by saving on search costs.
Lubensky’s (2013) model does not imply a unique way how retail prices
compare to RPRs. Because retailers are heterogeneous in equilibrium a dis-
tribution of retail prices emerges. As a result, retail prices are not restricted
to be lower, equal, or even larger than RPRs. The key implication is the
following. Even though retail prices roughly follow the level of RPRs because
RPRs correctly communicate the level of marginal cost, in equilibrium con-
sumers cannot perfectly infer the cost state from retail prices. However, they
can do so from RPRs given sufficient variation in marginal costs. This implies
that RPRs follow cost changes more closely than retail prices do. Therefore,
the following hypotheses emerges:
Hypothesis L RPRs are more highly correlated with marginal costs than
retail prices are.
RPRs and asymmetric information. Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013)
model RPRs as a communication device in vertical supply relations with
asymmetric information. Similarly to Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011), this
paper also assumes monopolies upstream as well as downstream. The manu-
facturer has private information about the realizations of consumer demand
and marginal cost both of which fluctuate over time. This asymmetry may
arise during the period before the launch of a new product, when the man-
ufacturer has superior information about expected demand through market
analysis, or in case the manufacturer is better able to gauge future market
developments. The authors show that the RPR does not play any role in a
single-shot equilibrium due to the retailer’s natural incentive to charge the
monopoly price. However, in an infinitely repeated game the manufacturer is
able to achieve an efficient (joint-producer-surplus maximizing) outcome: The
manufacturer sets the RPR and the wholesale price such that the retailer’s
profit is strictly larger than the respective one-shot game payoff and indepen-
dent of marginal costs for a given realization of the aggregate demand. The
wholesale price ensures that the retailer’s profit is constant conditional on the
level of consumer demand. Therefore, the manufacturer has an incentive to
announce an RPR which truthfully signals the demand realization such that
the retailer sets the efficient price. This price maximizes the joint producer
from RPR.
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surplus and hence the share of the manufacturer. In turn, the retailer is pre-
cluded from charging any price other than the efficient one by introducing a
simple grim trigger strategy which implies that upon deviation both parties
play their stage-game strategies ad infinitum.
Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) show that the equilibrium retail price can
be any monotone transformation of the RPR such that the retailer is able
to infer the efficient price with certainty. This implies that any change in
RPR will be followed by a corresponding immediate retail price change to
the same direction. Hence, there is no reason to expect that retail prices react
to positive RPR changes more strongly or quickly than to the negative ones.6
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, somewhat more strictly the final
hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Hypothesis B&G Retail price responses to positive and negative RPR
shocks are symmetric.
I test the hypotheses using a detailed dataset of Dutch retail gasoline
prices. This market is characterized by two distinct sub-markets, i.e. highway
and non-highway, in which level of market power is substantially different.
Most importantly, the Dutch market for gasoline is notable for the ubiquity
of RPRs. The following section defines this dataset.
4.3 Data
For the empirical analysis, this chapter uses a subset of the 2005-2013 Athlon
dataset which runs from December 8, 2008 until December 31, 2013. This
sample contains over 4 million observations with around 3,700 active sites
on October 1, 2013. Section 1.3 includes a detailed description of the data
collection procedure and major characteristics of this dataset, as well as the
structure and significant features of the Dutch retail gasoline market.
In Section 4.4.3, I use a sample of 65 Shell Express outlets followed from
September 27, 2013 to January 16, 2014. During this 112-day period, retail
prices and RPRs have been collected from the Shell Express website at hourly
intervals. The final sample consists of 164 782 observations.7 On average,
22 price quotes per day are available. All 65 stations are unmanned with 3
quarters of them being owned by the company.
6Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) suggest that in order to put minimal computational burden
on the retailer a simple linear relation between retail prices and RPRs is sufficient. In this
case, retail price responses to RPR shocks are strictly symmetric.
7Shell Express website: http://www.shellexpress.nl/nl nl/stations.
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4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Hypotheses P&R and FLPR: RPRs and competition
Hypotheses P&R and FLPR suggest that the level of competition inversely
affects the likelihood that retail prices will be equal to RPRs: In monopolies
retail prices are expected to be equal to RPRs, whereas in competitive mar-
kets retailers price below RPRs. In order to analyze the relationship between
retail prices and RPRs in light of these hypotheses, I first look at the fre-
quency that an individual station’s price is not lower than the RPR by more





I{RPRk(i)t − pit ≤ b}
Ti
(4.1)
where I{·} is an indicator function equal to 1 when the argument is true and
0 otherwise, pit denotes the retail price of station i on day t and RPRk(i)t
the retail price recommendation of company k (supplier of station i) on day t
and Ti is the number of price quotes for station i.
8 This measure shows
how frequently a firm charges prices close to RPRs.9 Figure 4.1 presents the
empirical cumulative distributions of y(b) for different values of b. Every curve
illustrates the bi-modality of the dependent variable: A significant fraction of
stations either always or never set prices within b cents per liter of the RPR.
In what follows, I assume b = 1 in order to analyze how often stations price
extremely close to RPRs because Hypothesis P&R predicts that retailers
price at the level of RPRs. Figure 4.1 shows that 73% of all stations always
charge prices lower than RPRs by more than 1 cpl. I find that only 1.5% of
stations always price within 1 cpl of the RPR. Figure 4.2 reveals even more
clearly that the variable of interest is far from being normally distributed,
irrespective of which subsample one looks at. This suggests that a firm’s
price level relative to the RPR is rather stable. For example, if a highway
station charges prices close to RPR it does so most of the time as Figure 4.2d
confirms. Unsurprisingly, nearly all unmanned stations always price much
lower than RPRs, cf. Figure 4.2b.
I measure the competition intensity by counting the number of rivals
within 2 km and 5 km radii for non-highway and highway stations respec-
tively. I differentiate between types of rivals and take the logarithm of the
8All prices are in cpl.
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Figure 4.1: Empirical CDF of y(b) for different values of b.
number of competitors (plus 1). In addition, as Figure 4.2 shows, individual
station characteristics matter so I control for them when estimating the effect
of competition on y(b). The controls include dummies indicating whether a
station is unmanned, major-branded (BP, Esso, Q8, Shell, Texaco, or To-
tal), located on a highway, or owned by an independent dealer (rather than
a company). Finally, I allow for all effects to be different for highway and
non-highway stations.10 Since y(b) is strictly censored at 0 and 1, OLS will
generate biased estimates. However, I abstain from Tobit regression because
there is relatively little variation in the interval (0, 1), i.e. y(b) follows a bi-
modal distribution, and use a probit model instead. For this purpose, define
a new binary variable z as follows:11
zi =
{
0 if yi(1) = 0,
1 if yi(1) > 0.
Table 4.1 presents the estimation results. Because the OLS and probit
estimates of the marginal effects are qualitatively the same, I only report
the results of the probit regression.12 Regarding local market effects, I find
that for non-highway stations the number of unmanned non-highway com-
petitors has a strong and significant effect on the frequency of charging prices
10In order to differentiate between the highway and non-highway effects, I multiply all
explanatory variables by the highway dummy Hi for highway stations and by (1−Hi) for
the non-highway ones, and estimate the model for all stations simultaneously.
11I also consider 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 as thresholds of success when defining zi. This does
not change the estimation results qualitatively.
12Quantitative differences can be explained by the fact that both models use slightly
different dependent variables, i.e. y(b) for OLS and z for probit.
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(d) . . . highway stations.
Figure 4.2: Histograms of y(1) for . . .
close to RPRs. The increase in the number of non-highway unmanned rivals
significantly reduces the probability that a non-highway station prices close
to RPRs. For highway stations, the presence of other highway competitors
decreases the fraction of days with retail prices near the level of RPRs. How-
ever, this effect vanishes if the rivals are major-branded which is the case for
more than 80% of highway sites.
Individual station characteristics also play a significant role in pricing.
Both highway and non-highway unmanned stations are (48.5 and 32.5 p.p.,
respectively) less likely to price closely to RPRs than their manned counter-
parts. Non-highway major-brand and dealer-owned stations are respectively
23.5 and 9.5 p.p. more likely to price within 1 cpl of RPRs. Highway sta-
tions set retail prices close to RPRs 49.8 p.p. more frequently compared to
non-highway sites.13
As a robustness check, I consider an alternative dependent variable. For
13Recall that the highway dummy is identified because I estimate the model jointly for
highway and non-highway stations.
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Table 4.1: Regression results.
Dependent variable: z d¯
Estimator: Probit OLS




ln(# highway. . . 0.3003 -0.7014** -1.1479 2.8540
sites + 1) (0.1883) (0.3419) (1.2602) (2.0501)
ln(# highway. . . -0.3326*
ommited
0.2229 5.4787***
unmanned sites + 1) (0.2014) (1.2651) (2.0114)
ln(# highway. . . -0.2011 0.9846*** 0.1574 -3.5879*
major sites + 1) (0.1934) (0.3507) (1.2879) (2.0155)
ln(# non-highway. . . 0.0629* -0.0091 -0.2218 0.5269
sites + 1) (0.0346) (0.1694) (0.2064) (0.7621)
ln(# non-highway. . . -0.1020*** 0.0188 0.8230*** -0.2048
unmanned sites + 1) (0.0284) (0.1330) (0.1661) (0.5148)
ln(# non-highway. . . -0.0276 -0.0254 0.0545 -0.2349
major sites + 1) (0.0307) (0.1489) (0.1837) (0.6677)
Individual station characteristics
unmanned
-0.3252*** -0.4847** 3.2077*** 6.8364***
(0.0407) (0.2042) (0.1609) (1.3070)
major
0.2354*** 0.3276* -1.2067*** -1.4291
(0.0318) (0.1826) (0.1612) (1.3159)
dealer-owned
0.0949*** 0.0054 -0.6765*** 1.0299
(0.0221) (0.1640) (0.1304) (0.8531)
highway n/a 0.4980** n/a -5.2634***
(0.1998) (1.3855)
# sites 2218 138 2218 140
(Pseudo) R2 0.2035 0.4103
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the location level;
n/a – not applicable; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
each station, I calculate the average difference between daily RPRs and retail
prices, i.e. average discount d¯i = mean(RPRk(i)t − pit). I keep the same
set of explanatory variables and estimate the model using OLS. The results
are presented in the last two columns of Table 4.1. The findings remain
unchanged: Stations with more unmanned competitors and unmanned outlets
themselves set prices further from RPRs whereas the prices of highway and
major-brand sites are closer to RPRs. Last but not least, I also re-run the
regressions for all b ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 15} and conclude that the choice of b does
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not change the results significantly.
Although the analysis shows that stations with more market power charge
RPRs more frequently, these results can be simply interpreted as competi-
tion effects on prices similar to those in Soetevent et al. (2014). Moreover,
the parameter estimates of individual-station characteristics, such as being
unmanned or dealer-owned, also represent the usual price effects: Lower op-
erating costs of unmanned sites mean lower prices, whereas higher prices at
dealer-owned outlets can be associated with a usual double-marginalization
effect. This indicates that RPRs may not play a coordinating role to mitigate
the latter effect. If RPRs were successful in establishing the producer-surplus-
maximizing prices, retail prices at dealer- and company-owned sites would be
the same, i.e. efficient as defined in Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013). So one may
argue that regression results simply reflect the inter-firm price heterogeneity.
I find that more than 76% of stations never charge prices equal to RPRs and
only 2% of sites price higher than RPRs. Therefore, the proposition of Buehler
and Ga¨rtner (2013) or Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011) that RPRs allow verti-
cal chains to maximize the joint surplus could explain the pricing of highway
stations. However, nearly 90% of highway outlets are company-owned which
suggests that the manufacturer-retailer coordination explanation is not rele-
vant in this market. Instead, it is more likely that RPRs reflect the marginal
cost fluctuations as the following section demonstrates.
4.4.2 Hypothesis L: RPRs and costs
Hypothesis L suggests that RPRs follow the marginal costs more accurately
than retail prices do. Since the exact marginal costs of 1 liter of gasoline are
not publicly available, I take a commonly used marginal cost approximation
for Benelux and other Western European markets – the ARA spot prices.
This implicitly assumes that marginal costs of different refineries are equal.
Table 1.4 supports this assumption. The interpretation of the RPR signal
is therefore slightly different. Rather than signaling cost differences between
manufacturer’s RPRs indicate cost fluctuations over time.
To get the first insight about the relevance of Hypothesis L, I com-
pare the correlation coefficients between ARA spot prices and RPRs, i.e.
r(ARAt−1, RPRk(i)t), and ARA spot and retail prices, i.e. r(ARAt−1, pit),
for all stations with at least 365 observations in the sample. Prices exclude
the VAT and the excise duty. I use the lagged ARA spot price because these
are the closing market quotes so they are not available to be incorporated in
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Table 4.2: Number of stations per brand.
# stations
Method: Correlation coef. R2 of ECM
Brand k(i) [1] [2] [2]/[1] [1∗] [3] [3]/[1∗]
BP 348 267 76.7% 323 288 89.2%
Esso 322 212 65.8% 261 168 64.4%
Gulf 106 102 96.2% 66 59 89.4%
Q8 90 60 66.7% 60 47 78.3%
Shell 565 474 83.9% 545 463 85.0%
Tamoil 125 102 81.6% 69 42 60.9%
Tango 134 130 97.0% 118 107 90.7%
Texaco 448 308 68.8% 299 242 80.9%
TinQ 219 205 93.6% 103 89 86.4%
Total 354 217 61.3% 227 146 64.3%
all 2711 2077 76.6% 2071 1651 79.7%
Notes: only stations with Ti ≥ 365 are included; [1] – all stations;
[2] – stations for which r(ARAt−1, RPRk(i)t) > r(ARAt−1, pit);
[3] – stations for which R2RPR > R
2
p; M = 5, L = 0.
retail prices or RPRs at the beginning of a given day. In line with Hypothe-
sis L, the left section of Table 4.2 shows that for 76.6% of all stations RPRs
have a stronger correlation with spot prices than retail prices do.14 This ra-
tio varies per manufacturer (brand) but for all brands it is larger than 60%.
This simple comparison of correlation coefficients is problematic because it
ignores the dynamic structure of retail price, RPR, and ARA spot price time
series. While the correlation coefficient gives a good idea about correlation in
the long run, it does not incorporate the retail price or RPR adjustments to
ARA spot price changes in the short run. To take this feature into account,
the following test compares the R2’s of two error correction models (ECMs)
for all stations in which retail prices and RPRs are modeled as functions of
ARA spot prices.
I build an ECM based on Borenstein et al. (1997). I assume that retail
prices (or RPRs) have the following long-run relation with ARA spot prices:
pi = αi0 + αi1ARA + εi. Retail prices and RPRs do not necessarily respond
to changes in ARA spot prices marginal cost instantaneously so I include
lagged responses to spot price shocks. Moreover, the model allows retail prices
and RPRs to follow an AR(L) process themselves. For simplicity and the
14The results are robust to the choice of m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 7} in ARAt−m.
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purpose of the test, at this stage all responses are assumed to be symmetric.
I estimate a fully-specified asymmetric ECM to study retail price responses
to RPR shocks in Section 4.4.3. Effectively, individual-station retail prices








+ θpi [pi,t−1 − (αpi0 + αpi1ARAt−2)] + εpit
where ∆ is the first-difference operator, ARAt is the ARA spot price in on
day t, M and L denote the largest lag of ARA spot and retail price changes
respectively, and εpit is a zero-mean error term. A corresponding ECM for

















The test of Hypothesis L boils down to comparing the R2’s after esti-
mating model (4.2) and model (4.3), i.e. R2p vs. R
2
RPR. According to the
hypothesis, one expects R2RPR > R
2
p. In order to be neutral with respect to
the null and the alternative hypotheses, I use the same number of variables in
(4.2) and (4.3). I estimate both models for all stations in the sample. Due to
missing price quotes in the sample, the number of observations available for
estimation of models with first differences and large number of lags decreases
significantly. Therefore, I take M = 5 and L = 0 in both (4.2) and (4.3).15
Then I count the number of cases for which R2RPR > R
2
p.
The results are presented on the right panel of Table 4.2. For four out
of five stations RPRs follow the changes in spot prices more accurately than
15To choose the values of M and L, I consult the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Crite-
rion (BIC) because it favors more parsimonious models in contrast to Akaike Information
Criterion. I find that for 8 out of 10 brands LBIC = 0 in (4.3). For all brands but Tamoil
MBIC ≥ 7. In (4.2), the lag structure for the majority of individual sites is similar. BIC
suggests that for 57.3% of all stations MBIC ≥ 7 and for 50.5% sites LBIC = 0. The
results are robust to changes in M and L. Another important reason to take L = 0 is that
Hypothesis L does not make any predictions that the past observations of RPRs influence
present RPRs. One might well argue that since there are no dynamics in Lubensky (2013),
M = 1 in (4.2) and (4.3). I find that this change does not affect the results. Furthermore,
in the analysis I only include stations for which the number of observations available for
the regression is at least 10 times the number of estimated parameters, i.e. I use the rule
(of thumb) of 10 observations per variable (see Peduzzi et al. 1996). This also explains the
differences between the number of stations in columns [1] and [1∗] in Table 4.2.
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retail prices do. In general, the results using the ECM approach are almost
identical to those based on correlation coefficients without imposing any par-
ticular structure on the relationship between retail prices (or RPRs) and
ARA spot prices. I conclude that the price data from the Dutch retail gaso-
line market provide strong evidence favoring Lubensky’s (2013) rationale for
announcing RPRs. Although no explicit criterion or test statistic is used,
in majority of cases RPRs represent marginal cost changes better than re-
tail prices do and hence may be used by consumers as a guideline for cost
developments.
4.4.3 Hypothesis B&G: Retail price responses to RPR shocks
Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) hypothesize that RPRs may be consistently
higher than retail prices simply to increase the willingness to pay of bargain-
loving consumers. The authors suggest that the joint-surplus-maximizing
price can be a linear function of the (larger) RPR. In this subsection, I
investigate if such a linear relationship exists by looking if prices respond
symmetrically to increases and decreases in RPRs.
Differently from Section 4.4.2 and from most papers that use the ECM
to study the crude oil spot price pass-through in retail gasoline prices (Ba-
con, 1991, Borenstein et al., 1997, Verlinda, 2008, Lewis, 2011), I employ
this method to analyze the relation between retail prices and RPRs. In the
previous section, I used ECMs to study retail price responses to the changes
in ARA spot prices. This ignored the fact that retail prices may respond
quicker (or slower) to positive shocks than to negative ones. For example,
Tappata (2009) suggests that this happens because of changes in consumer
search intensity when the expectations of marginal costs change due to real-
izations of costs in the past. In this section, I allow for asymmetric adjustment
and consider how retail prices respond to changes in RPRs. It is natural that
the spot prices of refined gasoline at the terminal influence retail prices via
RPRs. In order to isolate the effect of RPRs on retail prices, I subtract (one-
day-lagged) ARA spot price from RPRs. This approach is supported by the
estimates of αRk(i)1’s in (4.3) which vary from 1.02 to 1.07 but do not signif-
icantly differ from 1. This shows that in the long run RPRs move 1:1 with
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where superscripts “+” and “−” denote positive and negative changes re-
spectively, and weekday(w)t is a binary variable equal to 1 if weekday on
day t is w and zero otherwise with w = 2 representing Tuesday and w = 7
Sunday. I estimate (4.4) using a fixed-effects regression with standard errors
clustered at the station level. Note that here I also apply the rule of thumb
of 10 observations per variable. In the estimations, I use M = Q = L = 3
which is slightly lower than the 5 as indicated by Akaike Information Crite-
rion in order to have sufficient number of stations for the estimation.16 As a
robustness check I vary M , Q, and L from 3 to 7 and find no qualitative and
only minor quantitative differences in the results.
Figure 4.3 plots the cumulative responses to increases and decreases in
RPR for the subsamples of highway and non-highway, company- and dealer-
owned, and unmanned stations, and indicates the level of response asymme-
try accompanied by the 99% confidence intervals.17 The cumulative response
functions are derived following Borenstein et al. (1997). The computational
details are given in Appendix 4.B. The response asymmetry is measured as
the difference between the cumulative responses to positive and to negative
shocks. Standard errors of cumulative responses and the asymmetry are com-
puted using the delta method.
First of all, I find that the retail price responses to changes in RPRs are
very similar across different sub-groups of gasoline stations. This result points
16At a median station prices are missing on-average on one of four days. Hence increasing
the number of lags can result in over-fitting the model due to few available observations.




































































(b) Non-highway (1 286 stations,







































































































































(f) Non-highway (124 randomly
selected stations, 115 395 obs.)
Figure 4.3: Cumulative response functions and response asymmetry at
stations of different categories.
to the absence of any strategic role of RPRs that depends on the competi-
tion intensity or the ownership structure. Indeed, the cumulative responses
are very similar across company- (vertically-integrated) and dealer-owned
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(vertically-separated) stations.
Second, on average 70-90% of the RPR shock is incorporated in the re-
tail prices on the day of the RPR announcement, i.e. t = 0. For all gasoline
outlets it takes another 1-3 days to fully adjust the retail prices.18 If RPRs
were there to alleviate the double-marginalization problem by suggesting an
efficient price as Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) propose, one would expect im-
mediate retail price adjustment at company-owned stations by definition. On
the contrary, Figure 4.3(c) shows no sign of such effect.
Third, panels (b) and (c) in Figure 4.3 suggest that there exists a per-
sistent and statistically significant response asymmetry at non-highway and
company-owned stations. However, this effect is of negligible economic im-
portance (<0.07 cpl) and its statistical significance rests on the very large
sample (≈1 mln. obs.) used for the estimation.19 Figure 4.3(f) shows that by
using a smaller random sample of non-highway stations one obtain virtually
identical price response patterns (cf. Figure 4.3(b)) but with much higher
standard errors. Consequently, the asymmetry is not significantly different
from 0 even at the 5% significance level for t ≥ 1.20 Therefore, I conclude
that this (negative) asymmetry is negligible.
Interestingly, the response asymmetry of 0.039-0.086 cpl across different
stations on the day of the shock (the cusp at t = 0) and its statistical signif-
icance are robust to changes in the sample size. Even though the size of the
asymmetry is minor, the robustness of its statistical significance calls for fur-
ther investigation. This effect may be due to individual-station heterogeneity
but Figure 4.3 shows no distinguishable differences across main observable
characteristics. Alternatively, when analyzed on a daily basis the response
asymmetry may show up as minor if it lasts for less than one full day, i.e.
only for a number of hours. The changes in demand for gasoline throughout
a day are significant because of traffic flow peak hours. This observation,
combined with the fact that nowadays menu costs of gasoline retailers are
minimal, makes the latter scenario possible if not likely. The access to a sam-
ple of hourly retail price and RPR quotes allows to zoom in and to analyze
18I test if the response is significantly different from 1, i.e. full adjustment. To keep the
figures clear, the 99% confidence intervals for the responses are not provided but available
upon request.
19Whenever a parameter estimate is just a fraction off its null value, the t-statistic will
reach infinity when the sample size becomes infinitely large (see, for example, Hayashi,
2000, p. 120). This illustrates that an economically imperceptible effect will almost always
be statistically significant with a sufficiently large sample.


































Figure 4.4: Hourly cumulative response functions and response asymmetry at
Shell Express sites: September 27, 2013 – January 16, 2014.
how retail prices respond to RPRs on an hourly basis.
Hourly retail price adjustments. Essentially, I estimate model (4.4)
using hourly data. I include 95 lags of (positive and negative) retail price and
RPR changes in the fixed-effects regression in order to keep the lag structure
as close as possible to the setup of the daily data sample. Finally, I exclude 18
stations from the analysis which throughout the sample period exhibit 3.0-
4.0 cpl lower prices on all Thursdays relative to other days of the week.21 The
resulting cumulative response functions and the level of response asymmetry
are given in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 presents a more detailed picture of what Figure 4.3 shows. I
stress that this analysis makes use of a selected subsample in terms of gaso-
line stations and time frame because of the limited hourly data availability.
Therefore, the findings are slightly different. Namely, the cumulative response
patterns suggest that retail prices immediately adjust to positive changes in
RPRs while the responses to negative shocks are very gradual. Neverthe-
less, the main argument remains unchanged: There is a significant response
asymmetry on the initial day of the RPR shock. During the first 6-12 hours
following a positive shock the latter is fully reflected in retail prices. 12 hours
later the cumulative responses become virtually identical until the next day
when the asymmetry partly reappears. Knowing that roughly 90% of RPR
21This cyclical pattern of sharp “dips” in prices distorts the parameter estimates of the
ECM. Most of the RPR changes range between 1.0-2.0 cpl. Therefore, much larger cyclical
price drops or jumps are incorrectly attributed to RPR shocks causing the price responses
to seem artificially inflated.
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∆RPRt 6= 0
Figure 4.5: Cumulative percentage of positive and negative retail price
changes.
changes take place before 8:00 a.m. I conjecture that price jumps occur earlier
than price drops.
Figure 4.5 shows how retail price changes are distributed throughout the
day. Most of the time retail prices increase before morning peak hours while
they drop around lunch time. The difference is more pronounced on the days
when retail prices change multiple times as shown in panels (b) and (d) of
Figure 4.5.22 By splitting the sample into days when the RPR changes (panels
(c) and (d)) and those when the RPR does not change (panels (a) and (b)), I
find very similar results. If anything, RPR changes seem to slightly intensify
the trend of increasing prices early at night and lowering them later during
the day. Nevertheless, the similarity between the two upper and two lower
panels in Figure 4.5 suggests that the observed pricing strategy is not caused
by RPRs. Most importantly, this pattern provides an explanation for the
asymmetric retail price response to RPR changes presented in Figure 4.4.
Additionally, I also test if retail prices in the mornings (5:00–10:00 a.m.)
22RPRs never change more than once per day.
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are higher than during other time of the day. To this end, I setup the following










λihhour(H)h × weekendt + ξith
(4.5)
where hour(H)h is a dummy variable for hour H switching on when H = h,
weekendt is a weekend dummy equal to 1 if day t is Saturday or Sunday
and 0 otherwise, and ξith – an i.i.d. error term. I find that at 2/3 of the
stations the prices are significantly higher between 5:00–10:00 a.m. and for
one third of these stations this trend is absent during weekends. I find no
relation between this behavior and the ownership structure of gasoline sta-
tions. However, a possible explanation for these intra-day price differences
may be hourly changes in traffic intensity. Such data are freely available at
the National Data Warehouse for Traffic Information (NDW).23 Nevertheless,
a more detailed analysis of the link between traffic flows and retail prices is
beyond the scope of this thesis and remains for future research. The same
trend of higher morning prices has been already observed at German gasoline
retailers. However, a preliminary analysis of Boehnke (2014) suggests that
the intra-day gasoline price fluctuations are related to the price-elasticity of
consumers rather than to the levels of demand.
The response asymmetry observed in Figure 4.4 appears to be a result
of hourly retail price trends unrelated to changes in RPRs. While this find-
ing could also possibly explain a minor but statistically significant positive
asymmetry on the day of RPR change found in Figure 4.3, I can only pin-
point this phenomenon for the subsample of stations for which hourly RPR
data have been collected. Largely because of these reasons, we cannot reject
Hypothesis B&G. In general, retail prices respond to positive and negative
RPR changes symmetrically. However, whether recommended retail gasoline
prices in the Netherlands are strategically set larger than retail prices to
extract maximal consumer surplus, is yet to be discovered.
4.5 Discussion
Direct tests for the relevance of theoretical articles that I discuss are hard
to perform because of different and very strict market structures assumed
in these models which are hard to find in reality. Fortunately, the Dutch
23NDW website: www.ndw.nu/en.
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retail gasoline market can be divided into highway and non-highway sub-
markets where highway outlets have large market power due to lack of nearby
competitors. Together with the information on the ownership structure this
allows to investigate the relation between retail prices and RPRs in more
depth. Nevertheless, a number of hypothesis tests still require additional data.
To acknowledge these challenges, this section discusses the limitations of both
my empirical analysis and the predictions of theoretical studies of RPRs.
Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011) assume that consumers are loss-averse and
hence their propensity to consume decreases when they observe retail prices
that exceed RPRs. Therefore, the authors suggest that the manufacturer can
always ensure that retail prices will not exceed RPRs. However, the data show
that retail gasoline prices on Dutch highways are 6.2% of the time higher than
RPRs while this number is 1.7% for non-highway stations. This observation
is not a result of slower reactions to negative RPR shocks: This is an equally
likely outcome following positive and negative RPR changes. While at odds
with Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011), this scenario is not ruled out by models
of Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) and Lubensky (2013) which do not rely on loss
aversion. On highways, the loss aversion story is much less relevant because
highway stations almost never show the discount alongside the retail price
which allows consumers to back out the RPR. So unless consumers consult
the latter on the internet, the RPR cannot be a reference point on highways.
On the contrary, unmanned stations always display discounts
which inform consumers about RPRs. Along the lines of Puppe and
Rosenkranz (2011), Fabrizi et al. (2016) assume that consumers are bargain-
loving (as well as loss-averse) and that retailers compete in the downstream
market. They find that in equilibrium retail prices will always be below RPRs.
Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) also consider this extension: Given that consumer
demand positively depends on the retailer’s discount relative to RPR, in equi-
librium retailer will always set a price lower than RPR. I find strong support
for both extensions: Unmanned stations set lower prices than the manu-
facturer’s recommendation in 99.4% of the cases. However, if RPRs simply
indicate marginal cost fluctuations it is natural that the cheaper-to-operate
unmanned stations always charge prices below RPRs which are uniform for
all stations of a given brand. A cleaner test of Fabrizi et al. (2016) and
Buehler and Ga¨rtner’s (2013) predictions would have to analyze the cases
when discounts are introduced on the price boards at the number of outlets.
Lubensky (2013) models downstream competition with marginal cost un-
certainty and consumer search – a setup which is very close to the one in retail
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gasoline markets. Lubensky (2013) interprets the presence of RPR as a man-
ufacturer’s instrument to inform consumers about changes in marginal costs
and hence the price level in the market. The presence of RPRs for gasoline in
the Dutch media supports the notion that RPRs are used by the manufactur-
ers to inform consumers as well as retailers. However, while Lubensky (2013)
suggests that consumers can make informed purchasing decisions based on
RPRs, the structure of gasoline markets makes it complicated. The main
component of RPRs (besides taxes) is the ARA spot price which influences
RPRs of all brands. Therefore, probably it is no surprise that throughout
the sample period the difference between the highest and the lowest average
RPRs is smaller than 0.5 cpl (see Table 1.4). In Bruzˇikas et al. (2016) we
show by simulation that consumers are better off making their purchasing
decisions by comparing discounts rather than RPRs. This finding does not
contradict Lubensky (2013) but rather suggests that in the Dutch retail gaso-
line market RPRs represent marginal cost fluctuations over time and hence
act as a good benchmark to compare prices across different stations by using
discounts.
Because of data limitations, this chapter almost exclusively focuses on
the interaction between RPRs and retail prices. An access to even more data
would allow one to test other interesting hypothesis. One of them is regard-
ing the relation between retailers’ profits and marginal costs. Buehler and
Ga¨rtner’s (2013) model implies that downstream profits conditional on con-
sumer demand are constant with respect to marginal costs. On the contrary,
Lubensky (2013) predict a positive relation between retail profit margins and
marginal costs. This empirical test relies on the availability of wholesale price
and quantity data.
Finally, it would be interesting to see a direct test of whether RPRs
effectively alleviate the double-marginalization problem as hypothesized by
Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) or Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011). De los Santos
et al. (2013) provide partial support for this argument. They show that retail
prices went up when RPRs were banned and went back down once the ban
was lifted. However, De los Santos et al. (2013) do not find evidence showing
that retail prices equal RPRs and that RPRs act as de facto price ceilings.
It would be ideal to test if prices of independent retailers increase by more
than those of vertically-integrated ones when RPRs become unavailable.24
24According to the theory, in equilibrium vertically-integrated firms charge joint-profit-
maximizing prices. Therefore, their prices are independent of the presence of RPRs. De
los Santos et al. (2013) actually have information on the ownership structure but do not
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Alternatively, one may test if firms which already charge the RPR increase
their prices once RPRs cease to exist.
4.6 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, I review the current knowledge on retail-price recommen-
dations, including both theoretical and empirical studies. Surprisingly, the
literature on this widespread phenomenon is limited and calls for further re-
search in this area. I take this challenge by investigating the implications of
theoretical studies on the pricing behavior in the context of the Dutch retail
gasoline market.
The first impression after studying the literature on RPRs is that in mar-
kets with upstream and downstream monopolies one should expect retail
prices to be equal to RPRs (cf. Puppe and Rosenkranz, 2011, and Buehler
and Ga¨rtner, 2013). I find that in the Netherlands this is often true but
only for highway stations which naturally have a large market power. More-
over, most of the highway stations are company-owned suggesting that the
aforementioned theoretical explanations are not relevant in this market. The
empirical evidence corroborates the results of Fabrizi et al. (2016) who show
that intense competition pushes retail prices below RPRs. However, the data
suggest that the gap between retail prices and RPRs, i.e. discounts, as well
as the probability of charging RPRs are more easily explained by local-
market and individual-station characteristics which indicates that RPRs sim-
ply reflect the level of upstream marginal costs. The latter corresponds to
Lubensky’s (2013) proposition that RPRs inform consumers about changes
in marginal costs of the manufacturer. An important implication of this ex-
planation is that RPRs are more informative about marginal cost fluctuations
than retail prices are. The empirical analysis strongly supports this hypoth-
esis: Indeed, for most gasoline stations RPRs follow the ARA spot prices
more accurately. However, unlike in the theoretical model the marginal costs
of gasoline are mainly influenced by the crude oil price, a factor common to
all refineries. Hence, RPRs prove to be a relatively poor guideline in search
of lower prices because they are very similar across different manufacturers.
Therefore, RPRs can inform consumers about marginal costs of all firms and
make discounts a good signal of retail prices.
test this hypothesis. Moreover, in contrast to common findings (see e.g. Barron and Um-
beck, 1984, or Wilson, 2015) as well as the results in this chapter, their estimation suggests
that independent stores set lower prices than company-owned ones.
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Testing Buehler and Ga¨rtner’s (2013) implication that there is a mono-
tonic relation between retail prices and RPRs, I find that retail price re-
sponses to positive and negative RPR changes are symmetric for most of
the time except the initial day of the RPR shock. To have a closer look at
this asymmetry I use a sample of hourly retail price and RPR quotes. The
data show that during the first 12 hours after an RPR shock the retail price
adjustment to positive RPR changes is quicker because of the retailers’ strat-
egy to increase prices at the break of dawn and to lower them around lunch.
This finding points to a possibly fruitful research area combining the use of
hourly retail gasoline price data and the traffic flow information. Both types
of data are currently available and they open new opportunities for microeco-
nomic research using the natural experiments such as road works or closures
of stations in case of accidents.
Finally, I conclude that further work is needed in order to understand
the RPR phenomenon in the presence of retail competition. So far, none of
the theoretical articles attempted to study how retail competition influences
the role of RPRs. Alternatively, it would be interesting and fruitful to see an
extension of Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013) model with two retailers selling a
homogeneous product on separate markets. Potentially, the role of RPR may
be different given the fact that the manufacturer is able to provide only one
signal. This type of studies would especially contribute to the understanding
of the use of RPRs in retail gasoline markets.

















































































































































































































































(h) Texaco (220 stations,
184 473 obs.)
Figure 4.A.1: Retail price cumulative response functions to RPR shocks for





























































(j) Total (187 stations,
158 592 obs.)
Figure 4.A.1: (continued)
4.B Cumulative response functions (ECM)
Brand k’s cumulative response to a positive 1.0 cpl RPR change after t days,






































































The tth cumulative response comprises the following: the (t−1)th cumulative
response, the t-period response to the shock, the correction due to the devi-
ation from full response, and the autoregressive element of price adjustment
which is allowed to be asymmetric depending on the sign of the respective
price change.
The cumulative response function to a negative RPR change, i.e. R−kt,







tion (4.B.1). The price response asymmetry t days after the shock is cal-
culated as (R+kt −R−kt).




Models of price competition typically assume that consumers compare prices
of different suppliers and use this information together with information on
product characteristics to decide from whom to buy. Importantly, in these
models the vector of posted prices is considered a sufficient statistic, with
no separate role in the consumer’s decision-problem for stated discounts. As
we will however argue in this chapter, in markets characterized by frequent
price changes and repeated purchases, suppliers in the lower-end of the price
distribution have an interest to explicitly state the discount off a reference
price alongside the price.
When the reference price is related to market developments, announcing
the discount informs consumers about the current distribution of market
prices and the seller’s position in this distribution. A seller who consistently
posts prices at the lower end is more easily identified by consumers who focus
on discounts which are fairly stable than by those who compare absolute
prices because the latter are more volatile due to crude oil price fluctuations.
Since focusing on announced discounts requires less mental effort while only
causing small increases in costs, consumers will also find it attractive to look
at discounts only. As a result, discounts become a strategic variable for firms.
A prime example of a market with continuously fluctuating prices is the
retail gasoline market, with most of this price volatility driven by national and
international events outside the sphere of influence of the local retailer.1 In
*This chapter is based on Bruzˇikas, Heijnen, and Soetevent (2016).
1For the US market for example, Yilmazkuday and Yilmazkuday (2016) have recently
estimated that over 90% of the price variation is explained by nation-wide effects, refinery-
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(a) Esso Express price
board
(b) TinQ price board (c) Tango application
Figure 5.1: Examples of price boards and smartphone applications showing
discounts.
line with the signaling value of discounts, but unexplained by existing models
of price competition, discount levels have started to feature prominently on
the price boards and smartphone applications of many of the lower-cost gaso-
line retailers in the Netherlands, see Figure 5.1.2 Next to this, most firms have
introduced bonus-discount days at which they offer an extra (bonus) discount
of a number of cents per liter. These bonus-discount days are announced in
advance and most individual outlets committed to have their bonus-discount
day every week on the same weekday.
The mechanism of buyers paying more attention to discounts than to
absolute prices in comparing offers probably also applies to other markets
with frequent price changes, such as the foreign exchange market. There
the attractiveness of a trading offer is routinely evaluated by considering
the marketmaker’s bid-ask spread (Keim and Madhavan, 1997; Duffie et al.,
2005).
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. Armstrong and
Chen (2013) present a number of models to shed light on the practice of
discount pricing. Similarly to our approach Section 5.2, one of these models
also explores the possibility that discounts inform consumers about the price
specific costs and state taxes.
2In Figures 5.1a and 5.1c, prices are announced in euros per liter, and discounts in
cents per liter. In Figure 5.1b, both prices and discounts are announced in cents per liter
but discounts are displayed in much larger characters. “Discount” in Dutch is korting or
voordeel.
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at other suppliers. However, there are some notable differences with our ap-
proach. First, other than Armstrong and Chen (2013), we assume that sellers
have private information about the alternative deals available to buyers. This
difference is motivated by the empirical application we have in mind where
sellers have private information about developments in the international in-
put markets for gasoline. A second difference is that in our case, the discount
is not relative to a seller’s past price, but relative to a brand-specific refer-
ence price. Nevertheless, in both models a firm is willing to give a discount
in order to deter consumers from searching elsewhere.
Our game-theoretical model in Section 5.3 describes a seller’s strategy
to offer additional bonus discounts and builds on Spiegler’s (2011) model of
price-frame competition. In easing the comparison of prices by consumers,
discounts in our model serve as a price frame. In order to add realism we
extend Spiegler’s (2011) model to two periods and assume that firms choose
price frames sequentially. Moreover, we do not impose that price compari-
son probabilities are symmetric. This enables us to test our hypotheses on
discount competition using data from the Dutch retail gasoline market.
We analyze the benefits of focusing on the discounts relative to the rec-
ommended prices both from the firm’s and the consumer’s perspective. In
Section 5.2, a simple mathematical exercise lays bare firms’ incentives to
post discounts next to their prices. Firms at the lower end of price distri-
bution benefit from revealing their recommended prices by using discounts
next to the retail prices. This signal informs consumers about the firm’s fa-
vorable position in the market and the reference prices of other firms thereby
decreasing the expected benefits of additional search.
Consumers also have incentives to focus on discounts as the simulation
model in Appendix 5.B demonstrates. By comparing the fuel expenditures
when consumers rank stations every time they buy with the case where they
re-rank stations only when their selected station’s discount goes down, we
find that consumers who use discounts as a guide do almost as well. In other
words, in case comparing prices requires considerable effort, consumers may
prefer to compare discounts. Indeed, Figure 5.2 illustrates that following and
comparing discounts instead of prices requires less mental effort and leads to
selecting cheaper product most of the time.
The notion that announced discounts play an important role in the con-
sumer’s decision-making process when prices fluctuate will serve as our point
of departure in Section 5.3 where we formulate a model of discount competi-
tion. The decision to announce discounts is cast in the price-format compe-
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tition framework as introduced by Spiegler (2011). This is natural, because
in their decision to announce discounts, firms make it easier for consumers
to compare prices. This section also provides a theoretical rationale for firms
to announce bonus discounts on specific days of the week, as we observe in
our data. We analyze the competition between two identical firms that se-
quentially choose whether to announce and commit to offer bonus discounts
on a particular day of the week, and then simultaneously set prices. For cer-
tain parameter values, our game has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
which both firms announce bonus discounts but on different days of the week.
Our data allow us to test whether this actually happens in the Dutch retail
gasoline market.
A first glimpse of the data in Table 5.1 reveals that firms at the lower-end
of the price distribution indeed give regular discounts. Figure 5.2 shows that
for consumers, it is easier to infer from discounts than from a time series of
posted prices whether and when a specific supplier is cheap. Figure 5.2 plots
prices and discounts of two rival stations located within 5 km distance. This
graph shows that the variation in stations’ prices is much larger than the
variation in discounts. Almost every day when one station has a lower price
it has a higher discount than its competitor. This means that consumers do
not have to follow the fluctuations in price levels but can instead occasionally
check relatively stable discounts at the local gasoline station. An increase in
the discount will almost always indicate that a station is becoming relatively
cheaper; a decrease in the price level might simply reflect a drop in the
market-wide prices that cause a decline in the recommended price.
Figure 5.2 shows that at first Station 2, and then (starting March 2011)
both stations have bonus discounts. They can be easily identified as cyclical
spikes of 2.0-4.0 cents per liter (cpl) in station’s discounts. In this example,
both competitors offer bonus discounts on the same weekday, however this
is not always the case. Our empirical analysis in Section 5.5 aims to answer
the question what factors determine stations’ choices of a particular weekday
to offer the bonus discount. In order to formulate hypotheses, we use the
findings from our theoretical model as a guide.
Next to providing an empirical application of the model of price-frame
competition by Spiegler (2011), this chapter adds to the literature on the
role or recommended prices providing an alternative explanation. A com-
mon interpretation is that recommended prices may be used to facilitate
collusion (Faber and Janssen, 2008). A novel interpretation of Buehler and
Ga¨rtner (2013) suggests that retail price recommendations may act as an in-
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Figure 5.2: Comparing prices versus comparing discounts at two stations in
Rotterdam.
strument to inform retailers about marginal costs of production and changes
in consumer demand. Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011) explain that recom-
mended prices may be used by manufacturers to shift the profit from down-
stream to upstream firms. We posit that recommended prices are a tool that
eases the ranking of retail prices in markets where marginal costs are volatile.
Our simulation results indicate that discounts offered relative to retail price
recommendations allow consumers to find lower retail prices easier. Finally,
our model shows that under certain conditions retailers can benefit from the
existence of recommended prices by introducing the bonus discounts.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an explanation
why firms use discounts alongside the prices to begin with. In Section 5.3,
we introduce the theoretical model of bonus-discount competition observed in
the Dutch retail gasoline market. Section 2.3 presents our data. In Section 5.5,
we formulate and empirically test our hypotheses based on the theoretical
model. Finally, Section 5.6 summarizes and concludes.
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Table 5.1: Stations’ price levels vs. choices to display discounts on price
boards.
Average Average
(pit − p¯t) (pit − p¯t)
Brand in cpl Brand in cpl
Discounts hidden Discounts shown
Texaco 2.30 Q8 Easy -1.15
Total 1.17 TinQ -2.53
BP 1.23 Shell Express -2.78
Esso 0.33 Amigo -2.83
Q8 0.15 Tango -3.03
Shell 0.15 Esso Express -3.25
Gulf 0.06 BP Express -3.28
Brand Oil -0.82
Firezone -3.51
Note: p¯t is average non-highway price on day t.
5.2 Firm’s incentives to publish discounts
5.2.1 Empirical evidence
In this section, we provide a motivation for the firm’s choice to publish dis-
counts relative to the reference price alongside the retail prices. In the Dutch
retail gasoline market, we observe that the on average cheaper stations an-
nounce discounts whereas the more expensive ones do not.3 Table 5.1 com-
pares the stations’ price board formats with the average deviations from the
daily mean prices (excl. taxes) for the largest brands in the Netherlands. The
pattern that emerges is that stations of the cheapest brands always display
discounts. However, Firezone (a well known brand of unmanned stations)
outlets seem to be an exception and do not have similar price boards to
those in Figure 5.1 but instead have banners claiming “Always discount” or
temporarily displayed ads with listed discounts.
The individual-station discounts as shown in Figure 5.2 are more stable
than retail prices and indicate the price level rather accurately.4 Therefore,
the cheapest outlets might want to keep the discounts posted to make the
comparison of prices easier and to lure price-sensitive consumers. In turn, the
3Almost all stations announcing discounts next to the prices are fully-automated un-
manned outlets operating at significantly lower cost than their manned counterparts.
4Table 5.E.1 in Appendix 5.E shows that the differences between the discounts of sta-
tions 1 and 2 in Figure 5.2 correctly reflect the differences in prices on 85% and 92% of the
days when station 1 is cheaper and more expensive, respectively.
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more expensive brands might be better off hiding the discounts, in order not
to discourage potential consumers. In the following subsection, we develop
theory to evaluate a firm’s decision to publish discounts. The results are in
line with the empirical evidence presented in Table 5.1.
5.2.2 Discounts as signal of market conditions
This subsection sketches the connection between international spot prices,
firm-level recommended prices and retail prices at the level of individual
outlets. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we omit the
time indices and ignore taxes.5 We subsequently use this framework to answer
which information an agent who visits station i gains about the price charged
at alternative outlets, in case he or she: a) only observes the retail price pi at
station i; b) next to station i’s retail price, also observes the discount offered
relative to the recommended price.
With the empirical application to gasoline retailing in mind, we make the
following assumptions on market structure. Upstream firms, e.g. oil majors,
are vertically integrated with downstream firms, e.g. retail gasoline outlets.
Let N(k) (n(k)) denote the set (number) of downstream outlets owned by
major k. Each major k announces a recommended price pRECk on a daily
basis. This price is used by all local outlets i ∈ N(k) as one of the inputs for
the retail price pi, the other variables being those that reflect outlet-specific
cost levels.
For simplicity, assume that each refiner k sets his recommended price
pRECk as follows:
pRECk = φz +mk (5.1)
where z ∼ N (µz, σ2z) is the gasoline spot market price, φ is the parameter that
relates spot and recommended prices for all upstream firms, and mk is the
upstream margin of major k. The recommended price of each major k shares
a common component φz which relates price recommendations to the spot
prices. In this section, we do not separately discuss the development of spot
prices and ignore the actual dynamics of the price series (see Appendix 5.B for
more details on spot prices and specification of the error correction model).
Further, we also assume that φ = 1. Given the distribution of recommended
prices in (5.1), each station i that belongs to major k will set its retail price
as a function of the recommended price:
pi = αp
REC
k − di + εpi (5.2)
5See Appendix 5.A for an extensive specification.
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with εpi ∼ N (0, σ2p) an i.i.d. disturbance that incorporates shocks at the local
market level and di > 0 a station-specific constant that represents the average
discount at outlet i. We implicitly assume that the parameter relating retail
and recommended prices α = 1. This yields the following relation between
the discount Di, the recommended price p
REC
k , and the retail price pi:
Di = p
REC
k − pi = di − εpi . (5.2∗)
In other words, a consumer who observes both the retail price and the dis-
count also knows the recommended price of the outlet’s mother company. As
the recommended prices of all firms are related to that price via the relation
with the spot price (see equation (5.1)), being informed about the recom-
mended price of firm k also reduces the consumer’s uncertainty about the
current retail prices at alternative outlets of competing firms.
Given the price distributions as described above, we turn our attention
to answering the question which information an agent who visits station
i ∈ N(k) gains about the price charged at alternative outlets, in each of the
following two cases:
Case A: Station i only posts its retail price pi;
Case B : Station i posts its retail price and the discount offered relative to
the brand’s recommended price pRECk .
For ease of exposition, we consider a situation with two brands k and l that
each own one station.
Prior to visiting the station, the consumer knows the statistical relations
between the different prices as described by equations (5.1) and (5.2) includ-
ing the value of parameters φ and α, µz, σz, and σp. The consumer is also
knowledgeable about brand specific markups mk and ml but not about differ-
ences in station-specific discounts off the reference price, i.e. di and dj where
i ∈ N(k) and j ∈ N(l). Thus the set-up allows agents to know about struc-
tural differences in reference prices (mk 6= ml).6 Before visiting a station, the
consumer does not know the realization of pRECk and Di but is aware of the
underlying distribution of average discounts, i.e. di ∼ N (d¯, σ2d).
6Our empirical data however reveal that consumers in practice need to observe a high
number of price quotes before they can confidently conclude such structural differences
exist. See Section 5.4.2 for a more detailed discussion of inter-brand recommended-price
differences.
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Case A: Station i only posts its retail price pi In this case, the




l and pj . Given the
information known to the consumer, we can derive that in this case
E[pj |pi, µz,mk,ml, d¯] = pi + (ml −mk)− a
(













Proof: See Appendix 5.C.1.
Case B : Station i posts its retail price pi plus a discount Di In this
case, the consumer can back out the underlying reference price pRECk without
uncertainty. From this, it follows that
E[pj |pi, Di, µz,mk,ml, d¯] = pRECl − d¯ (5.4)
Proof: See Appendix 5.C.2.
So how does a consumer’s perception of the price distribution at the alterna-
tive outlet j change if the station that she visits (station i) starts to publish
the discount Di on its price boards next to the retail price? Revealing the
discount increases the expected price at outlet j when





(z − µz) > 0 (5.5)
Proof: See Appendix 5.C.3.
Hence for draws for which the discount is sufficiently above average, i.e. when






(z − µz), the act of announcement will increase the expected
price at the alternative outlet. That is, stations with favorable draws have an
incentive to announce discounts because this reduces the consumers’ expected
benefits of continued search. Therefore, stations with more than 50% of the
daily discounts larger than d¯, i.e. those with di > d¯, will find it optimal to
announce their discounts publicly on their price boards all the time.
We stress that this simplified example merely serves as an illustration
what are the incentives of cheaper firms to announce the discounts.7 Our
simple model has important limitations as we assume that consumers do not
7Using a simulation exercise, in Appendix 5.B we provide additional motivation that
consumers actually benefit from referring to discounts as a guide to rank stations.
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update their beliefs, regarding the underlying inter-firm price distribution,
when they observe a firm’s decision to reveal or to conceal the discount. In
reality, consumers may change their prior and firms can react to the update
of beliefs by adjusting their price or by altering their discount-disclosure
strategy. Therefore, the main caveat in a fully-specified theoretical model is
that more expensive firms will have an incentive to mimic the cheap ones by
displaying discounts in order not to be associated with high prices in the first
place.8
We argue that the situation where all firms disclose discounts cannot be
an equilibrium outcome. Note that by displaying its low discount an expen-
sive seller reveals his position in the price (or discount) distribution. Hence,
for the mimicking to be credible and effective the recommended price should
be increased. However, this is not feasible because in practice (and in the-
ory, e.g. Lubensky, 2013) a recommended price of one manufacturer serves
multiple retailers. Therefore, it is not profitable for the expensive sellers to
announce discounts hence it only remains attractive for the cheaper retail-
ers. Alternatively, expensive firms can increase their prices even further to
exploit consumers with high search costs at the expense of reduced demand.
This implies that as a consequence the underlying price (and discount) dis-
tribution changes. Hence the price gap between expensive and cheap outlets
increases and the strategies to announce discounts will not be affected.
5.3 Theoretical model of discount competition
Section 5.2 shows why cheaper gasoline stations always display and more
expensive ones do not display their discounts (relative to RPR) next to the
prices. Appendix 5.B explains why searching consumers find it optimal to
focus on discounts. However, these findings do not explain why firms use
discount days as a strategic instrument. In this section, we aim to achieve
just that. At first, we discuss some discount patterns observed in the Dutch
retail gasoline market showing that some firms indeed use discounts strate-
gically. Subsequently, we develop a simple model in which firms use discount
days to influence the share of consumers that actively searches for the lowest
price, i.e. if a firm offers a discount on a certain day of the week, then a frac-
8Alternatively, consumers may be more likely to avoid a given firm which does not
reveal discounts. This is only possible if consumers can visit firms by choosing the order
themselves. In contrast, most theoretical models consider consumer search to be random
or (more realistically) ordered in a predetermined way (see Arbatskaya, 2008).
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tion of consumers buying from this firm rather than searching for the lowest
price increases. By choosing the right price frame, to use the terminology of
Spiegler (2011), the behavior of consumers can be influenced.
5.3.1 Intra-firm discount dispersion
Recall Figure 5.2 that shows the discounts observed at two competing gaso-
line stations in Rotterdam. These two competitors simultaneously introduced
Thursday bonus discounts in March 2011. However, we observe that this
strategy in not used only by individual stations but at the brand-level too.
Figure 5.3 illustrates how two brands started offering weekly bonus discounts
together. These time series are produced by calculating the average daily
discounts at all stations of two particular brands. Note that the scales of
the discounts for both brands are different. Figure 5.3 shows that Brand #2
coordinates the discounts at all its stations rather uniformly. This brand
had bonus discounts at some of its stations in the first half of the period
illustrated but then these discounts were recalled. Around March 2011 both
brands started offering bonus discounts on Thursdays. However, because of
small magnitude of Brand #1’s average bonus discounts we can infer that
only selected stations of Brand #1 engaged in discount competition at that
time.
Table 5.2 presents gasoline retailers’ brands that offer bonus discounts
and the weekdays on which these discounts are offered as announced on the
websites of different gasoline retailers. From the list it is clear that on all
weekdays (with the exception of Sunday) at least one brand offers a bonus
discount. This might be an indication that competitors tend to select different
bonus-discount days. However, there are brands offering bonus discounts on
the same weekdays too (recall Figure 5.3). In order to get more insights
into the causes of this phenomenon we set up a theoretical model of bonus-
discount competition.
5.3.2 Setup of the model
Firms
To simplify the analysis, we focus on a market with two firms, indexed by
i = 1, 2 and a two-day week, where w = 1, 2 indexes the day of the week.
Moreover, demand is inelastic and there are no cost of production. Each firm
sets a price pi, that is valid on both days of the week. In addition, firms can
announce a bonus-discount day w when the price is lowered by δ > 0. If piw
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Figure 5.3: Time series of average discounts of two brands.
Table 5.2: Number of stations offering bonus discount on different weekdays.
Brand Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Bonus-discount day
Amigo 0 18 0 1 0 1 0 Tue
Argos 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 n.a.o.
Avia Xpress 0 0 0 2 0 4 3 n.a.o.
BP Express 0 0 6 13 0 5 3 n.a.o.
Esso Express 1 1 1 9 1 2 3 n.a.o.
Firezone 1 1 0 5 78 16 17 Fri
Shell Express 2 0 3 32 6 9 9 n.a.o.
Tamoil 2 0 12 1 0 4 4 Wed
Tango 0 0 0 135 23 12 1 Thu
TinQ 18 1 103 43 0 208 14 Mon+, Wed, Sat
Total 24 21 129 241 108 262 55
Notes: Only brands with more than 5 stations offering weekly bonus discounts inclu-
ded. n.a.o. – bonus discount day is not announced online; + – at selected sites only.
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denotes the price of firm i on day w, then piw = pi when the firm abstains
from discounts and piw = pi − δ when the firm has a discount on day w.
Implicitly, we make two assumptions about pricing. If the firm is free to
set different prices on different days of the week, then the discount becomes
cheap talk in the sense that the firm can announce a discount, but refrain
from giving the discount by increasing the price on that day by the same
amount. To ensure that discounts have real effects, we assume that firms set
the same (non-discounted) price on both days. This assumption eliminates
the possibility for firms to trick the consumers, cf. the “honest” regime in
Armstrong and Chen (2013).9 The other assumption is that the discount size
is exogenous and strictly positive. We have two reasons for doing so. First, the
data show that systematic in-advance-announced bonus discounts are never
extremely large and most of the time vary from 2.0 to 4.0 cpl (around 83.7%
of the cases, see Table 5.4). Another reason is that the discount has a natural
lower bound of 1 cpl.10
Consumers
There is a mass of consumers normalized to 1. The consumers’ willingness to
pay is equal to 1 and they demand one unit of the product in both periods.
Consumers are neither able to delay their demand nor to buy in advance.
Initially one half of the consumers prefers one firm and the other half prefers
another firm. Given the firms’ price-frame choices, some of these consumers
become searchers and the rest remain loyal. The searchers are consumers
who compare prices. The fraction of searchers in the market is denoted by
β ∈ (0, 1). Loyal (or captured) consumers always buy from the firm they are
loyal to (as long as the price does not exceed their willingness to pay). Firm i
has αi ∈ (0, 1) loyal consumers where i = 1, 2. Note that α1 + α2 + β = 1.
The fractions of searchers and loyal consumers depend on the strategic
decision of the firms whether or not to give a discount. This decision amounts
to choosing a price frame from the set X = {sκ;κ = 0, 1} with xi = s1
9Alternatively, we can say that this assumption insures that the bonus discounts are
credible and real. In practice, we see that the credibility of the bonus discounts is ensured
by retail price recommendations which consist of the fluctuating marginal cost, and stable
manufacturer’s and retailer’s mark-ups. A brand may announce a bonus discount and then
always increase the reference price by the same amount to negate the bonus discount,
however we do not observe this kind of firm behavior in practice.
10In principle firms could also announce a bonus discount of 0.1 cpl since gasoline prices
are expressed with three decimal places. However, we observe that 6.8% of bonus discounts
are equal to 1.0 cpl and only 0.5% are lower than 1 cpl (see Table 5.4).
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(s0) meaning that firm i will (not) announce and commit to a discount. We
distinguish between four different scenarios:
1. Neither firm gives a discount, x1 = x2 = s0 (coded 00)
2. Consumer is loyal to a firm that gives a discount and the other firm
does not give a discount (10)
3. Consumer is loyal to a firm that does not give a discount while the
other firm gives a discount (01)
4. Both firms give a discount (11)
The price comparison probability piκν , where κν ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, is defined
as follows: piκν is the fraction of (previously loyal) consumers who become
searchers and compare prices. Note that if the consumers of firm 1 compare
prices with probability piκν , then the consumers of firm 2 are in scenario νκ.
Hence, in total there are β = 12piκν +
1
2piνκ searchers because initially half
of the consumers are attached to each firm. This implies that firm i is left
with αi =
1
2 [1 − piκν ] loyal consumers. Contrary to Spiegler (2011), we do
not impose that price comparison probability function is symmetric. That is
pi10 < pi01: the firm which announces a bonus-discount day has more loyal
consumers than its competitor. In particular, we assume the following:
Assumption 5.1 The price comparison probability function satisfies
0 < pi10 < pi00 < pi11 < pi01 < 1. (5.6)
Note that the price comparison probability function has the following
properties: announcing a discount day will lead to more loyal customers, but
a firm will have less loyal customers when the rival firm announces a discount.
This assumption is plausible because the discount introduces a possibility to
benefit more from searching. Moreover, if both firms offer a discount then
the number of loyal customers is lower vis-a`-vis the situation where neither
offers a discount. This is natural because with discounts it is more likely to
gain from searching so there will be more searchers. Therefore, if both firms
offer a discount, then competition in the market increases.
In case when one firm announces the discount and the other does not we
make the additional assumption that searchers stop comparing prices and
always buy from the firm that uses the bonus-discount price frame. This is
captured by the following:
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Assumption 5.2 When only firm i offers the discount all searchers become
loyal to this firm. Therefore, firm i sells to αi + β consumers on both days
for any price pi ≤ 1.
This type of behavior may be rational if the discount is large enough
to outweigh possible gains of comparing prices. Technically, this assumption
ensures that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in any subgame where only
one firm announces a discount. However, in symmetric cases (when both firms
either do or do not announce discounts) the searchers buy from the firm with
a lower price (including the discount).
Timing of the game
One of the questions to answer is whether firms choose the same discount day
or whether they choose to set different discount days. To avoid coordination
problems, we assume that firm 1 first announces whether it will make use
of this instrument and on which day and then firm 2 announces its discount
day. In the final stage firms simultaneously choose price. We refer to the final
stage as the pricing stage.
5.3.3 Equilibrium of the game
We solve the game by backward induction. We start by finding equilibria
of all subgames in the pricing stage where firms compete by simultaneously
setting prices. Note that in the pricing stage there are four distinct subgames:
1. Neither firm announces a bonus-discount day (Symmetric case 1).
2. Both firms announce to offer bonus discounts on the same day (Sym-
metric case 2).
3. Both firms announce to offer bonus discounts on different days (Sym-
metric case 3).
4. One firm announces a bonus-discount day and another does not (Asym-
metric case).
After solving for equilibrium profits in each subgame, we determine the Nash-
equilibrium of the discount announcement stage.
Subgames in the pricing stage
Symmetric case 1 Since firms do not announce bonus-discount days, the
share of searchers in the market is β = pi00. Consequently, both firms have
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equal shares of loyal consumers αi =
1
2 [1− pi00], i = 1, 2. A complete and de-
tailed solution of this particular game can be found in Spiegler (2011, pp.148-
149). Since in our version of the game we have two periods, the equilibrium
profit of each firm is Πi = 2αi = 1− pi00.
Note that this game clearly does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies: firm i is willing to undercut the competitor’s price to win the
searchers as long as pj ∈ (αi/(αi + β), 1], where j 6= i. If firm j sets a lower
price, then competition for the searchers becomes too intense and firm i is
better off selling only to his loyal customers at price equal to the maximum
willingness to pay, i.e. for pj ≤ αi/(αi + β), the best-response is pi = 1. So
this game will have a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with support [αi/(αi+
β), 1]. Moreover, the firm’s (per-period) maxmin profit αi is the equilibrium
profit. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) is chosen such that the firm
receives the maxmin profit for any price in the support of the cdf:
Fi(p)αip+ [1− Fi(p)](αi + β)p = αi
In the symmetric case (α1 = α2), the cdf will be the same for both firms.
The next two subgames are solved using similar reasoning.
Symmetric case 2 When both firms commit to offer a bonus discount
on the same day the number of searchers is equal to the price comparison
probability, i.e. β = pi11. The number of firm i’s loyal consumers is given by
αi =
1
2 [1− pi11], i = 1, 2.
Proposition 5.1 Let α1 = α2 = α. There exists a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium in mixed strategies where firms draw prices from the cdf
F (p) =







. Firms’ payoffs are Π = 2α(1− 12δ).
Proof. See Appendix 5.D.1.
Note that in equilibrium firms earn less than than in Symmetric case 1
because on one of the days they offer a bonus discount and the fraction of
loyal consumers is smaller.
Symmetric case 3 Now consider what happens when both firms commit
to offer bonus discounts but they do so on different days. Both firms offer
a discount so the fractions of searchers and loyal customers are the same as
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in Symmetric case 2. However, because on each day a different firm offers a
discount, deriving the Nash-equilibrium is less straightforward.




. Then there exists a symmet-





Proof. To find a mixed-strategy equilibrium note the following: If the support
of (symmetric) price distributions has a length of 2δ then setting price halfway
the support implies that on his discount day the retailer sells to searchers with
certainty. Whereas in the period when the rival gives a discount, a firm only
sells to the loyals. Knowing these properties one can find the (mixed-strategy)
equilibrium profit level, and then determine the cdf’s on both halves of the
price support. For the full proof and cdf expressions, refer to Appendix 5.D.2.
We highlight that δ must be small enough for this subgame to have an
equilibrium of this form.11 When firms give discounts on different days, a
larger discount increases the probability that firms capture searchers on their
discount day. At the same time, however, firms have an incentive to set larger
prices to exploit loyal consumers in order to compensate for the lower profit
margin on the discount day. Therefore, the larger the discount, the higher the
regular price is. But because consumer’s willingness to pay is 1, it imposes the
upper bound for the price and consequently for the discount. This theoretical
finding is in line with the empirical observation that bonus discounts are not
too large. We find that 99% of all given bonus discounts in the Dutch retail
gasoline market are not larger than 6.0 cpl (27% of the 99th percentile of
the retail-spot price margin) and more than two thirds of them are between
2.0-3.0 cpl (9%-13.5% of the margin; see Table 5.4).
Proposition 5.1 claims that firms’ profits are decreasing in the level of dis-
counts. This is very intuitive because firms announce discounts on the same
day which implies that they are competing for the searchers. Because the
discount size is exogenously given, it simply lowers prices and profits of both
firms. However, when firms announce discounts on different days profits as
well as prices are increasing in discounts, according to Proposition 5.2. The
underlying reason is that giving discounts on different days allows firms to
share the demand of searchers. Because larger discount means lower competi-
tion for searchers and higher regular prices, the profits of both firms increase.
Therefore, one may interpret discounts announced on different days as a tool
11Our method of finding an explicit equilibrium fails when δ exceeds this threshold.
However, standard existence results apply to this game (cf. Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986).
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to share the market of searching consumers.
Asymmetric case Without loss of generality suppose that firm 1 offers a
bonus discount and firm 2 does not. The number of firm 1’s loyal consumers
is α1 =
1
2 [1−pi10] > 12 [1−pi01] = α2. So the number of searchers in the market
is β = 12 [pi10 + pi01]. Assumption 5.2 guarantees a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for this game.
Since firm 2 knows that it will only sell to its loyal consumers (given
p1 ≤ 1) it will maximize the profit by setting p2 = 1. Firm 1 knows that it has
captured the searchers by announcing the discount so it will also set p1 = 1.
Hence, on the bonus-discount day firm 1 will earn (1 − δ)(α1 + β). Firms
do not want to undercut one another because there is no gain in demand. In
other words, lowering the prices strictly decreases profits. Equilibrium profits
are given by Π1 = (2− δ)(α1 + β) and Π2 = 2α2.
Price-frame stages
In the first two stages of the game where the firms announce the discounts,
the leader (firm 1) and the follower (firm 2) of the game are facing the payoff
matrix given in Table 5.3. Firm 1 chooses whether to offer a discount or not.
Firm 2 observes this decision and then makes its choice. Note that if both
firms choose to introduce a discount, then firm 2 additionally has to decide
whether to offer a discount on the same day as firm 1 or on another day (which
explains the two cells in the bottom-right of the payoff matrix). Generically,
the game has a unique equilibrium which depends on the values of pi00, pi01,
pi11 and δ. In order to present the results in a clear way, we parameterize the
search probabilities in the following fashion:
1. pi01 = pi00 + λ, where λ ∈ (0, 1− pi00), and
2. pi11 = (1− η)pi00 + ηpi01 = pi00 + ηλ, where η ∈ (0, 1).
Note that λ and η measure the effectiveness of the bonus-discount price
frame. In particular, an increase in λ is associated with a larger spread in
the search probabilities in general (price-framing effectiveness) while larger
η implies more searchers when both firms announce discounts relative to the
case without discounts. Because the results remain qualitatively the same
when varying the values of pi00 and η, we have decided to present the results
in terms of δ and λ, and fix pi00 and η at 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. In addition,
because pi10 does not feature in the payoff matrix and hence does not affect
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the equilibrium of the game, we simply assume that pi10 = pi00 − ε > 0
for ε > 0 in to satisfy Assumption 5.1. We use a bifurcation approach to
locate the points in (λ, δ)-space where the Nash-equilibrium changes, i.e. the
(degenerate) points in the parameter space where the game has two Nash-
equilibria. In general this will lead to a curve that is easy to characterize.
First, by comparing the profits when both firms announce discounts on
the same day with the profits when discounts are on different days (two
bottom-right cells in Table 5.3), we can show that when







and both leader and follower offer a discount, then it is optimal for the follower
to set the same discount day as the leader. We directly see that h(λ) > 0.
Second, by analyzing the payoff matrix one can show that when δ = λ = 0,
the game has two Nash-equilibria: (1) only the leader offers a discount and (2)
both firms offer a discount on the same day. Therefore, this point is the start
of a curve on which two Nash-equilibria exist. Since these Nash-equilibria
can only coexist when the follower is indifferent between offering discount














(1− pi00 − ηλ) =⇒ δ = 2(1− η)λ
1− pi11 .
This bifurcation curve ((i) in Figure 5.4) is increasing and continues until
we hit the boundary δ = h(λ), i.e. curve (iii), where the follower switches to
setting a discount on a different day than the leader. We refer to the point
where this bifurcation curve hits the boundary as (λˆ, δˆ) (denoted by the
black dot in Figure 5.4). Observe that, starting at (λˆ, δˆ), δ = h(λ) serves as
another bifurcation curve, namely as the boundary between the equilibrium
where both firms set discounts on the same day and the equilibrium where
both firms set discounts on different days. One can show that this curve is
increasing. Finally, another bifurcation curve terminates at (λˆ, δˆ), i.e. the one
that separates the equilibrium where only the leader offers a discount from
the equilibrium where both offer discounts on different days. This curve ((ii)
in Figure 5.4) is again characterized by the follower being indifferent between
offering discount and not offering a discount:








One can show that this curve is increasing and ends at (λˆ, δˆ).
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Figure 5.4: Possible equilibria for different values of δ and λ when pi00 = 0.3
and η = 0.5. In region (A) only the leader offers a discount, in region (B)
both firms offer a discount on the same day, and in region (C) both firms
offer a discount but on different days. The curves are labeled in roman
numbers. Line (iv) is the upper bound on δ following Proposition 5.2.
The only thing that we still need to establish is that the following two
situations cannot be an equilibrium: (1) only the follower announces a dis-
count day and (2) neither firm sets a discount day. The first possibility can
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be excluded by observing that the leader can always guarantee himself a
profit of 1 − pi01 by giving a discount (this situation occurs when the fol-
lower is indifferent between using the discount instrument and not using the
discount instrument, but chooses to use discounts nonetheless). This implies
that apart from this degenerate case, it cannot be a Nash-equilibrium for
the leader to choose to use no discounts if he knows that the follower will
respond by setting a discount. To rule out the second possibility, observe
that this can only be an equilibrium if δ is sufficiently large. Otherwise it is
a best-response for the follower to use discounts. Calculations show that for
this to be an equilibrium the minimum value for δ exceeds the upper bound
given by Proposition 5.2.
Figure 5.4 shows the bifurcation curves for the case where pi00 = 0.3 and
η = 0.5. Note that for most parameter values both firms will use discounts.
Only in area (A), where the discount is low and the search probabilities are
not very sensitive to the price frame used, it is optimal for the follower to
abstain from the discount instrument. The follower will only set a discount
on a different day then the follower if the discount is sufficiently large (in area
(C)). The intuition behind switching between different strategies (areas (A),
(B), and (C) in Figure 5.4) is as follows. Suppose the discount price frame
is not very effective in stimulating consumers to search more (λ is very low)
and discounts are of moderate size, then the follower can afford to ignore
searching consumers and refrain from announcing a discount (area (A)). If
however, announcing a discount increases search significantly (larger λ) then
the searchers become too many to ignore, so the follower will announce the
discount on the same day to compete for them (move from (A) to (B)).12 If
instead, the discount increases sharply (small λ, large δ), then it is optimal for
the follower to announce a different discount day on which a large discount
almost guarantees the demand of searchers (move from (A) to (C)). Finally,
when the discount price frame is effective (moderate or large λ), larger δ
makes competing for the searchers too costly and induces the follower to
choose a different discount day (move from (B) to (C)). Summarizing, we
postulate that if we observe that only one firms uses discounts, then searching
probabilities are not influenced much by framing decisions. Moreover, the
theory suggests that in markets with higher discounts, it is more likely to
observe discounts on different days.
12The same switch from (A) to (B) occurs, if it is very cheap to compete even for few




This chapter makes use of the Athlon dataset including retail, ARA spot
price, and RPR price quotes.13 We exclude all highway stations and all
manned stations from the sample because most often these sites do not post
discounts on their billboards and do not engage in discount competition. We
also exclude stations for which we have less than 300 price quotes because
we do not have a sufficient number of observations in order to estimate the
error correction model due to missing values. Our final sample includes 883
unmanned non-highway gasoline stations and runs from December 8, 2008 to
December 31, 2013. This amounts to 902,125 unique price observations.
Because we were able to collect RPRs for 10 largest brands in the Nether-
lands, we can accurately recover the discounts for the stations of these brands.
However, other brands announce discounts as well and some of them engage
in discount competition too. For example, Amigo indicates that its (Tuesday)
bonus discount is relative to the RPR, however the latter is not published.14
Because in these cases RPRs are unavailable we calculate the discount as the
difference between the national average recommended price (GLA) and the
retail price.15 The GLA is widely recognized as a representation of market
developments in the Netherlands as it is posted daily in Dutch news portals.
GLA is the average of RPRs of 5 largest brands: BP, Esso, Shell, Texaco,
and Total.16
5.4.2 The role of retail price recommendations
Table 1.4 presents descriptive statistics of the deviations from daily average
RPR for each company. Even though some refiners have (statistically) sig-
nificantly lower RPRs than others, the difference between the largest and
the smallest mean RPR is less than 0.5 cpl. Therefore, consumers can rely
almost entirely on the discounts to make decisions about their purchases. In
other words, since the expected difference between RPRs of two brands is at
most 0.5 cpl, a 1 cpl difference in discounts is sufficient to determine which is
13For a detailed discussion of the data collection procedure and major characteristics of
this dataset, please refer to Section 1.3.
14See www.amigotankstations.nl/dinsdag, in Dutch.
15GLA is an abbreviation for the Dutch “Gemiddelde Landelijke Adviesprijs” which trans-
lates as “national average recommended price”.
16See, for example, www.unitedconsumers.com (in Dutch).
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the cheaper station. This suggests that consumers can indeed rank gasoline
stations based on discounts instead of comparing volatile prices every time
they purchase gasoline.
A very narrow interval of the mean RPR deviations from the daily average
justifies our choice to model discount competition without taking RPRs into
account. The RPRs of different refiners simply fluctuate in line with the spot
market prices and thus reflect movements in marginal cost. Although some
refiners announce the lowest RPR more often than competing brands, only
19.3% of the time there is only a single refiner with the lowest RPR. Next
to that, for every refiner, a randomly selected RPR will be the lowest or the
highest RPR on a given day, both with over 25% probability. This results
in substantially high chances (more often than every four days) that the on-
average cheapest refinery is in fact the most expensive one on a given day.
Thus RPRs carry very little information for the consumers other than the
general price level in the retail market. This is evident in Table 5.B.3 which
shows that compared with the expenses when consumers select a station
based on the RPR, they can only become worse off when buying at a randomly
selected station.
In the following section, we perform an extensive analysis of bonus-
discount competition. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 already illustrated that there exist
stations which use bonus discounts strategically. To address this phenomenon
we have to analyze whether, and if so how direct rivals use bonus discounts
to compete for local market demand.
5.5 Empirical analysis
This section evaluates the predictions of the theoretical model introduced
in Section 5.3 using the price data from the Dutch retail gasoline market.
First, we introduce our hypotheses. Then we present the estimation strategy.
Finally, we discuss and evaluate the results.
5.5.1 Identification of bonus discounts
For the empirical analysis we have to identify which stations actually offer
bonus discounts and which do not.17 Therefore, we define a station that offers
17There is a number of reasons why we cannot rely on the information which is available
on the Internet to label stations as offering bonus discounts or not. For example, some data
are simply not available anymore because a number of stations do offer bonus discounts for
a specific period of time and then they stop doing so. Such information is only available
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bonus discount based on the pattern of its discount time series. Namely, if a
station has a discount at least 1 cpl larger than the day before and the day
after for at least 5 consecutive, say, Fridays, we state that this station has a
bonus discount on Friday.18 In the case of Friday bonus discounts, the size
of the bonus discount is simply the difference between the discount (defined
as Dit ≡ pRECkt − pit) on Thursday and the discount on Friday. Table 5.2
presents the numbers of stations that offer bonus discounts on different days
of the week as classified by the algorithm defined above. It is evident that
our algorithm correctly identifies the stations using weekly bonus discounts
compared to the weekdays publicly announced on the Internet which are
listed in the last column of Table 5.2.
By inspecting the distribution of observed bonus discounts in Table 5.4
we can evaluate how well our model fits the data and vice versa. The 99th
percentile of the bonus discounts is around 5.0 cpl (excluding the 21% VAT;
6.0 cpl incl. VAT).19 In the theoretical model introduced in Section 5.3 we
normalize the marginal cost to 0 and the monopoly price is implicitly set at 1
(which is the maximal profit margin possible). We approximate the equivalent
statistic for the real data by subtracting the ARA spot prices from the net-
of-tax retail prices. The 99th percentile of this margin is 18.3 cpl. Therefore,
we can expect δ in the model not to exceed 0.273.20 Figure 5.4 shows that
this value is higher than the maximum of δ. From the opposite perspective,
more than 90% of all observed bonus discounts fall within the interval of δ in
Figure 5.4 for which an equilibrium is defined. Therefore, leaving the assumed
exogeneity of the bonus discount size aside, one can claim that the model
captures the levels of observed bonus discounts fairly well.
on the Internet when a site currently offers a bonus discount. Then there are some stations
which announce bonus discounts on their billboards but not online, hence this information
is only easily accessible for the local consumers but not for us.
18Varying the number of consecutive weeks with bonus discounts in order to qualify does
not influence the results significantly. Moreover, we allow stations to have multiple bonus
discounts per week even if they are on consecutive days, e.g. Friday to Sunday. In this
case, discounts on Thursdays and Mondays must be at least 1 cpl lower than on Fridays,
Saturdays and Sundays.
19We use the 99th percentile rather than the maximum in order to account for the outliers
in the data.
20In order to translate the actual maximum of the observed bonus discounts into the
level of δ, we scale 5.0 cpl using the ratio of 1.00/18.3 cpl to get 0.273.
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Table 5.4: The distribution of bonus discounts: 2012-2013.
Bonus
discount Frequency Percent Cumulative∗
1.0 1478 6.82 7.32
2.0 5902 27.25 36.35
3.0 8392 38.75 78.51
4.0 2480 11.45 92.76
5.0 841 3.88 97.80
6.0 245 1.13 99.44
12.0 2 0.01 100.00
Total 21657
Note: ∗The least common values of bonus discounts
are not listed but included in cumulative percentages.
5.5.2 Research hypotheses
We use Figure 5.4 as the basis to formulate our research hypotheses. Firstly,
the theory indicates that there should always exist at least one bonus-discount
day. Hence our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 5.1 The probability of observing one or more bonus-discount
days in an average local market is higher than observing zero bonus-discount
days.
Secondly, the model suggests that for bonus discounts δ > h(λ) the fol-
lower will choose a different bonus discount day than the leader. If the bonus
discounts in the Dutch retail gasoline market are sufficiently large, then we
can expect the following to be true:
Hypothesis 5.2 Given a bonus-discount day selected by the leader, the fol-
lower is more likely to choose a different day of the week as his/her bonus-
discount day.
Technically this boils down to the following: The probability that the number
of bonus-discount days will increase, conditional on the second firm also an-
nouncing its bonus-discount day in week (v+1), is larger than the probability
that the number of bonus-discount days will remain unchanged.
We acknowledge that our theoretical model could be extended by relaxing
the exogeneity assumption of the size of the bonus discounts. However, this
assumption establishes a clear direction of the causality between the size of
δ and the follower’s choice of the bonus-discount day. This allows us to test
a hypothesis regarding the follower’s strategy in a given market:
Hypothesis 5.3 In markets with higher established bonus discounts, the
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follower is more likely to announce a bonus discount on a different day than
the leader.
While Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.3 are very similar, the former focuses on the
general trend in the Dutch retail gasoline market whereas the latter zooms
into the local markets and looks at the firm’s strategy given certain con-
ditions in a particular market. Therefore, we will have to control for many
variables besides the size of the leader’s bonus discounts, e.g. brand, number
of competitors, demographic characteristics of the market, etc. In the follow-
ing subsection we introduce the methodology used to test the hypotheses and
present the results.
5.5.3 Results
General trends and switching probabilities
To evaluate the predictions of the theoretical model, we use 3-digit zip-code
areas to define separate local markets. We exclude the local monopolies, i.e.
the markets served by only one brand, because our theory model and the
hypotheses consider a duopoly. This yields 217 markets in the Dutch retail
gasoline market with an average area of approx. 38 m2 (3.5 km radius circle).
Then, for each 3-digit zip-code area r and week v we define a state variable
Srv = {n1rv, n2rv, . . . , n7rv} where nw is the number of brands using bonus
discounts on the wth day of the week.21 For example, if two brands offer
bonus discounts on Thursday, and one on Saturday the state is given by
{0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0}. Note that this state has two bonus-discount days and 3
brands using bonus discounts. We assume that these states follow an ergodic
Markov-chain process. This means that states do not have “memory” and the
state in the next week in a given zip-code area only depends on the current
state.
Table 5.5 illustrates how often we observe states with different number of
bonus-discount days and different number of brands using bonus discounts.
We exclude years 2008-2009 from the analysis because 97% of the time we
observe state S0 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} since the bonus-discount competition
kicked off in 2010. The remaining period shows that this phenomenon is
becoming more prevalent over time as the state S0 is less often observed in
21We count the number of brands on a certain day rather than individual stations in
order to avoid possible bias in the estimates. There are cases when two stations of the same
brand are simply located on the opposite sides of the street. Those stations are obviously
not competing but they are very likely to offer the bonus discount on the same weekdays.
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Table 5.5: Percentages of state observations for different values of nb.days
and nb.brands.
2010-2013 2010-2011 2012-2013
nb.days nb.brands nb.days nb.brands nb.days nb.brands
0 61.92 61.92 86.26 86.26 39.56 39.56
1 26.16 22.85 11.82 10.64 39.34 34.06
2 9.87 10.73 1.81 2.84 17.27 17.97
3 1.86 3.58 0.11 0.26 3.46 6.64
4 0.19 0.79 – – 0.36 1.51
5 – 0.04 – – – 0.09
6 – 0.06 – – – 0.12
7 – 0.01 – – – 0.03
8 – 0.01 – – – 0.03
Notes: nb.daysrv and n
b.brands
rv is the number of weekdays and brands respectively,
with a bonus discount in 3-digit zip-code area r at week v.
2012-2013 compared to 2010-2011 (cf. 39.6% vs. 86.3%). In line with Hypoth-
esis 5.1, state S0 is less common than states with one or more bonus-discount
days together in 2012-2013.
Table 5.6 presents the average switching probabilities from states with m
to states with n bonus-discount days.22 First of all, we see that the states are
rather stable and switching to states with more or with less bonus-discount
days occurs approximately every 3 months (1 in 14 weeks). Moreover, for
states with more than 1 bonus-discount day the probability to switch to a
state with one more bonus-discount day is significantly smaller than the prob-
ability to switch to a state with less bonus-discount days. In the last column
of Table 5.6 the eigenvector of the switching probability matrix shows the
probabilities of observing different states in the stable equilibrium. The re-
sults indicate that the local Dutch retail gasoline markets are moving towards
a new equilibrium in which states with one or two bonus-discount days are
more prominent than that with zero bonus-discount days. This is in line with
Hypothesis 5.1.
Table 5.7 carries a lot of information in a compact manner so we will
briefly explain how one should read it. A cell in the first row and column (2)
of the first panel says that P (∆Xr,v+1 = Z|Y ) = 0.0256. In the first panel,
22We opt for average switching probabilities aggregating by the number of bonus-discount
days because we observe 72 unique states Srv. Analyzing individual switching probabilities
from one state to another becomes too detailed and rather uninformative. Furthermore,
for some states (especially with 3 or 4 bonus-discount days) we would not have a sufficient
number of observations to draw strong conclusions.
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Table 5.6: Average switching probability matrix: 2012-2013.
n Eigen-
0 1 2 3 4 vector
0 0.9209 0.0757 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.1595
1 0.0256 0.9211 0.0491 0.0004 0.0000 0.3638
m 2 0.0052 0.0397 0.9201 0.0225 0.0005 0.3635
3 0.0000 0.0101 0.1105 0.8675 0.0052 0.0869
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0750 0.9250 0.0263
Note: SPmn is the average probability of switching from a state
with m bonus-discount days to the state with n bonus-discount
days in the next week.
variable X is the number of bonus-discount days in a week, i.e. nb.days, the
first row indicates that condition Y is nb.daysrv = 1, and in column (2) of the
first panel Z = −1. Hence P (∆nb.daysr,v+1 = −1|nb.daysrv = 1) = 0.0256: The
empirical probability that the number of bonus-discount days in market r in
week (v + 1) will decrease by one, given that currently there is one bonus-
discount day in this market, is 2.5%. The first panel of Table 5.7 simply
provides statistical tests for some switching probabilities in Table 5.6. The
main finding is that only if currently there is only one bonus-discount day
then it is more likely for the number of bonus-discount days to increase than
to decrease. In the second panel, we additionally compare the probability
of the number of brands offering bonus discounts (nb.brandsrv ) increasing with
the probability that nb.brandsrv will go down. One can conclude that given
market r is in a state with one bonus-discount day, next week this market
is more likely to have 2 rather than 0 brands with bonus discounts (5.8%
vs. 3.9%). However, if the number of brands with bonus discounts is 2 or
3, then it is more likely that the following week this number will go down.
Finally, using the last panel of Table 5.7 we test Hypothesis 5.2. Given that
the number of brands offering bonus discounts in week (v + 1) increases by
one and nb.daysrv = 1, the new brand is almost 3 times more likely to choose
a different bonus-discount day rather than the same as its rival (71.4% vs.
28.6%). This finding combined with the propositions of our theoretical model
indicates that in the Dutch market the bonus discounts are relatively high.
Follower’s strategy: An application of probit regression
As we have discussed above, Hypothesis 5.2 evaluates the general trend in
the Dutch retail gasoline market and merely scratches the surface of what
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Table 5.7: Hypothesis 5.2 test: 2012-2013.
Variable X Condition Y (1) (2)
P (∆Xr,v+1 = Z|Y ) Significantly
Z = 1 Z = −1 different?
nb.days
nb.daysrv = 1 0.0491*** 0.0256*** YES (0.0005)
nb.daysrv = 2 0.0225*** 0.0397*** YES (0.0159)
nb.daysrv = 3 0.0052 0.1105*** YES (0.0000)
nb.daysrv ∈ {1, 2, 3} 0.0346*** 0.0406*** NO (0.2351)
P (∆Xr,v+1 = Z|Y ) Significantly
Z = 1 Z = −1 different?
nb.brands
nb.daysrv = 1 0.0579*** 0.0393*** YES (0.0128)
nb.daysrv = 2 0.0415*** 0.0652*** YES (0.0111)
nb.daysrv = 3 0.0221** 0.1092*** YES (0.0001)
nb.daysrv ∈ {1, 2, 3} 0.0487*** 0.0567*** NO (0.1755)
P (∆Xr,v+1 = Z|Y,∆nb.brandsr,v+1 = 1) Significantly
Z = 1 Z = 0 different?
nb.days
nb.daysrv = 1 0.7138*** 0.2862*** YES (0.0001)
nb.daysrv = 2 0.4933*** 0.5067*** NO (0.9340)
nb.daysrv = 3 0.3067 0.6933* NO (0.4117)
nb.daysrv ∈ {1, 2, 3} 0.6304*** 0.3696*** YES (0.0039)
Notes: X is a variable for which we calculate conditional probabilities of changes. nb.daysrv and
nb.brandsrv is the number of weekdays and brands respectively, with a bonus discount in 3-digit
zip-code area r in week v. Condition Y states how many bonus discount days are in the cur-
rent week before the change. The value of the change in variable X is denoted by Z.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (H0: P (·) = 0); p-values for H0: (1) = (2) are in parentheses.
strategy firms employ at the local market level. In order to test Hypothesis 5.3
we set up the following probit model:





+ β′4controlsi + β
′
5weekdayi + β6secondfollowi + εi
yi = 1 if y
∗
i > 0
yi = 0 if y
∗
i ≤ 0. (5.7)
where yi is a binary variable equal to 1 when the follower chooses a differ-
ent bonus-discount day than the leader(s) and equal to 0 when the follower
chooses the same weekday, y∗i is the latent variable, δ¯j is the leaders’ 8-week
average bonus discount before the follower’s introduction of a bonus-discount
day, brandi is a vector of follower-brand dummies and brandj is a vector
of leader(s)-brand dummies, controlsi is a vector of control variables for
local market effects, weekdayi is a vector of weekday dummies (a weekday
dummy equals 1 if that weekday is selected as the bonus-discount day by the
follower), and εi ∼ N (0, 1).
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For the means of this reduced-form regression, we have to determine the
bonus-discount leaders and followers in all local markets. The leader(s) is
(are) the firm(s) which already has (have) a bonus-discount established in
week (v − 1). The follower is a firm that introduces a new bonus discount
for the first time in week v given that in week (v − 1) there is at least
1 bonus-discount day. Notice that we exclude observations where the same
firm becomes a follower more than once. In case this occurs, we keep the first
instance only. It can also happen that there are multiple followers in the same
market. This implies that the first follower’s discount will be counted in δ¯j if
the second follower introduced a bonus-discount within 8 weeks. To account
for these events, we introduce a dummy variable secondfollowi which is equal
to 1 if there was already a follower introducing a bonus discount within the
last 8 weeks in the same market where firm i is operating.
It is clear that model (5.7) is suffering from endogeneity bias. Neverthe-
less, we are able to determine the direction of the bias and to show that we
obtain a conservative measure of β1. Suppose that action A is “choose a dif-
ferent bonus-discount day”, and B – “introduce a bonus-discount day”, then
the following is true:
P (yi = 1|xi) ≡ P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
,
where xi is a vector of all independent variables.
23 We argue that the leader’s
lagged bonus discounts influence the decision of the follower to offer a bonus
discount himself, i.e. δ¯j has an effect on P (B). Recall that for low values
of λ in our theoretical model, δ has to be high enough for the follower to
introduce a bonus discount (cf. Figure 5.4). Therefore, we expect that the
effect of leader’s average bonus discount on the probability that the follower
announces a bonus-discount day will be positive. In (5.7) we model the effect
of δ on P (A|B), i.e. the conditional probability that the follower will choose a
different bonus-discount day from that of the leader, given that the follower
introduces a bonus discount. The conditional probability P (A|B) is nega-
tively affected by the probability that the follower offers a bonus discount
(P (B)). Therefore, if we estimate (5.7) using the maximum likelihood esti-
mator, βˆ1 will be biased downwards because of the positive relation between
δ and P (B).
Table 5.8 presents the marginal effects of the probit regression of (5.7).
Note that in this regression, the full set of control variables is included but we
23In fact, P (A|B) = P (A)
P (B)
because P (B|A) = 1 by definition.
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Table 5.8: Probit regression of (5.7).
Probit Delta-method
marg. effects std. errors
8-week δ¯leader 0.0709** (0.0347)
Brand dummies









Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity (White).
Only significant variables are reported.
report only the significant ones.24 First of all, we find that ceteris paribus, if
the leader’s 8-week average bonus discount increases by 1 cpl the conditional
probability of the follower choosing a different bonus-discount day will be
7.1 percentage points (pp) higher. This estimate is significant at the 5%
level.25 Taking note of the argument that the estimate of β1, and therefore
the marginal effect of δ¯j is downward-biased, we conclude that regression
estimates support Hypothesis 5.3.
Alongside the positive effect of δ¯j on the conditional probability of choos-
ing a different weekday as suggested by the theory, other factors also play
a significant role in stations’ decisions on which weekday to announce their
bonus discounts. Unsurprisingly, we find that the main driver of which day of
the week a particular station will select as a bonus-discount day is its brand.
As Table 5.2 reflects, most of the stations follow the general brand strat-
egy when it comes to selecting a particular day of the week. This is evident
from the marginal effect estimates of the brand and weekday dummies in Ta-
ble 5.8. For example, if the follower is a TinQ site then this station is 31.6 pp
more likely to introduce a new bonus-discount day in a week compared to
24We include weekday dummies from Tuesday to Sunday, and the following brand dum-
mies for both the followers and the leaders: Avia Xpress, BP Express, Esso Express, Fire-
zone, Shell Express, Tamoil, Tango, and TinQ.
25Linear probability model (OLS) shows that this effect is 4.8 pp points and is significant
at the 10% level.
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unbranded sites. Esso Express stations on the other hand are 46.3 pp more
likely to match the leader’s bonus-discount day. This could be explained by
the fact that TinQ has three publicly announced bonus-discount days in the
week, whereas Esso Express has zero (see Table 5.2). If the leader is a Fire-
zone station then the follower is 66.1 pp more likely to choose a different
bonus-discount day than that of the leader. However, this is a case because
Firezone gives bonus discounts on Fridays and we find that none of the fol-
lowers (except Firezone stations) choose Friday. We can similarly explain the
observation that when the leader is Tango then it is 38.0 pp more likely that
his bonus-discount day will be matched since Thursday is a popular weekday
for bonus discounts (see Table 5.2). Note that if the leader is Tango and the
follower chooses Thursday as his bonus-discount day, then the conditional
probability that there will be a new bonus-discount day in the market is
94.6 pp (= 38.0 + 56.6) lower, i.e. the follower will almost certainly match
the leader’s bonus-discount day. This is not surprising since more than 80%
of all Tango sites have bonus discounts on Thursdays.
The probit model provides us with two important insights. First of all,
we conclude that brands of the follower and the leader have a major effect in
determining whether the follower will match the leader’s bonus-discount day
or not. But most importantly, we find that in markets absent of major-brand
players the size of already established bonus discounts plays a significant role
in shaping the follower’s strategy. In line with our theoretical predictions, the
level of bonus discount has a positive effect on the conditional probability that
the follower will select a different bonus-discount day, provided the follower
introduces a bonus discount.
5.6 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze the phenomenon of discount competition in mar-
kets with frequent price changes. Most gasoline refiners in the Netherlands
publicly announce retail price recommendations (RPRs) which generally fol-
low developments of the gasoline spot market price. Gasoline stations at the
lower end of the price distribution compete purely in prices because they are
unmanned stations which do not offer any additional products or services
rather than gasoline. In order to stand out from the crowd, alongside the re-
tail price on the billboards and often in larger digits, they post the discount,
i.e. the difference between the RPR and the retail price. In contrast to prices,
discounts are relatively stable and require less effort and time to follow and
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memorize. This considerably eases the task of consumers to compare prices in
markets where they fluctuate significantly. Also, firms can use the discounts
to influence the behavior of irrational consumers to their advantage.
Section 5.2 briefly explains why gasoline stations at the lower end of price
distribution display discounts relative to the recommended prices alongside
their retail prices. We show that if a searching consumer is at a station which
most of the time offers discounts lower than the average of all sites, she will
expect to see a higher price at the next station to be visited, when the current
station reveals its discount compared to when it does not.
In Section 5.3, we introduce a model of bonus-discount competition. In
line with Varian (1980) and Spiegler (2011), we assume that two identi-
cal firms each have a fraction of captured consumers and compete for the
searchers. We extend the model to two periods. Ultimately, we allow firms
to introduce a bonus discount of a given size in one of the periods. If intro-
duced by both firms, the bonus discount increases the total share of searchers
because it becomes easier to compare prices due to the assumed property of
this price frame (cf. Spiegler, 2011). However, if only one firm introduces a
bonus discount then all searchers become loyal to that firm.
The theoretical model suggests that it is more likely to observe one or
more bonus-discount days in a given market rather than zero. Using an exten-
sive dataset of the Dutch retail gasoline market we find that this is indeed the
case. Moreover, the switching probability matrices indicate that the Dutch
retail gasoline market is moving towards a long-run equilibrium in line with
our theoretical model. Given the trend that more stations select a different
rather than the same bonus-discount day from the already established one,
our theory suggests that the majority of the observed bonus discounts are
higher than some threshold. Finally, in line with the theory, we show that
the follower is more likely to choose a different bonus-discount day than that
of the leader when the leader’s average bonus discount increases. However,
the main factor that determines which day of the week will be selected is the
brand-specific bonus-discount strategy.
The major contribution of this chapter is that it extends and empirically
tests the predictions of the price-frame model of Spiegler (2011). We find em-
pirical evidence which supports our theoretical prediction that when average
bonus discounts are higher they will be more spread throughout the week.
In this way, we provide the rationale for previously overlooked weekly bonus
discounts prominent in the Dutch retail gasoline market. Finally, the chapter
also contributes to the developing topic of discount pricing and complements
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the work of Armstrong and Chen (2013).
To sum up, this chapter analyzes the incentives of firms and consumers
to use the discounts alongside the retail prices. The discounts are the key
because they make prices easier to compare by filtering out the rapid and
substantial variation of marginal costs. Moreover, we provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the existence of non-binding retail price recommenda-
tions. Complementing earlier work by Buehler and Ga¨rtner (2013), Luben-
sky (2013), and Puppe and Rosenkranz (2011), we illustrate that RPRs may
be a means of establishing discounts which can be used strategically by con-
sumers and firms alike.
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5.A Retail gasoline price composition
Spot prices As in Faber and Janssen (2008), we use prices from the
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) spot market as our input price for
gasoline. Within the industry, the ARA spot market rates are the acknowl-
edged benchmark prices for the region including the Netherlands.26
In order not to unnecessarily complicate the line of argument in this
section, for now we simply assume that daily spot prices zt are independent
and identically distributed draws from a normal distribution with mean µz
and variance σ2z :
zt ∼ N (µz, σ2z). (5.A.1)
In Appendix 5.B, where we evaluate different search strategies using simu-
lated time series of prices, we use a richer specification of spot price dynamics
that allows for an AR process in spot prices.
Recommended prices Next we apply an error-correction model to rep-
resent the adjustment process of company specific recommended prices to
lagged recommended prices and lagged differences in the changes of the spot
price. As is common in this literature (see e.g. Borenstein et al., 1997), we
model the time series of recommended prices pRECex before taxes (excise duty
and VAT) for each firm. The recommended price pREC as observed by con-
sumers is easily derived from this price series by adding the excise duty and
subsequently multiplying by the VAT-rate:
pRECkt = τ [p
REC
ex,kt + Excise], (5.A.2)
with τ ≡ (1 + V AT ). We assume that the long term relation between the
recommended price set by firm k at time t and the ARA spot price to be
pRECex,kt = φzt +mk, (5.A.3)
with φ a multiplication factor to the spot price which is also assumed identical
to all firms and mk an unobserved brand-specific “mark-up” which includes
firm’s gross profit margin before subtracting time-invariant cost components
common to all firms and firm-specific costs such as operating and marketing
expenses. Given that both the spot price and the recommended price are ex-
pressed per liter, we expect φ to equal one. This relation will serve as the basic
building block for the error-correction model we estimate in Appendix 5.B
26See http://www.pjk-international.com/.
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(see equation (5.B.1)). Using a simpler stochastic relation between the spot
price and the recommended price that abstracts from response lags, we can
express the recommended price of firm k on day t as follows:
pRECex,kt = φzt +mk + ξkt, with ξkt ∼ N (0, σ2ξ ) (5.A.4)
Retail prices In the final step, we model the relation between the recom-
mended price as announced by the firm and the actual retail prices set by
the individual outlets owned by the firm. We assume that for outlet i ∈ N(k)
the relation can be described as follows:
pit = αp
REC
kt − di + εpit = ατpRECex,kt + ατExcise− di + εpit, (5.A.5)
with εpit ∼ N (0, σ2p) a normally distributed i.i.d. disturbance that incorporates
shocks at the local level. The second equation follows from (5.A.2). We expect
α to take on a value close to one and we assume α = 1 throughout this section.
di is an outlet-specific constant that represents the average discount the outlet
i offers off the recommended price as announced by its parent company k.
The station-specific discount Dit at day t, the recommended p
REC
kt and the




In other words, a consumer who observes both the retail price and the dis-
count also knows the recommended price of the outlet’s mother company
that day. As the recommended prices of all firms are related to that price
via the relation with the daily spot price (see equation (5.A.3)), being in-
formed about the recommended price of firm k also reduces the consumer’s
uncertainty about the current retail prices at alternative outlets of competing
firms.
5.B Expected benefits of different search strategies
This section shows by simulation that in retail markets with frequent ex-
ogenous price changes and positive search cost, consumers may benefit from
focusing on the discount firms give relative to a firm-specific reference price
the fluctuations of which reflect common changes in market conditions, e.g.
general cost changes.
Our approach is as follows. First we describe the vertical market structure
using the retail gasoline market as our blueprint. Next we introduce the price
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processes describing the dynamics of the recommended and actual prices. To
mimic the price processes observed in the market as accurately as possible, we
match our parameter values with empirical estimates derived from data that
include all daily recommended prices as announced between by companies
with outlets in the Dutch retail gasoline market as well as the actual sales
price at different outlets of these brands. Our data covers the period between
December 8, 2008 and December 31, 2013.
5.B.1 Estimating the distributions of spot, recommended,
and retail prices
Similar to Borenstein et al. (1997), we assume at this point that prices “me-
chanically” follow the assumed dynamics, with no active role for firms in
strategically setting either prices or discounts. In the final step, we calcu-
late and compare various strategies of comparing prices and discounts. We
consider strategies where consumers compare recommended or retail prices
at regular times with strategies where a new price comparison is triggered
by a change in the price or discount offered by the current outlet of choice.
The average annual fuel expenditures (over R = 1000 iterations) are used to
evaluate the cost-saving effect of different strategies.
In the simulations, we will construct a local market with three upstream
firms each owning two outlets, n(k) = 2, k = 1, 2, 3. We use this relatively
small number of six outlets in order to keep things tractable and because it
is sufficient to show the implications of different search strategies.
Spot prices We use a richer specification than (5.A.1) in the previous sec-
tion, because an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of the null hypothesis
that time series of ARA spot prices contains a unit root cannot reject the null
at the p = 0.10 level.27 Further analysis using the Schwarz-Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) shows that the preferred specification of the dynamic
process is a first-order autoregressive process:
∆zt = β[zt−1 − zt−2] + εzt ,
27The value of our test statistic for the ADF test for a specification with a drift term
is −2.42 with the p = 0.10 critical value being −2.57. Also in a specification with a linear
time trend, the ADF test cannot reject the null of a unit root (value of the test statistic in
that case is −2.82 with the p = 0.10 critical value being −3.12).
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with ∆zt ≡ zt − zt−1 and βˆ = −0.1035 (p < 0.001).28 In this equation, zt is
the ARA spot market price and εz ∼ N (0, σ2z). The estimate for σˆ2z = 0.5487.
Recommended prices Next we apply an error-correction model to rep-
resent the adjustment process of company specific recommended prices to
lagged recommended prices and lagged differences in the changes of the spot
price. In the period we consider, the VAT has ranged from 19 to 21 percent
and the excise duty has been between 68 and 72 cents a liter29. In our sim-
ulation we therefore fix the VAT in equation (5.A.2) at 0.2 (20%) and the
excise duty at 70 cents/liter.
Given the long term relation of equation (5.A.3), the error correction
model we estimate for each firm i has the following form:30
∆pRECex,kt = θ
[





γl∆zt−l + εUkt. (5.B.1)
with ∆pRECex,kt ≡ pRECex,kt − pRECex,kt−1 and εUkt ∼ N (0, σ2U ) a normally distributed
i.i.d. disturbance. The lags in the spot are included to acknowledge that the
adjustment to changes in the spot price may not be instantaneous.
Equation (5.B.1) can be rearranged to obtain an expression that is linear
in variables:
∆pRECex,kt = −θmUk +
L∑
l=1
γl∆zt−l + θpRECex,kt−1 − θφzt−1 + εUkt. (5.B.2)
We have separately estimated equation (5.B.2) for the ten brands in our
sample that announce recommended prices. Note from equation (5.B.2) that
a consistent estimate for φ is obtained by dividing the estimated coefficient
on zt−1 by the coefficient on pRECex,kt−1. Similarly, a consistent estimate of m
U
k
is obtained by dividing the estimated constant by the coefficient on pRECex,kt−1.
Table 5.B.1 summarizes the results. As expected, the coefficient φ on zt−1
is very close to one. One also observes that estimates of the adjustment
parameter θ are very similar across brands, as is the “mark-up” which is for
all brands close to 16 cents per liter, which seems a very reasonable estimate.
28The coefficients of the intercept (0.159) and time trend (−3.29e−5) are insignificant
with p = 0.206 and p = 0.265, respectively.
29The VAT was 19% before October 1, 2012, and 21% after that date. Information on
excise duties retrieved from the European Commission Excise Duty Tables 2008-2014, to
be found at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/taxation/.
30Again, we use this realistic statistical relation that allows for lags instead of equation
(5.A.4).
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Table 5.B.1: Results for the estimation of (5.B.2).
Firm θˆ φˆ mUk γ1 γ2
1 -0.036 1.066 15.981 0.076 0.103
2 -0.044 1.064 16.320 0.090 0.116
3 -0.041 1.068 16.235 0.070 0.152
4 -0.043 1.064 16.091 0.037 0.129
5 -0.044 1.057 16.534 0.038 0.111
6 -0.042 1.068 16.185 0.011 0.062
7 -0.038 1.058 16.429 0.072 0.181
8 -0.038 1.069 15.854 0.066 0.171
9 -0.056 1.064 16.365 0.058 0.122
10 -0.040 1.068 15.841 0.057 0.136
Average -0.042 1.065 16.184 0.057 0.128
The number of lagged differences of the spot price that, according to the
BIC criterion, should be included in the ECM differs per brand and ranges
from 0 to 7. In the simulation, we will use L = 2 lags.
Retail prices The relation between the recommended price and the actual
retail prices set by the individual outlets is modeled as in equation (5.A.5).
Table 5.B.2 summarizes the coefficient values as used in the simulation; these
are all based on the empirical estimates. The parameter values are the same
for all upstream firms except that we allow for small differences in the mark-
up. This reflects that some firms may be more cost-efficient or settle for a
lower profit margin.
5.B.2 Consumer search strategies
We are now ready to evaluate different search strategies available to con-
sumers who have to buy a good on a regular basis but are confronted with a
market with frequent price changes. In particular, we consider the demand for
gasoline by a representative consumer who every y days has to completely re-
fill her 40 liter tank. This demand is exogenously given. The consumer knows
that in her local market, there are three firms who each own two outlets.
She is also informed about the dynamic price process that the recommended
prices follow as described in the previous subsections, with parameter values
as in Table 5.B.2. However, the consumer does not know the parameter val-
ues that define the retail price processes of each retailer. In other words, the
consumer does not know which stations are on average the cheapest.
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Table 5.B.2: Parameters used in the simulated time series of prices.
Parameter value Parameter value
Spot price Retail price
z0 37.4 (starting value) α 1.00
β -0.1035 σ2p 0.5
σ2z 0.5487 d1 16
Recommended price d2 15
VAT 0.20 d3 14
Excise 70 d4 13
θ -0.1 d5 12







We evaluate the following search strategies in terms of the expected an-
nual fuel expenditures:
1 SRANK(x): rank prices of all suppliers every x purchases, buy from the
supplier with the lowest price and continue to buy from this supplier
till the next ranking;
2 SRANDOM : never rank prices, always buy from a randomly selected
supplier.
3 SREC : rank the recommended prices of the three firms, buy fuel from
a randomly selected outlet of the firm with the lowest recommended
price.
4 SpTRIGGER: rank prices of all suppliers only if the price at the outlet
of choice has increased with δP cents.
5 SdTRIGGER: rank discounts of all suppliers only if the discount at cur-
rent outlet of choice has decreased with δD cents.
It is clear that SRANK(1), comparing all retail prices every time one buys
fuel will lead to the lowest average cost. However, in markets with frequent
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price changes, this may involve a considerable effort.31 For all strategies, the
consumer needs to trade of the cost of effort with the potential gains. Of
course, a consumer may decide to rank prices now and then, but not every
time she buys fuel x > 1 in order to reduce her search cost. Search cost can be
completely eliminated by just randomly selecting an outlet to buy fuel, this
is strategy SRANDOM . This will certainly increase expected fuel expenditures
but the question is how much? Our simulation model is able to answer this
question.
Instead of ranking individual outlet prices, the consumer may instead
base his purchase decision on the recommended prices as announced by the
different firms on their web sites and in newspapers (SREC This arguably
involves less effort, but it may increase expenditures as there is no guarantee
that the brand with the lowest recommended price also sets the lowest prices
at its outlets.
The final two strategies SpTRIGGER and SdTRIGGER have in common that
consumers continue to buy from the same outlet unless an increase in price
by certain number of cents (SpTRIGGER) or a decrease of the discount by
a certain number of cents (SdTRIGGER) triggers the consumers to re-launch
their search. When triggered, consumers using the SpTRIGGER will again rank
prices and decide to buy from the supplier that now has the lowest price,
consumers using the SdTRIGGER instead will rank the discounts offered and
start buying from the supplier that now offers the highest discount.
The results in Table 5.B.3 contain a number of important insights. Let’s
focus on the column y = 1, the consumer who buys fuel every day. Her annual
expenditures amount to e23,232 when she compares prices every time she
buys fuel. Compared to the case where she would compare prices only every
third day, she saves e48 a year. However, in the latter case, she would only
need to compare prices 122 times a year instead of 365. So, she only gains
from comparing prices more often if her cost of comparing prices is less than
19.8 eurocents (= 48/(365− 122)).
Table 5.B.3 shows that the strategies of randomly picking an outlet or
deciding from which firm to buy by considering the recommended price lead
to annual expenditures that are, respectively, e381 and e213 higher than
under SRANK(1). In other words SRANDOM is only more attractive than
SRANK(1) if one’s cost of comparing prices exceed e1.04.
Expected annual expenditures are somewhere in between SRANK(x) and
31Even with the price comparison sites currently available, an individual buying fuel twice
a week has to visit these sites 100 times a year, the time cost of which is not negligible.
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Table 5.B.3: Simulation results: Expected annual fuel expenditures (in e)
and expected number of price comparisons for different search strategies
(R = 1000 iterations).
buy fuel every y days
y 1 3 5 7 1 3 5 7
annual expenditures # of comparisons
SRANDOM 23613 7886 4721 3375 0 0 0 0
SREC 23445 7830 4688 3351 0 0 0 0
SRANK(x)
x 1 23232 7759 4645 3321 365 122 73 52
2 23266 7772 4654 3328 183 61 37 26
3 23280 7778 4658 3331 122 41 24 17
4 23288 7782 4661 3333 91 30 18 13
5 23294 7785 4663 3334 73 24 15 10
SpTRIGGER
δP 1 23333 7792 4666 3335 19 10 8 6
2 23344 7796 4668 3337 10 7 5 5
3 23357 7800 4670 3338 6 5 4 3
4 23366 7801 4671 3339 4 4 3 3
5 23366 7802 4671 3339 3 3 2 2
SdTRIGGER
δD 1 23298 7781 4659 3330 5 3 2 2
2 23319 7787 4661 3333 1 1 0 0
3 23313 7785 4661 3332 0 0 0 0
4 23310 7784 4661 3332 0 0 0 0
5 23310 7784 4661 3332 0 0 0 0
Note: All numbers are rounded to the nearest integer.
SRANDOM for consumers who apply one of the trigger strategies. However,
both in terms of expenditures, as in terms of the number of times they have to
do a comparison (Table 5.B.3), consumers focusing on discounts are better
off. Compared to SRANK(1), a consumer on average pays e66 more but
searches 360 times less when she compares discounts and only switches outlet
if the discount at the current default outlet decreases with δD = 1 cent or
more. In other words, if the cost of comparing is more than 18.3 cents, the
consumer will prefer to focus on discounts. A comparison-free but e147 more
costly alternative to the SdTRIGGER strategy is buying gasoline based on
the retail price recommendations. However, for y = 1, the SREC strategy is
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only optimal if the costs of comparing discounts once are larger than e29.40
(e10.50 if consumer fuels up once a week, i.e. y = 7).
Needless to say, the savings obtained by performing many comparisons
are decreasing in y: a consumer who re-fills only once a week saves e9 a
year by using SRANK(1) instead of SdTRIGGER with δD = 1 but compares
50 times more, a saving of 18 cents per comparison conducted. Hence, if
consumers’ costs of comparing prices are between e0.18 and e10.50 they
will find SdTRIGGER to be the optimal strategy.
32
In sum, our simulations show that in markets with frequent price changes
and positive cost of price comparisons, consumers may be better off by fo-
cusing on the discounts different firms give off a reference price that moves
together with general market fluctuations. Since the recommended prices
represent the fluctuations in the oil market correctly the discounts are infor-
mative and useful for the consumers. Given that consumers make use of the
discounts, firms can also use them to affect the behavior of the consumers.
5.C Proofs
5.C.1 Proof of equation (5.3)
The consumer observes only pi. From equation (5.2), we know the retail price
at the alternative outlet j is
pj = p
REC
l − dj + εpj (5.C.1)
Using equations (5.1) and (5.2), we can express the retail price of station j
in terms of pi by rewriting (5.C.1):
pj = z +ml − dj + εpj = (pRECk −mk) +ml − dj + εpj
= pi + di − εpi −mk +ml − dj + εpj
Then the expected value of station j’s price conditional on the price of sta-
tion i can be written as follows:
E[pj |pi, µz,mk,ml, d¯] = E[pi + (di − εpi ) + (ml −mk)− (dj − εpj )|pi, . . . ]
= pi + (ml −mk)− E[dj − εpj |pi, . . . ]
+E[di − εpi |pi, . . . ]
32For an illustration, an average gasoline-powered car with a fuel consumption of 6 litres
per 100 km can drive 2 km with 18 cents worth of fuel, assuming gasoline costs 1.50 e/l.
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Obviously, the conditional expected value of station j’s discount is d¯:
E[dj − εpj |pi, µz,mk,ml, d¯] = E[dj − εpj |µz,ml, d¯] = d¯. The conditional expec-
tation of station i discount is more complex:









































For more details on conditional distributions, refer to Rao (1973, p. 522).
Consequently,












pi − (µz +mk − d¯)
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= pi + (ml −mk)− a
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5.C.2 Proof of equation (5.4)
The consumer observes pi and Di so she knows p
REC
k with certainty:
pRECk = pi +Di
But because the consumer is also knowledgeable of the margins of both refin-
ers, i.e. mk and ml, she can also deduce the recommended price of major l:
pRECl = z +ml = p
REC
k −mk +ml = pi +Di + (ml −mk) (5.C.2)
where in the first two steps we use equation (5.1). Finally, using equa-
tions (5.C.1) and (5.C.2), the expected price of station j conditional on pi
and Di can be written as follows:
E[pj |pi, Di, µz,mk,ml, d¯] = E[pi +Di + (ml −mk)− (dj − εpj )|pi, Di, . . . ]
= pi +Di + (ml −mk)− E[dj − εpj |pi, Di, . . . ]
= pRECl − d¯

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5.C.3 Proof of equation (5.5)
Using equations (5.3) and (5.4), we can express the difference between the
two conditional expectations as follows:
∆E ≡ E[pj |pi, Di, µz,mk,ml, d¯]− E[pj |pi, µz,mk,ml, d¯] (5.C.3)
= (pRECl − d¯)−
[
pi + (ml −mk)− a
(












. Note that combining (5.1) and (5.2∗) yields
pi = p
REC
k −Di = z +mk −Di (5.C.4)
Then by using equations (5.C.2) and (5.C.4) we rewrite (5.C.3) as follows:
∆E = (pi +Di + (ml −mk)− d¯)
−
[
pi + (ml −mk)− a
(
z +mk −Di − (µz +mk − d¯)
)]
= Di − d¯+ a(d¯−Di + z − µz)
= (Di − d¯)(1− a) + a(z − µz) > 0







Di − d¯+ a





(z − µz) > 0.

5.D Solutions of the subgames in the pricing stage
of Section 5.3.2
In each case, we assume that the firms use a mixed-strategy equilibrium with
a continuous distribution whose support is a connected subset of the real line.
Standard arguments can be used to show that there cannot be holes in the
support and that there are no atoms in the distribution.
5.D.1 Symmetric case 2: Both firms offer a discount on the
same day
First, note that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Both firms want
to undercut and gain the searchers or charge p = 1 and earn the max-min
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profit Πi = 1 − β where β = pi11. Observe that α1 = α2 = α because both
firms announce discounts, therefore α = 12 [1 − pi11] = 12 [1 − β]. Since both
firms are symmetric, we look for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where
firms choose prices from identical distributions defined on the same support.
Irrespectively of the price, each firm always sells to its loyal consumers
on both days. Moreover, if firm i charges a lower price than firm j (including
the discount) then firm i also sells to the searchers. Therefore, we can write
the expected profit for firm i if it sets price p as follows:
E[Πi] = αp+ β Pr(p < pj)pi + α(p− δ) + β Pr(p− δ < pj − δ)(p− δ)
= α(2p− δ) + β[1− Fj(p)](2p− δ)
= (α+ β)(2p− δ)− β(2p− δ)Fj(p)
Suppose pi ∈ [p¯i, 1]. For pi = 1:
Πi(1) = α+ α(1− δ) = α(2− δ)
Hence for any pi < 1 the expected profit must be equal to the profit Πi(1),
i.e.
(α+ β)(2p− δ)− β(2p− δ)Fj(p) = α(2− δ)
which yields
Fj(p) =
(α+ β)(2p− δ)− α(2− δ)
β(2p− δ) (5.D.1)
Because firms do not charge lower prices than p¯i, Pr(pi < p¯i) = 0. Setting





















offs are Πi = α(2 − δ). Note that the payoffs are strictly decreasing in δ,
hence firms are better off when the discount is lower.
5.D.2 Symmetric case 3: Both firms offer a discount on dif-
ferent days
If firms offer a discount on different days, the shares of loyal and searching
consumers are the same as in the proof above. The expected profit of firm i
when it sets price p is given as follows:
E[Πi] = αp+ β Pr(p < pj − δ)p+ α(p− δ) + β Pr(p− δ < pj)(p− δ)
= α(2p− δ) + β[1− Fj(p+ δ)]p+ β[1− Fj(p− δ)](p− δ)
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Note that the argument of the cdf is either p + δ or p − δ. To be able to
solve for the equilibrium, we postulate that the support has length 2δ. This
guess turns out to be correct if we make some additional assumptions on the
parameter values. First, we solve for Fj , then we discuss the condition on the
parameter values.
Suppose that p ∈ [p¯i − δ, p¯i + δ]. Note that Fi(p¯i − δ) = 0, Fi(p¯i + δ) = 1.
Therefore we have
Πi(p¯i) = α(2p¯i − δ) + β(p¯i − δ)
= p¯i − (α+ β)δ
This is the equilibrium profit where the value of p¯i is yet to be determined.
Suppose p ≥ p¯i so that Fj(p+ δ) = 1. Then the following must hold:
E[Πi] = α(2p− δ) + β[1− Fj(p− δ)](p− δ) = p¯i − (α+ β)δ (5.D.2)
After replacing the share of loyals α by 12 [1 − β] and some manipulation,
(5.D.2) yields Fj(p− δ) = p−p¯iβ(p−δ) where p ∈ [p¯i, p¯i + δ]. This cdf is equivalent
to
F bi (p) =
p− (p¯i − δ)
βp
(5.D.3)
where p ∈ [p¯i − δ, p¯i]. Note that F bi (p¯i − δ) = 0.
Suppose p ≤ p¯i so that Fj(pi − δ) = 0. Then the following holds in
equilibrium:
E[Πi] = α(2p− δ) + β[1− Fj(p+ δ)]p+ β(p− δ) = p¯i − (α+ β)δ (5.D.4)
By using α = 12 [1 − β] and reorganizing (5.D.4), one obtains Fj(p + δ) =
(1+β)p−p¯i
βp where p ∈ [p¯i − δ, p¯i], which is equivalent to
F ti (p) =
(1 + β)(p− δ)− p¯i
β(p− δ) (5.D.5)
where p ∈ [p¯i, p¯i + δ]. Note that F ti (p¯i + δ) = 1.
In order for the cdf to be continuous, the following equation has to be
satisfied:






β(p¯i − δ)− δ
β(p¯i − δ) (5.D.6)
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For the lower bound of the cdf support to be non-negative, p¯i ≥ δ. Therefore,
equation (5.D.6) has a single solution:
p¯i =


























Note that the equilibrium profit of both firms is strictly increasing in δ,
however for the upper bound the following must hold p¯i + δ ≤ 1. Therefore,
the bonus discount must satisfy the following in equilibrium:
δ ≤ 2β
2 + 3β +
√
4 + β2
Finally, straightforward but tedious calculations show that the profit of
the firm is lower than the equilibrium profit when a price outside of the
support is chosen.
5.E Additional tables
Table 5.E.1: Sign distribution of the differences between prices and




− 0 (0.0%) 46 (15.1%) 258 (84.9%)
0 70 (18.3%) 218 (57.1%) 94 (24.6%)
+ 605 (91.8%) 48 (7.3%) 6 (0.9%)
Notes: Sample: 2008–2013. The differences in discounts would perfectly in-
dicate the differences in prices if all off-antidiagonal elements were zeros.
Chapter 6
Summary and conclusions
This thesis aims to improve the understanding of retail gasoline pricing in
particular and of competitive pricing in general. Using a detailed price dataset
from the Dutch retail gasoline market, we analyze competitive forces, con-
sumer search, vertical relations, and price framing strategies which are all
affected by the increasing automation of this sector. First, this thesis looks
at the direct and spillover price effects of transforming stations from manned
to unmanned, i.e. reducing firm’s costs. Then it demonstrates the impor-
tance of consumers’ risk as well as loss aversion when they search for lower
prices. We also present new empirical evidence in order to better understand
the phenomenon of retail price recommendations (RPRs), and finally, discuss
how discounts rather than prices can be used by consumers and firms alike.
This chapter offers an overview of the findings of this thesis. In Section 6.1,
I summarize the results achieved in five previous chapters. Section 6.2 con-
cludes by drawing the main lessons of this thesis, pointing out the limitations
of my work, and proposing areas worth of future investigation.
6.1 Summary
In Chapter 1, I emphasize that over the years retail gasoline pricing received
a great deal of attention from academia. Empirical research on gasoline retail-
ing advanced as a result of major developments in data availability: The in-
creased volume, frequency, as well as variety and coverage of the data opened
new possibilities for more in-depth studies of retail gasoline markets. In the
last 5 years, 82% of the datasets used to study retail gasoline prices included
more than 10 000 observations while nearly one third exceeded 1 million.
The increased volume is a direct effect of the higher frequency at which the
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data arrive. Atkinson (2008) notes that daily data from price comparison
websites are sufficient to analyze general trends at major-brand stations but
more detailed analyses may require hourly data with higher market cover-
age. These qualities of the data significantly contribute towards this thesis.
I exploit high market coverage (>85%) of the daily dataset in studying the
effects of the proliferation of unmanned stations (Chapter 2) and discount
competition (Chapter 5) whereas hourly data prove to be vital in explain-
ing why retail prices respond quicker to positive than to negative changes in
RPRs (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 focuses on the trend of increased unmanned gasoline retailing.
Using Dutch retail gasoline price data, this chapter shows that prices at
converted sites have decreased with e0.03-0.04/liter, which is economically
significant given an estimated gross retail margin of e0.19/liter. Moreover,
we find evidence of positive spillover effects to neighboring sites. The largest
spillover effect of roughly e0.01/liter is on the unmanned major-branded
rivals. The analysis also shows that manned competitors take the reduction
in quality at unmanned sites into account: The spillover effects on prices
of higher-quality firms are smaller but positive and statistically significant.
This indicates that the pass-through of realized cost reductions is the prime
force driving the observed lower price levels at transformed stations, not a
deterioration in perceived product quality.
By means of an event study analysis, we investigate the exact timing of
the direct and spillover effects. The adjustment of prices at stations which
transform to unmanned is immediate. This contrasts the gradual adjustment
to lower prices when a station changes its brand from major to non-major. To
emphasize the robustness of the direct effects, we opt for a method generating
rather conservative (i.e. large) standard errors. As a consequence, the event
study analysis indicates that spillover effects are insignificant. However, if
one only looks at the mean of the latter, the price adjustment of rivals also
seems to be immediate.
Because consumer search is typical for retail gasoline markets, Chapter 3
studies the effects of different consumer risk attitudes on search behavior.
In particular, it analyzes how in a problem of sequential search with cost-
less recall the relation between the consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for
continued search and the level of price uncertainty depends on her risk pref-
erences. Taking the average equilibrium price as given, we demonstrate how
a change in price variance affects the stopping rules of searching consumers
who are either risk neutral, risk averse, or loss averse. Independent of the cur-
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rent best price, an increase in price uncertainty encourages continued search
when consumers are risk neutral. However, we prove that theory predicts an
inversion when consumers are either risk or loss averse. In those cases, an
increase in price uncertainty only increases the WTP for continued search if
the current best price is sufficiently low.
We subsequently use this observation in an empirical test to identify be-
tween different risk preferences in a stylized problem of sequential search.
In line with the inversion, we find that a reduction in price uncertainty de-
creases the WTP for continued search when the current best price is low but
increases the WTP when it is high. While at odds with the assumption of
risk neutrality, this finding is consistent with models of consumer risk and/or
loss aversion. In addition, the model parameters of risk and loss aversion that
lead to the best empirical fit have values similar to those estimated for other
decision domains.
Chapter 4 attempts to improve our understanding of the role of RPRs.
Recently, a number of theoretical models have been proposed to achieve this
goal but none of them received a close attention from empirical economists.
One of the main empirical implications suggests that when manufacturer uses
the RPRs to maximize the joint profit of the vertical chain, the retailer will
set his price equal to RPR (see Puppe and Rosenkranz, 2011, and Buehler
and Ga¨rtner, 2013). The results show that in general few firms charge RPRs
as the theory proposes: While highway stations set prices equal to RPRs
65% of the time, non-highway sites do so in only 9% of the cases. However,
even for highway stations this explanation is not relevant as the majority of
highway outlets are owned by manufacturers and therefore do not face the
double-marginalization problem. Chapter 4 proposes that RPRs can actually
inform consumers about changes in marginal costs: In line with Lubensky’s
(2013) theory, RPRs follow the marginal cost changes closer than retail prices
do. Finally, we find evidence that the retail price response to RPR changes
is asymmetric on the day of the shock, i.e. retail prices accommodate the
increases of RPRs faster than the decreases. Hourly retail gasoline price data
show that prices tend to increase early in the morning and decrease around
lunch even if RPRs are constant. This explains a previously undocumented
intra-day retail price response asymmetry with respect to changes in RPRs.
Finally, Chapter 5 investigates why and how in markets with frequently
changing baseline prices, firms use discounts off a reference price. We first
show how the use of a discount frame enables firms to signal market con-
ditions, a feature that is particularly attractive to firms at the lower end
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of the price distribution. Gasoline retailing is a prime example of a market
with continuously fluctuating prices. We illustrate our theory with extensive
data of the Dutch market where indeed the lower-priced unmanned outlets
announce discounts (relative to RPRs) alongside the actual price.
Another phenomenon in this market is that firms publicly announce and
commit to offer weekly bonus discounts on top of baseline discounts. Build-
ing upon the price-frame competition model of Spiegler (2011), we present a
theory of such discount competition. We extend the original model by intro-
ducing a two-period setting and an option to offer a bonus discount from the
regular price in one of two periods. Our model predicts that the leader will
always announce a bonus-discount day and the follower will choose to offer
bonus discount on a different weekday if the level of bonus discounts is suf-
ficiently high. An empirical test provides strong support for this hypothesis.
However, if a station belongs to a large chain of unmanned retailers then the
brand-level strategy rather the size of competitor’s bonus discount will play
a more significant role in the choice of the bonus-discount day.
6.2 Conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for
further research
This thesis proposes a couple of general policy implications. Our results sug-
gest that automation of retail sector can significantly benefit consumers and
intensify competition. From a competitive point of view, retail market au-
tomation may reduce the service quality and potentially increase product
differentiation and hence rivals’ prices. Nevertheless, this effect appears to be
dominated by a substantial drop in costs so prices decrease at the automated
outlets as well as their direct competitors.
In general, consumer search is a costly and socially wasteful activity. This
thesis theoretically and empirically demonstrates that displaying discounts
which inform consumers about price distribution leads to less search and ben-
efits the society. The results show that RPRs may communicate marginal cost
fluctuations to consumers and allow firms to establish informative discounts.
Although if advertised by expensive firms discounts induce risk- and/or loss-
averse consumers to search more, this mechanism ensures that this will not
occur in equilibrium. Our findings support this claim as we do not observe
expensive gasoline retailers revealing discounts relative to RPRs. Therefore,
competition authorities can regard discounts as a welfare-improving practice
because they reduce prices as well as consumer search.
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This thesis also teaches us several lessons about retail gasoline pricing and
responds to a few questions regarding this topic which have circulated in the
media. First of all, I would like to return to the discussion on the effects of the
growing unmanned retail gasoline sector. A popular view by market players in
the Dutch market is that unmanned gasoline stations make the competition
for manned sites unbearable (TankPro, 2014b). In contrast to this opinion,
our results show that when a local competitor becomes unmanned, on aver-
age manned retailers lower their prices less than the unmanned ones. This
suggests that manned stations could use their full potential by lowering retail
prices further to increase revenues from fuel, and therefore shop attendance,
in order to make profits from the grocery sales (TankPro, 2014a).
Second, we can also argue that discounts in the Dutch retail gasoline
market are not merely a bait to attract consumers (Consumentenbond, 2014).
Because RPRs of different manufacturers fluctuate close to one another and
discounts are fairly constant (with an exception of bonus-discount days),
in the vast majority of cases a larger discount implies a lower (or at least
equal) retail price. Therefore, consumers can use discounts rather than prices
to design simple search strategies in order to save on fuel expenditures and
search costs. In addition, since bonus discounts are announced in advance and
major unmanned retailers have different bonus-discount days, price sensitive
consumers can benefit by timing their fuel-ups accordingly.
Third, we claim that lower-priced gasoline retailers can credibly inform
consumers about their position relative to rivals’ prices by displaying dis-
counts. Without a reference point, it is complicated for the consumer to eval-
uate if an observed price is high or low because the price uncertainty has two
underlying components. Within-firm price variation is caused by crude oil
price fluctuations whereas prices vary between firms due to different station-
specific and local market characteristics. Announcing a discount (which al-
lows consumers to learn the RPR) seems to lower the price uncertainty by
providing consumers a reference which signals the level of marginal costs.
In addition, lower price uncertainty reduces the expected gains of continued
search so consumers are less likely to search further. However, as Chapter 3
demonstrates if consumers are risk or loss averse then this strategy is only
optimal for on-average cheaper firms. More expensive outlets are better off
hiding their discounts: If the consumer observes a relatively high price then
more certainty lowers the risk of encountering an even larger price and hence
makes searching more attractive.1
1Interestingly, in contrast to the latter argument a well-known low-cost retailer Ama-
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This discussion has its limitations because we assume that the change
in price uncertainty and the price distribution itself are exogenous. To draw
more robust conclusions, one should endogenize the choice of reducing price
uncertainty and the price setting. For example, announcing a discount off
the RPR is likely to reduce price uncertainty and to discourage consumers
from continuing search after observing a relatively low price. However, this
might induce cheaper firms to reduce their prices even further in order to
be more attractive to searchers. Consequently, a change in price uncertainty
may affect the average price as well. In fact, Janssen et al. (2011) show that
reducing cost uncertainty for consumers leads to lower prices. If the same
holds when the price uncertainty decreases is yet to be discovered.
Further contributions are also necessary in studying the role of RPRs.
The empirical analysis of RPRs in the retail gasoline sector identified a so
far theoretically unexplored question: How does the manufacturer use his
RPR to communicate cost and demand changes to his retailers serving two
separated local markets subject to different levels in competition? Buehler
and Ga¨rtner (2013) thoughtfully present how the manufacturer uses RPRs
to coordinate actions with a single monopolist retailer. Their work calls for
an extension to better explain the role of RPRs in settings where multiple
retailers serve different local markets and face competition. The examples of
such industries include gasoline, car, and electronic device retailing.
To conclude, I would like to emphasize the importance of data quality
for the future of empirical research on gasoline retailing. The majority of the
questions in this thesis, e.g. regarding the significance of discounts and/or the
relation between retail prices and RPRs, would not have been answered if we
did not have a detailed dataset at hand. This shows that further advance-
ments in this field are possible by focusing on more data-intense projects.
As our explorations using hourly data demonstrate exploiting, for example,
a combination of real-time retail price and traffic flow data may provide new
knowledge on intra-day pricing and lead firms to adopt even more sophisti-
cated strategies.
zon has recently decided to stop showing discounts relative to list prices. Another low-cost
retailer JCPenney’s reintroduced RPRs and discounts after their stock prices dropped by
more than 67% following the removal of discounts relative to RPRs. The cheapest gaso-
line stations in the Netherlands also display their discounts on large price boards. This
illustrates the importance of discounts to low-price retailers in effectively signaling their
position compared to competitors. Visit https://hbr.org/2016/07/what-amazon-risks
-by-eliminating-list-prices for more details on the use of RPRs by Amazon.
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Door een aanzienlijke toename in de kwaliteit en beschikbaarheid van onder-
zoeksgegevens hebben onderzoekers in de afgelopen tien jaar benzinemarkten
in meer detail kunnen bestuderen dan ooit tevoren. Economen hebben zich
gericht op verschillende onderwerpen, varie¨rend van het analyseren en ver-
klaren van de aanzienlijke prijsverschillen die, ondanks de homogeniteit van
het product toch bestaan, tot het bestuderen van de specifieke kenmerken
van prijscycli. Desondanks zijn een aantal vragen onbeantwoord gebleven,
onder meer door het ontbreken van geschikte onderzoeksgegevens. Deze vra-
gen varie¨ren van de effecten van het toegenomen aantal onbemande stations
op mededinging, via de relatie tussen de risicohouding en het zoekgedrag van
consumenten, tot de rol van adviesprijzen en kortingen in markten met aan-
zienlijke intratemporele prijsonzekerheid. Dit proefschrift stelt zich als doel
deze kloof in de empirische literatuur te dichten door te kijken naar de struc-
turele veranderingen in de concurrentie en de prijsonzekerheid in deze markt,
en door gebruik te maken van rijke data. Meer in het algemeen richt het proef-
schrift zich op het bestuderen van concurrentieverhoudingen in verkoopprij-
zen, het zoekgedrag van risicomijdende en verliesmijdende consumenten en
het framen van prijzen via kortingen.
Overzicht
Hoofdstuk 1 constateert dat benzineprijzen recent veel aandacht hebben ge-
kregen binnen de academische literatuur. De toegenomen hoeveelheid, fre-
quentie, varie¨teit en dekking van onderzoekgegevens hebben nieuwe moge-
lijkheden geopend voor meer gedetailleerde empirische studies over de consu-
mentenbenzinemarkt. In de afgelopen 5 jaar omvatte 82% van de gebruikte
datasets over benzineprijzen meer dan 10 000 waarnemingen, terwijl bijna
een derde zelfs meer dan 1 miljoen waarnemingen bevatte. Deze toename is
een direct gevolg van de hogere frequentie waarmee geschikte onderzoeks-
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gegevens beschikbaar worden gesteld. Atkinson (2008) merkt op dat de da-
gelijkse prijzen van prijsvergelijkingswebsites voldoende zijn om algemene
trends te analyseren bij stations van bekende merken. Echter, meer gedetail-
leerde analyses hebben uurgegevens nodig met een hoge marktdekking. Dit
proefschrift maakt gebruik van zulke gedetailleerde gegevens. Ik gebruik van
onderzoeksgegevens op dagbasis over een groot deel van de markt (>85%)
om de effecten van de snelle toename van onbemande stations (Hoofdstuk 2)
en het effect van concurrentie op kortingen (Hoofdstuk 5) te onderzoeken,
terwijl uurgegevens essentieel blijken om te verklaren waarom verkoopprij-
zen sneller aangepast worden bij positieve dan bij negatieve veranderingen in
de adviesprijzen (Hoofdstuk 4).
In de afgelopen 10 jaar is een groot deel van de benzinestations in West en
Noord Europa omgebouwd tot onbemande stations. Ondanks de toenemende
populariteit van onbemande stations zijn de gevolgen van deze structurele
verandering nog niet gekwantificeerd. Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert deze vraag.
Met behulp van Nederlandse gegevens toont dit hoofdstuk aan dat de prijzen
bij omgezette benzinestations met 0.03-0.04 EUR/liter zijn gedaald. Afgezet
tegen een geschatte bruto verkoop marge van 0.19 EUR/liter is deze da-
ling economisch significant. Bovendien vinden we bewijs van positieve over-
loopeffecten op nabij gelegen stations. Het grootste overloopeffect van circa
0.01 EUR/liter wordt gevonden bij onbemande stations van bekende, con-
currerende merken. De analyse laat ook zien dat bemande stations rekening
houden met de kwaliteitsvermindering bij onbemande stations: de overloop-
effecten op de prijzen van bedrijven die hogere kwaliteit bieden zijn kleiner,
maar positief en statistisch significant. Dit geeft aan dat de belangrijkste
oorzaak van de waargenomen prijsdalingen bij omgezette stations de doorbe-
rekening van de gerealiseerde kostenbesparingen is, en niet de verlaging van
de waargenomen kwaliteit van het product.
Door middel van een event study hebben we de exacte timing van directe
effecten en overloopeffecten onderzocht. De prijsaanpassingen bij stations die
zijn omgebouwd tot onbemande stations vinden onmiddellijk plaats. Dit is
in tegenstelling tot de meer geleidelijke prijsdalingen wanneer een station
met een bekend merk wordt omgezet naar een station met een onbekend
merk. Om de robuustheid van de directe effecten te waarborgen hebben we
gekozen voor een methode die conservatieve (d.w.z. grote) standaardfouten
genereert. Als gevolg daarvan geeft de event study aan dat de spillovereffecten
verwaarloosbaar zijn. Echter, als men alleen kijkt naar het gemiddelde van de
laatste methode, dan blijkt dat de prijsaanpassingen van concurrenten ook
onmiddellijk plaatsvinden.
Zoekgedrag is typerend voor consumenten op de benzinemarkt. Een on-
derzoek van de ANWB toont aan dat twee van de drie automobilisten bereid
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zijn een paar kilometer om te rijden om te besparen.1 Naast het zoekgedrag
van consumenten wordt de markt ook gekenmerkt door prijsonzekerheid die
voortvloeit uit de prijsschommelingen van ruwe olie. Om de wisselwerking
tussen deze twee fenomenen in kaart te brengen, onderzoeken we hoe veran-
deringen in prijsonzekerheid het zoekgedrag van consumenten be¨ınvloedt. In
het bijzonder hebben we onderzocht wat hierin de rol is van risico- en ver-
liesaversie. Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert hoe, voor een consument die zoekt naar
een lage prijs, haar risicovoorkeuren invloed hebben op de relatie tussen de
bereidheid om te betalen voor een voortzetting van de zoektocht, en de mate
van prijsonzekerheid . Voor een bepaalde gemiddelde prijs laten we zien hoe
een verandering in prijsvariatie van invloed is op het besluit om te stop-
pen met zoeken voor consumenten die ofwel risiconeutraal, risicomijdend of
verliesmijdend zijn. Bij risiconeutrale consumenten leidt een stijging in de
prijsonzekerheid tot een voortzetting van de zoektocht, onafhankelijk van de
beste prijs die tot dan toe is gevonden. We tonen echter aan dat dat niet
langer het geval is wanneer consumenten risico- of verliesmijdend zijn. In die
gevallen leidt een stijging in prijsonzekerheid alleen tot een stijging van de
betalingsbereidheid om verder te zoeken, als de beste prijs tot dan toe laag
genoeg is.
Vervolgens gebruiken we deze waarneming in een empirische test om ver-
schillen te identificeren tussen de verschillende risicovoorkeuren in een ge-
stileerd sequentie¨le zoekprobleem. In lijn met bovenstaande vinden we dat
een verlaging van de prijsonzekerheid de betalingsbereidheid om verder te
zoeken vermindert wanneer de beste prijs tot dan toe laag is, maar dat de
betalingsbereidheid hoog is als de beste prijs tot dan toe hoog is. Alhoewel in
tegenspraak met de aanname van risiconeutraliteit, is deze bevinding consis-
tent met risico- en/of verliesmijdend gedrag. Bovendien blijkt dat de model-
parameters van risico- en verliesmijdend gedrag die tot de beste empirische
fit leiden, vergelijkbare waarden hebben als in andere beslissingsdomeinen.
Hoofdstuk 4 probeert een bijdrage te leveren aan het begrip van de rol van
adviesprijzen in consumentenmarkten. Hoewel adviesprijzen voorkomen in
vele bedrijfstakken (benzine, auto’s, elektronische apparatuur, boeken, etc.),
is dit verschijnsel geen populair onderwerp onder economen. Onlangs zijn
een aantal theoretische modellen voorgesteld om de rol van adviesprijzen te
verklaren, maar geen van hen heeft veel aandacht gekregen van empirische
economen. Hoofdstuk 4 identificeert hoe theoretische hypotheses te vertalen
zijn naar toetsbare hypotheses voor de Nederlandse benzineverkoopmarkt
waar fabrikanten publiekelijk adviesprijzen aankondigen.
Een van de belangrijkste empirische implicaties suggereert dat wanneer
1Bron: www.anwb.nl/auto/nieuws/2015/augustus/nederlanders-rijden-om-voor
-benzine.
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fabrikanten adviesprijzen gebruiken om de gezamenlijke winst van de verti-
cale keten te maximaliseren, de winkelier zijn prijs gelijk zal stellen aan de
adviesprijs (zie Puppe en Rosenkranz, 2011, en Buehler en Ga¨rtner, 2013).
De resultaten tonen echter aan dat weinig bedrijven adviesprijzen hanteren
die in lijn zijn met de theorie: terwijl snelwegstations in 65% van de geval-
len hun prijzen gelijk stellen aan de adviesprijzen, doen niet-snelwegstations
dit slechts in 9% van de gevallen. Toch is zelfs voor snelwegstations deze
verklaring niet relevant omdat de meerderheid van de snelwegverkooppunten
eigendom is van fabrikanten. Hierdoor worden zij niet geconfronteerd met het
dubbele marginalisatieprobleem. Hoofdstuk 4 stelt dat adviesprijzen kunnen
worden gebruikt om consumenten te informeren over veranderingen in mar-
ginale kosten: in lijn met Lubensky’s (2013) theorie blijkt dat adviesprijzen
veranderingen in marginale kosten nauwkeuriger volgen dan verkoopprijzen.
Tot slot vinden we bewijs dat de reactie van verkoopprijs op veranderingen
in de adviesprijs asymmetrisch is op de dag van de schok, dat wil zeggen
dat verkoopprijzen sneller aangepast worden als adviesprijzen toenemen, dan
wanneer ze afnemen. Benzineverkoopprijzen op uurbasis laten zien dat prij-
zen vroeg in de ochtend meestal toenemen en afnemen rond lunchtijd, zelfs
als adviesprijzen constant zijn. Dit verklaart een eerder niet gevonden asym-
metrie in reacties op intradag verkoopprijzen in relatie tot veranderingen in
adviesprijzen.
Tot slot onderzoekt Hoofdstuk 5 waarom en hoe in markten met fre-
quent veranderende basisprijzen bedrijven gebruik maken van kortingen op
een referentieprijs. Eerst tonen we aan hoe het gebruik van kortingen be-
drijven in staat stelt om impliciet marktomstandigheden te communiceren
aan consumenten, een functie die bijzonder aantrekkelijk is voor bedrijven
aan de onderkant van de prijsverdeling. Benzine is een goed voorbeeld van
een markt met frequent fluctuerende prijzen. We illustreren onze theorie met
behulp van uitgebreide gegevens van de Nederlandse markt, waar de lager
geprijsde onbemande verkooppunten inderdaad kortingen aankondigen (ten
opzichte van adviesprijzen), naast de actuele verkoopprijs.
Een ander fenomeen in deze markt is dat bedrijven wekelijkse bonuskor-
tingen bovenop de basiskortingen publiekelijk aankondigen. Voortbouwend
op het price-frame competition model van Spiegler (2011), wordt een theorie
gepresenteerd voor zulke concurrentie-in-korting. We breiden het oorspron-
kelijke model uit door een setting met twee periodes te introduceren met de
optie om een bonuskorting aan te bieden bovenop de reguliere prijs in een van
de twee periodes. Het model voorspelt dat de marktleider een bonuskorting-
dag altijd zal aankondigen en dat de volger ervoor zal kiezen om een bonus-
kortingdag aan te bieden op een andere dag van de week, mits het niveau van
de bonuskorting voldoende hoog is. Een empirische test levert sterk bewijs
voor deze hypothese. Als een benzinestation echter deel uitmaakt van een
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grote keten van onbemande retailers, dan speelt de strategie op merkniveau
een belangrijkere rol dan de hoogte van de bonuskorting van de concurrent
bij de keuze voor een bonuskortingdag.
Conclusies, beperkingen en suggesties voor verder
onderzoek
Dit proefschrift bevat een aantal algemene beleidsimplicaties. Onze resulta-
ten suggereren dat consumenten kunnen profiteren van de automatisering
van de detailhandelsector en de intensivering van de concurrentie. Vanuit
een concurrentie-oogpunt kan de automatisering van de detailhandelmarkt
de servicekwaliteit verlagen, maar ook zorgen voor een toename in product-
differentiatie en dus in de prijzen van concurrenten. Toch lijken deze effecten
gedomineerd te worden door een aanzienlijke daling van de kosten waardoor
prijzen dalen bij zowel geautomatiseerde outlets als bij hun directe concur-
renten.
In het algemeen is het zoeken door consumenten een kostbare en sociaal
verspillende activiteit. Dit proefschrift toont theoretisch en empirisch aan dat
het weergeven van kortingen die consumenten informeren over de prijsverde-
ling tot minder zoekgedrag van consumenten leidt en een welvaartsverhogend
effect heeft. De resultaten tonen aan dat adviesprijzen schommelingen in de
marginale kosten kunnen communiceren aan consumenten. Hoewel kortingen
geadverteerd door dure bedrijven ervoor zorgen dat risico- en/of verliesmij-
dende consumenten juist meer gaan zoeken, zorgt dit mechanisme ervoor dat
dit niet zal gebeuren in het evenwicht. Onze resultaten ondersteunen deze be-
wering aangezien we niet zien dat dure benzineretailers kortingen geven ten
opzichte van adviesprijzen. Daarom kunnen mededingingsautoriteiten kortin-
gen beschouwen als een middel dat de welvaart verhoogt omdat ze leiden tot
lagere prijzen, en het zoeken door consumenten verminderen.
Dit proefschrift geeft ook nieuwe inzichten over de concurrentie tussen
benzinestations als gevolg van enkele vragen over dit onderwerp die zijn ver-
spreid in de Nederlandse media. Ten eerste wil ik graag de discussie over
de effecten van het groeiende aantal onbemande benzinestations aankaar-
ten. Een populaire visie onder marktpartijen in de Nederlandse markt is dat
onbemande benzinestations de competitie voor bemande stations ondraag-
lijk maakt (TankPro, 2014b). Onze resultaten laten echter zien dat wanneer
een lokale concurrent kiest voor een onbemand station, de bemande stati-
ons hun prijzen, gemiddeld genomen, minder verlagen dan de onbemande
stations. Dit suggereert dat de bemande stations hun verkoopprijzen ver-
der kunnen verlagen om daarmee consumenten te lokken naar hun winkel
en zo extra inkomsten te genereren met de verkoop van supermarktartikelen
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(TankPro, 2014a).
Ten tweede kunnen we ook stellen dat kortingen in de Nederlandse benzi-
neverkoopmarkt niet slechts dienen als lokaas om consumenten aan te trekken
(Consumentenbond, 2014). Fluctuaties in de adviesprijzen van verschillende
fabrikanten liggen dicht bij elkaar en kortingen zijn vrij constant (met uitzon-
dering van de bonuskortingdag). Daarom impliceert een hogere korting in het
overgrote deel van de gevallen een lagere (of ten minste gelijke) verkoopprijs.
Zo kunnen consumenten kortingen in plaats van prijzen gebruiken om simpele
kostenbesparende zoekstrategiee¨n te ontwikkelen. Aangezien bonuskortingen
van te voren worden aangekondigd en bekende onbemande verkopers ver-
schillende bonuskortingsdagen hebben, kunnen prijsgevoelige consumenten
bovendien profiteren door hun tankbeurten hierop af te stemmen.
Ten derde betogen we dat goedkopere benzinestations op een geloofwaar-
dige manier hun consumenten kunnen informeren over hun positie ten op-
zichte van de concurrentie door het weergeven van kortingen. Zonder een
referentiepunt is het moeilijk voor de consument om te evalueren of een
waargenomen prijs hoog of laag is, vooral omdat de prijsonzekerheid twee
onderliggende componenten bevat. Prijsverschillen binnen bedrijven wordt
veroorzaakt door fluctuaties in de prijs van ruwe olie, terwijl prijsvariaties
tussen bedrijven fluctueren als gevolg van verschillen in stationspecifieke en
lokale marktkenmerken. Het aankondigen van een korting (waardoor consu-
menten de adviesprijs kunnen herleiden) verlaagt de prijsonzekerheid voor
consumenten door een referentiepunt te geven dat het niveau van de margi-
nale kosten aangeeft. Bovendien verlaagt een lagere prijsonzekerheid de ver-
wachte opbrengst van verder zoeken zodat consumenten eerder zullen stoppen
met zoeken. Echter, zoals Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien, als consumenten risico- of
verliesmijdend zijn dan is deze strategie alleen optimaal voor bedrijven die
gemiddeld genomen goedkoper zijn. Duurdere verkooppunten zijn dan be-
ter af door hun korting te verbergen: Als een consument een relatief hoge
prijs waarneemt, dan verlaagt een hogere prijszekerheid het risico om een
nog hogere prijs tegen te komen wat het zoeken meer aantrekkelijk maakt.2
Bovenstaande veronderstelt dat de verandering in prijsonzekerheid en in
de prijsverdeling zelf exogeen zijn. Om meer robuuste conclusies te kunnen
2Interessant is dat in tegenstelling tot het laatste argument de bekende low-cost re-
tailer Amazon er onlangs voor heft gekozen om te stoppen met het tonen van kortingen
ten opzichte van de catalogusprijzen. Een andere low-cost retailer, JCPenney’s, voerde ad-
viesprijzen and kortingen opnieuw in nadat de prijzen van hun aandelen met meer dan
67% waren gedaald als gevolg van het afschaffen van kortingen ten opzicht van advies-
prijzen. De goedkoopste benzinestations in Nederland tonen hun kortingen ook op grote
prijsborden. Dit illustreert het belang van kortingen voor low-price retailers om effectief hun
positie ten opzichte van concurrenten te signaleren. Kijk op https://hbr.org/2016/07/
what-amazon-risks-by-eliminating-list-prices voor meer informatie over het gebruik
van adviesprijzen door Amazon.
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trekken, zou men de keuze om prijsonzekerheid te reduceren of om de prijs
vast te stellen moeten endogeniseren. Bijvoorbeeld, het aankondigen van een
korting op de adviesprijs verlaagt waarschijnlijk de prijsonzekerheid en ont-
moedigt consumenten om verder te zoeken nadat zij een relatief lage prijs
hebben gevonden. Dit kan er echter toe leiden dat goedkopere bedrijven hun
prijzen nog lager zetten om zo aantrekkelijker te zijn voor zoekende consu-
menten. Bijgevolg kan een verandering in de prijsonzekerheid ook van invloed
zijn op de gemiddelde prijs. In feite laten Janssen et al. (2011) zien dat het
verminderen van de kostenonzekerheid voor lagere prijzen voor consumen-
ten zorgt. Of hetzelfde geldt wanneer de prijsonzekerheid afneemt moet nog
worden bezien.
Verder onderzoek is ook noodzakelijk in het bestuderen van de rol van
adviesprijzen. De empirische analyse van adviesprijzen in de consumenten-
benzinemarkt suggereert bijvoorbeeld de vraag hoe de fabrikant de advies-
prijs gebruikt om veranderingen in kosten en vraag te communiceren aan zijn
verkopers op twee gescheiden lokale markten die onderhevig zijn aan verschil-
lende niveaus van concurrentie. Buehler en Ga¨rtner (2013) laten zien hoe de
fabrikant adviesprijzen gebruikt om acties te coo¨rdineren met een enkele mo-
nopolistische verkoper. Hun werk vraagt om een uitbreiding om de rol van
adviesprijzen beter te begrijpen in een setting waar meerdere verkopers te
maken hebben met verschillende lokale markten en concurrenten. Voorbeel-
den van zulke industrien zijn de benzine-, auto-, en witgoed-detailhandel.
Tot slot wil ik het belang van datakwaliteit benadrukken voor de toekomst
van empirisch onderzoek in de benzinemarkt. Het merendeel van de vragen
in dit proefschrift, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot het belang van kortingen
en/of de relatie tussen verkoopprijzen en adviesprijzen, zouden niet beant-
woord kunnen worden zonder een gedetailleerde dataset. Hieruit blijkt dat
toekomstige vooruitgang op dit gebied mogelijk is door te focussen op meer
data-rijke projecten. Zoals onze verkenningen met behulp van uurgegevens
al suggereren kan het gebruik van bijvoorbeeld een combinatie van real-time
verkoopprijsgegevens en verkeerstroomgegevens nieuwe inzichten verschaffen
in de manier waarop prijzen in de loop van de dag worden aangepast.
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